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Abstract
The first chapter of this thesis, joint with Angela Abbate analyses the importance of the
risk-taking channel for monetary policy. To answer this question, we develop and estimate
a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments,
due to an agency problem which distorts banks’ incentives. As the real interest rate
declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases,
lowering the efficiency of investment. We show that this novel transmission channel gen-
erates a new and quantitatively significant monetary policy trade-off between inflation
and real interest rate stabilization: it is optimal for the central bank to tolerate greater
inflation volatility in exchange for lower risk taking.
The second chapter develops a quantitative model of sovereign default with endogenous
default costs to propose a novel answer to the question why governments repay their debt.
In the model domestic banks are exposed to sovereign debt. Hence sovereign default causes
large losses for the banks, which translate into a financial crisis. The government trades
these costs off against the advantage of not repaying international investors. Besides
replicating business cycle moments, the model is able to generate not only output costs of
a realistic magnitude, but also endogenously predicts that default is followed by a period
during which no new foreign lending takes place. The duration of this period matches
empirical estimates.
The third chapter outlines a method to reduce the computationally necessary state
space for solving dynamic models with global methods. The idea is to replace several
state variables by a summary state variable. This is made possible by anticipating future
choices that depend on one of the replaced variables. I explain how this method can be
applied to a simple portfolio choice problem.
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Chapter I
Monetary policy an the asset risk
taking channel
joint with Angela Abbate
1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has sparked a debate about the influence of monetary policy
on the risk-taking behaviour of the banking sector. A number of recent studies such as
Jimenez et al. (2014) show that low interest rates increase the risk appetite of banks,
creating an additional channel of monetary policy transmission, known as the risk-taking
channel.1 Though there has been much discussion of the risk-taking channel amongst
policy makers in recent years,2 its general-equilibrium and optimal monetary-policy im-
plications remain unclear. Answering these questions requires a quantitative model which
is consistent with both the evidence on the risk-taking channel and with conventional
views about monetary policy. Our contribution is to build and estimate a medium-scale
New Keynesian DSGE model, where monetary policy influences bank risk taking, which
in turn affects the real economy. Furthermore, we provide analytical results which show
how the inefficiency of risk taking depends on the volatility of the real interest rate, imply-
ing a motive for the policy maker to stabilize the real interest rate, at the cost of greater
inflation volatility. This constitutes a new trade-off that influences optimal monetary
policy in a quantitatively significant way.
In our model banks raise funds through deposit and equity, which they then use to in-
vest in risky capital projects. In particular, banks choose from a continuum of investment
projects, each defined by different risk-return characteristics. Every project has a certain
probability of being successful and yielding capital in the next period. However, the safer
the project, the lower the return in the event of success. As in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014),
we assume that depositors cannot observe the investment risk choice and that bank own-
ers are protected by limited liability. These two assumptions create an agency problem:
The authors would like to thank Arpad Abraham, Pelin Ilbas, Ester Faia, Stephane Moyen, Evi
Pappa, Raf Wouters, our colleagues at the Bundesbank, European University Institute and National
Bank of Belgium, as well as participants to the Applied Time Series Econometrics Workshop in St. Louis,
XX Workshop on Dynamic Macroecomics in Vigo and to the 6th Bundesbank-CFS-ECB Workshop on
Macro and Finance in Frankfurt for useful comments. We thank the NBB for funding Dominik Thaler’s
research stay in Brussels.
1This term was first used by Borio and Zhu (2008).
2See, for instance, New York Times, ’Fed officially concedes risk of low rates but signals no shift’,
11.10.2010, Financial Times, ’Draghi warns central banks against blind risk taking’, 14.5.2015, Bloomberg
Business, ’Carney says QE can encourage excessive risk taking in financial markets’, 25.1.2015.
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banks are partially isolated from the downside risk of their investment and choose a risk
level that is socially excessive.3 The agency problem could be mitigated if bankers held
more equity. Yet, banks rely on both types of funding because equity is relatively more
costly than deposits, as a result of deposit insurance and a friction in the equity market.
A lower risk-free rate increases the relative cost advantage of deposits. As a consequence,
banks respond by levering up and choosing riskier investment projects. This higher risk
implies a lower average efficiency of investment, which leads to a decline in the capital
stock. Our model hence generates a new transmission channel through which monetary
policy affects the real economy. This channel dampens the positive effects of expansion-
ary monetary policy, as reductions in the interest rate exacerbate the financial market
distortions and their implied inefficiency. We validate the quantitative implications of the
model by estimating it on US data. Posterior odds show that the inclusion of the risk-
taking channel improves the in-sample fit for nonfinancial variables. At the same time
our model predicts a path of risk taking that matches survey evidence on the riskiness of
newly issued loans from the Fed Survey of Terms of Business Lending.
We use the model to analyse the normative implications of the risk-taking channel,
and their quantitative importance in terms of consumer welfare. While in standard New
Keynesian models it is optimal for the central bank to stabilize inflation,4 the risk-taking
channel introduces a motive for real interest rate stabilization. We show theoretically
that the efficiency of the banks’ risk choice depends negatively on the volatility of the
real interest rate, thereby providing a motive for stabilizing the real interest rate. The
risk-taking channel therefore generates a new monetary policy trade-off, as this addi-
tional objective conflicts with inflation stabilization. Moreover, we show that this new
objective alters optimal policy in a quantitatively significant way. Using optimal simple
rules, we find that the central bank optimally accepts around 50% more inflation volatility
relative to the case without the channel, in return for a more stable real interest rate.
Furthermore, ignoring the risk-taking channel comes at a welfare cost equivalent to a
0.5-1.0% loss in lifetime consumption. These results contradict existing findings for other
general-equilibrium models with financial frictions such as De Fiore and Tristani (2013)
and Bernanke and Gertler (2001), where optimal policy remains close to full price stability
even if financial frictions are introduced. In particular, De Fiore and Tristani (2013) char-
acterize Ramsey policy in a small New Keynesian set-up with credit frictions, where firms
borrow in advance to pay wages, and where default risk and costly monitoring generate a
spread between the loan rate and the risk-free rate. The authors show that the presence of
credit frictions augments the otherwise standard second-order approximation of the wel-
fare function with one additional term: i.e. that interest-rate and credit-spread volatility
3By socially excessive we mean that it exceeds the risk level that would be chosen, if no friction were
present.
4Though in standard New Keynesian models a trade-off between output and inflation stabilization is
generated by cost push shocks, the relative importance of output stabilization is typically found to be
small.
2
directly influence welfare. However, this additional term is found to be quantitatively
small, so that optimal policy does not substantially deviate from price stability.
Our work relates to a growing theoretical literature that links monetary policy to
financial sector risk in a general-equilibrium framework. Yet, several features distinguish
our work from existing ones. First, motivated by the evidence reviewed above, it is the
first to explicitly model the effect of monetary policy on the riskiness of banks’ assets
and its macroeconomic effects. Second, we show theoretically how the risk-taking channel
generates a new significant trade-off for the monetary policy authority. Most of the
existing literature explores risk on the funding side of banks’ balance sheets, associating
risk with increased leverage. For instance, several models build on the financial accelerator
framework of Bernanke et al. (1999).5 The mechanism in these models relies on the buffer
role of equity, and therefore leverage is found to be counter-cyclical with respect to the
balance sheet size. Our model, by contrast, gives rise to pro-cyclical leverage, which is
in line with the empirical evidence reported in Adrian and Shin (2014) and Adrian et al.
(2015). Another example is Angeloni and Faia (2013) and Angeloni et al. (2015), where
lower interest rates translate into a higher bank leverage, and a higher fraction of inefficient
bank runs. Asset risk, on the other hand, has so far mainly been discussed in the literature
on optimal regulation such as Christensen et al. (2011) and Collard et al. (2012). In these
papers, however, either the depositors or the financial regulator ensure that risk is always
chosen optimally, so monetary policy has no influence on risk taking.6 In contrast to the
previous two papers, we provide micro-foundations for the asset risk-taking channel and
focus on monetary policy while abstracting from regulation.7
Our model of the asset risk-taking channel explains two stylized facts documented by
recent empirical evidence. First, low interest rates cause banks to make riskier invest-
ments. Using micro data from the Spanish Credit Register, Jimenez et al. (2014) find
that lower interest rates induce banks to make relatively more loans to firms that qualify
as risky ex ante as well as ex post.8 Second, the increase in risk taking is not fully com-
pensated for by higher risk premia, as shown by Buch et al. (2014) and Ioannidou et al.
(2014). As a consequence, the expected return on banks’ investment decreases, as risk
increases in response to lower interest rates. Moreover, the model posits that the bank
risk choice is determined by the level of leverage, rather than the quantity of loans: a
modelling choice which is in line with the findings of Ioannidou et al. (2014) and Jimenez
5For example, in Gertler et al. (2012) and de Groot (2014) a monetary expansion increases banking
sector leverage, which in turn amplifies the financial accelerator and strengthens the propagation of shocks
to the real economy.
6Both papers feature ad-hoc extensions that relate risk to the amount of lending and hence indirectly
to monetary policy.
7One could reinterpret our model as applying to an economy where regulation is unable to fully control
risk taking.
8This finding is confirmed by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2013), Angeloni et al. (2015), Afanasyeva and Guent-
ner (2015) and Buch et al. (2014) for the US and by Ioannidou et al. (2014) for Bolivia. We complement
these results in appendix D, where we show that further times series evidence on the risk-taking channel
for the US banking sector based on data from the terms of business lending survey.
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et al. (2014).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop a DSGE model of the asset
risk-taking channel. Section 3 presents the results from the estimation of the model and
discusses the dynamic implications of bank risk taking. Section 4 analyzes how monetary
policy should be conducted if the risk-taking channel is present, and Section 5 concludes.
2 A Dynamic New Keynesian model with a bank
risk-taking channel
We build a general-equilibrium model where competitive banks obtain funds from de-
positors and equity holders, and invest them into capital projects executed by capital
producers. Every bank chooses its investment from a continuum of technologies, each
defined by a given risk-return characteristic. The risk choice of the bank is distorted
by an agency problem and affected by the level of the real interest rate. This model
reproduces two features found in the data: risk taking depends on the contemporaneous
interest rate and is priced inefficiently. The real sector of the economy features otherwise
standard elements, which are therefore sketched only briefly here. More details on the
standard sectors and the complete set of equations characterizing the model can be found
in Appendix B.
2.1 Households
The representative household chooses consumption ct, working hours Lt and savings in
order to maximize its discounted lifetime utility. Saving is possible through three instru-
ments: government bonds st, which pay the safe gross nominal interest rate Rt, deposit
funds dt, and bank equity funds et. The two funds enable the household to invest into the
banking sector, and pay an uncertain nominal return of Rd,t+1 and Re,t+1.9 Maximization
of his lifetime utility (see Appendix B) yields the usual labour supply condition, the Euler
equation, and two no-arbitrage conditions:
Et
[
Λt+1
Rd,t+1
pit+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
pit+1
]
, (1)
Et
[
Λt+1
Re,t+1
pit+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
pit+1
]
, (2)
where Λt is the marginal utility of consumption.
9In our notation the time index refers to the period when a variable is determined.
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2.2 Equity and deposit funds
As we explain in detail below, there is a continuum of banks which intermediate the
households’ savings using deposits and equity. Each bank is subject to a binary idiosyn-
cratic shock which makes a bank fail with probability 1 − qt−1, in which case equity is
wiped out completely and depositors receive partial compensation from the deposit insur-
ance scheme. We assume that households invest into bank equity and deposits through
two funds, which diversify away the idiosyncratic bank default risk by investing into all
banks.10
The deposit fund works without frictions, and represents the depositors’ interests
perfectly. It raises money from the households and invests it into dt units of deposits.11
In the next period, the fund receives the nominal deposit rate rd,t from each bank that
does not fail. Deposits of failing banks are partially covered by deposit insurance. Most
deposit insurance schemes around the world, including the US, guarantee all deposits up
to a certain maximum amount per depositor.12 We model this capped insurance scheme
by assuming that the deposit insurance guarantees deposits up to a fraction ψ of total
bank liabilities et +dt. We assume that the deposit insurance cap is inflation-adjusted, to
avoid complicating the monetary policy trade-off by allowing an interdependence between
monetary policy and deposit insurance. As we will show later, the deposit insurance cap
is always binding in equilibrium, i.e. the bank’s liabilities exceed the cap of the insurance
rd,tdt > ψ(dt + et)pit+1. Defining the equity ratio kt = etdt+et , the deposit fund therefore
receives a real return of ψ/(1 − kt) per unit of deposits from each defaulting bank at t.
The deposit fund hence pays a nominal return of:
Rd,t+1 ≡ qtrd,t + (1− qt) ψ1− ktpit+1 . (3)
Unlike the deposit fund, the equity fund is subject to a simple agency problem. In
particular, we assume that the fund manager faces two options. He can behave diligently
and use the funds raised at t to invest into et units of bank equity. A fraction qt of banks
pay back a return of re,t+1 next period, while defaulting banks pay nothing. Alternatively,
the fund manager can abscond with the funds and consume a fraction ξt in the subsequent
period, while the rest is lost. To prevent the fund manager from doing so, the equity
providers promise to pay him a premium pt at time t+ 1 conditional on not absconding.
Equity providers pay the minimal premium that induces diligent behaviour, i.e. pt = ξtet.
This premium is rebated to the household in a lump-sum fashion. Once absconding is
ruled out in equilibrium, the equity fund manager perfectly represents the interests of
10Focusing on idiosyncratic risk is a simplification that keeps the model tractable. Since more idiosyn-
cratic risk is undesirable (as we will see below), assuming instead that bank risk also has an aggregate
dimension would just reinforce the results.
11We use deposits to refer to both units of deposit funds and units of bank deposits since they are
equal. We do the same for equity.
12For a comprehensive documentation see, for instance, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005).
5
the equity providers. The equity fund hence pays the return on bank equity net of the
premium:
Re,t+1 ≡ qtre,t+1 − ξtpit+1 . (4)
We allow the equity premium ξt to vary over time.13 Since bank equity is the residual
income claimant, the return on the equity fund is affected by all types of aggregate risk
that influences the return of surviving banks.
The two financial distortions introduced so far have important implications. The
agency problem implies an equity premium, i.e. a premium of the risk-adjusted return on
equity over the risk-free rate. Deposit insurance, on the other hand, acts as a subsidy on
deposits, which implies a discount on the risk-adjusted return on deposits. As explained
below, the difference in the costs of these two funding types induces a meaningful trade-off
between bank equity and bank deposits under limited liability.
2.3 Capital producers
We assume that the capital production process is risky in a way that nests the standard
capital production process in the New Keynesian model. In particular, capital is produced
by a continuum of capital producers indexed by m. At period t they invest imt units of
final good into a capital project of size omt . This project is successful with probability qmt ,
in which case the project yields (ω1 − ω22 qmt )omt units of capital at t + 1. Otherwise, the
project fails and only the liquidation value of θomt units of capital can be recovered (where
θ  ω1 − ω22 qmt ). Each capital producer has access to a continuum of technologies with
different risk-return characteristics indexed by qm ∈ [0, 1]. Given a chosen technology qmt ,
the output of producer m is therefore:
Kmt =

(
ω1 − ω22 qmt
)
omt with probablity qmt
θomt else
This implies that the safer the technology (higher qmt ), the lower output in the event of
success.
The bank orders capital projects, and requires the capital producer to use a certain
technology, but this choice cannot be observed by any third party. Given the technology
choice qt, and assuming that the projects of individual producers are uncorrelated, we can
exploit the law of large numbers to derive aggregate capital:
Kt = ot
(
qt
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
+ (1− qt)θ
)
. (5)
Furthermore we assume that capital, which depreciates at rate δ, becomes a project
13This shock, driving a wedge between deposit and safe rates on one hand, and equity rates on the
other, is similar to the risk premium shock often found in medium-scale DSGE models (e.g. Smets and
Wouters (2007)). Like all shocks in the model, it follows a standard lognormal AR(1) process.
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(of undefined qt) at the end of every period. That is, existing capital may be destroyed
due to unsuccessful reuse, and it can be reused under a different technology than it was
originally produced.14
The total supply of capital projects by the capital producers is the sum of the existing
capital projects ooldt = (1 − δ)Kt−1, which they purchase from the owners (the banks)
at price Qt, and the newly created projects onewt , which are created by investing it units
of the final good. We allow for investment adjustment costs and investment efficiency
shocks, i.e. we assume that it units of investment yield εIt (1− S(it/it−1)) units of project,
where S = κ
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
. Hence ot = onewt + ooldt and onewt = εIt
(
1− S
(
it
it−1
))
it. Capital
producers maximize their expected discounted profits taking as given the price Qt and
the household’s stochastic discount factor:15
maxit,ooldt Et
∞∑
0
βtΛt
[
Qtε
I
t
(
1− S
(
it
it−1
))
it +Qtooldt − it −Qtooldt
]
.
While the old capital projects are always reused, the marginal capital project is always
a new one.16 Hence, the price of projects Qt is determined by new projects according to
the well known Tobin’s q equation:
Qtε
I
t
[
1− S
(
it
it−1
)
− S ′
(
it
it−1
)
it
it−1
]
− 1 = βEt
[
Λt+1
Λt
εIt+1Qt+1S
′
(
it+1
it
)(
it+1
it
)2]
. (6)
Note that our model of risky capital production boils down to the standard riskless
setting of the New Keynesian model if we fix qt = q¯ and choose parameters such that
qt
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
+ (1− qt)θ = 1.
2.4 The Bank
The bank is the central agent of our model: it raises resources through deposits and equity
and invests them into a risky project. As in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014), an agency problem
arises between banks and depositors when choosing the risk level, since depositors cannot
observe the banks’ risk choice and banks are protected by limited liability. The less
equity a bank has, the higher the incentives for risk taking. Yet, since deposit insurance
and the equity premium drive a wedge between the costs of deposits and equity, the
banks’ optimal capital structure comprises both equity and deposits, balancing the agency
problem associated with deposits with the higher costs of equity. We will show that the
equilibrium risk chosen by the banks is excessive, and that the interest rate influences the
14This assumption ensures that we do not have to keep track of the distribution of different project
types. Think of a project as a machine yielding capital services, which can be run at different speeds
(levels of risk). In case it is run at a higher speed, the probability of an accident destroying the machine
is higher. After each period the existing machines are overhauled by the capital producers and at this
point the speed setting can be changed.
15Their out-of-steady-state profits are rebated lump sum to the household.
16We abstract from a non-negativity constraint on new projects.
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degree of its excessiveness.
We assume that there is a continuum of banks which behave competitively so that
there is a representative bank (we therefore omit the bank’s index in what follows). The
bank is owned by the equity providers, and hence maximizes the expected discounted
value of profits17 using the household’s stochastic discount factor. Every period, the bank
optimally chooses its liability structure by raising deposits dt and equity et from the
respective funds. These resources are then invested into ot capital projects, purchased at
price Qt. When investing into capital projects, the bank chooses the risk characteristic
qt of the technology applied by the capital producer. This risk choice is not observable
for depositors. Each bank can only invest into one project and hence faces investment
risk:18 with probability qt the bank receives a high payoff from the capital project; with
probability 1− qt the investment fails and yields only the liquidation value. Assuming a
sufficiently low liquidation value θ, a failed project implies the default of the bank. In this
case, given limited liability, equity providers get nothing and depositors get the deposit
insurance benefit. In case of success the bank can repay its investors: depositors receive
their promised return rd,t and equity providers get the state-contingent return re,t+1.
It is useful to think of the bank’s problem as a recursive two-stage problem. At the
second stage, the bank chooses the optimal risk level qt given a certain capital structure
and a certain cost of deposits. At the first stage, the bank chooses the optimal capital
structure, anticipating the implied solution for the second-stage problem. Note that not
only the bank but also the bank’s financiers anticipate the second-stage risk choice and
price deposits and equity accordingly, which is understood by the bank.
Before we derive the solution for this recursive problem, we establish the bank’s objec-
tive function. Per dollar of nominal funds raised in period t the bank purchases 1/(QtPt)
units of the capital project from the capital producer, choosing a certain riskiness qt. If
the project is successful it turns into (ω1− ω22 qt)/(QtPt) capital goods. In the next period
t + 1, the bank rents the capital to the firm, which pays the real rental rate rk,t+1 per
unit of capital. Furthermore the bank receives the depreciated capital, which becomes a
capital project again, with a real value of (1−δ)Qt+1 per unit of capital. The bank’s total
nominal income, per dollar raised, conditional on success is therefore:
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
rk,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
Pt+1
Pt
.
17Profits in excess of the opportunity costs of equity.
18The assumption that the bank can only invest into one project and cannot diversify the project risk
might sound stark. Yet three clarifications are in place: First, our set up is isomorphic to a model where
the bank invests into an optimally diversified portfolio of investments but is too small to perfectly diversify
its portfolio. The binary payoff is then to be interpreted as the portfolio’s expected payoff conditional on
default or repayment respectively. Second, if the bank was able to perfectly diversify risk, then limited
liability would become meaningless and we would have a model without financial frictions. Third, we
don’t allow the bank to buy the safe asset. Yet this assumption is innocuous: since the banks demand
a higher return on investment than the households due to the equity premium, banks wouldn’t purchase
the safe asset even if they could.
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At the same time, the bank has to repay the deposit and equity providers. Using the
equity ratio kt, the total nominal repayment per dollar of funds due in t+ 1 in the event
of success is re,t+1kt + rd,t (1− kt).
The bank maximizes the expected discounted value of excess profits, i.e. revenues
minus funding costs, using the stochastic discount factor of the equity holders, i.e. the
household. Given the success probability of qt,19 the bank’s objective function is:
max
qt,kt
βE
[
Λt+1
pit+1
qt
((
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
rk,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
pit+1 − rd,t(1− kt)− re,t+1kt
)]
.
(7)
Note that we did not multiply the per-unit profits by the quantity of investment. By
doing so we anticipate the equilibrium condition that the bank, whose objective function
is linear in the quantity of investment, needs to be indifferent about the quantity of
investment. The quantity will be pinned down together with the return on capital by
the bank’s balance sheet equation et + dt = Qtot, the market clearing and zero-profit
conditions.
The bank’s problem can be solved analytically, yet the expressions get fairly complex.
Therefore we derive here the solution for ψ = θ = 0, that is without deposit insurance and
with a liquidation value of 0. This simplifies the expressions but the intuition remains the
same. Allowing ψ and θ to be nonzero on the other hand is necessary to bring the model
closer to the data. The solution for the general case is discussed in section 3.5.5.
To make notation more tractable we rewrite the bank’s objective function (7) in real
variables expressed in marginal utility units:20
ω1qtr˜l,t − ω22 q
2
t r˜l,t − qtr˜d,t(1− kt)− qtr˜e,tkt , (8)
For later use we rewrite the household’s no-arbitrage conditions (1) and (2) combined
with the definition of the funds’ returns (3) and (4) as r˜d,t = R˜tqt and r˜e,t =
R˜t+ξ˜t
qt
. We now
solve the bank’s problem recursively.
2.4.1 Second-stage problem
At the second stage, the bank has already raised et + dt funds and now needs to choose
the risk characteristic of the investment qt, such that equity holders’ utility is maximized.
As already mentioned, we assume that the bank cannot write contracts conditional on qt
with the depositors at stage one, since qt is not observable to them. Therefore, at the
second stage the bank takes the deposit rate as given. Furthermore, since the capital
19Here we anticipate that the bank defaults in the event of a bad project outcome. See section 2.4.5
20That is, we use the following definitions: r˜l,t = Et
[
Λt+1
(
rk,t+1+(1−δ)Qt+1
Qt
)]
, r˜d,t =
Et
[
Λt+1 rd,tpit+1
]
, r˜e,t = Et
[
Λt+1 re,t+1pit+1
]
, R˜t = Et
[
Λt+1 Rtpit+1
]
, ξ˜t = Et [Λt+1ξt] .
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structure is already determined, maximizing the excess profit coincides with maximizing
the profit of equity holders. The bank’s objective function is therefore:
max
qt
ω1qtr˜l,t − ω22 q
2
t r˜l,t − qtr˜d,t(1− kt) . (9)
Deriving problem (9) with respect to qt yields the following first-order condition:21
qt =
ω1r˜l,t − r˜d,t (1− kt)
w2r˜l,t
. (10)
2.4.2 First-stage problem
At the point of writing the deposit contract at stage one, depositors anticipate the bank’s
choices at stage two and therefore the depositors’ no-arbitrage condition r˜d,t = R˜tqt must
hold in equilibrium.22 Using this equation together with the previous first-order condition
(10) we can derive the optimal qt as a function of kt and r˜l,t:
qˆt ≡ qt(kt) = 12ω2r˜l,t
(
ω1r˜l,t +
√
(ω1r˜l,t)2 − 4ω2r˜l,tR˜t(1− kt)
)
. (11)
We can now solve the first-stage problem of the bank, which chooses the capital struc-
ture kt to maximize excess profits, anticipating the qt(kt) that will be chosen at the second
stage:
max
kt
qˆtω1r˜l,t − ω22 r˜l,tqˆ
2
t − qtr˜d,t(1− kt)− qtr˜e,tkt , (12)
subject to the no-arbitrage condition for depositors (r˜d,t = R˜tqt ) and for equity providers
(r˜e,t = R˜t+ξ˜tqt ). Plugging these in and deriving, we obtain the first-order condition for kt:
ω1r˜l,t
∂qˆt
∂kt
− ξ˜t − ω22 r˜l,t
∂qˆ2t
∂kt
= 0 . (13)
which (assuming an interior solution) can be solved for kt as:
kˆt ≡ kt (r˜l,t) = 1− ξ˜t(R˜t + ξ˜t)(ω1r˜l,t)
2
ω2R˜tr˜l,t
(
R˜t + 2ξ˜t
2) . (14)
2.4.3 Closing the bank model: the zero-profit condition
Since there is a continuum of identical banks, each bank behaves competitively and takes
the return on investment r˜l,t as given. Perfect competition and free entry imply that
banks will enter until there are no expected excess profits to be made. In the presence
21We focus on interior solutions and choose the larger of the two roots, which is the closest to the
optimum, as we will see below.
22Note that the agency problem arises from the fact that the bank does not consider this as a constraint
of its maximization problem.
10
of uncertainty it is natural to focus on the case that banks make no excess profit in any
future state of the world:
(
ω1 − ω22 qt−1
)(
rk,t + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
)
− rd,t−1
pit
(1− kˆt−1)− re,t
pit
kˆt−1 = 0 . (15)
Using the equity and deposit supply schedules and taking expectation over this equation
we get:
qˆtω1r˜l,t − ω22 r˜l,tqˆ
2
t − kˆtξ˜t − ˜Rt = 0 . (16)
Combining (16) with the optimality conditions (11) and (14), we can derive analytical
expressions for the equity ratio kt, riskiness choice qt (the last term in each row is an
approximation under certainty equivalence and Rrt ≡ Rt/Et [pit+1]):
kt =
R˜t
R˜t + 2ξ˜t
≈
Rrt
Rrt + 2ξt
(17)
qt =
ω1(ξ˜t + R˜t)
ω2(2ξ˜t + R˜t)
≈
ω1(ξt +Rrt )
ω2(2ξt +Rrt )
(18)
2.4.4 Properties of the banking sector equilibrium
These results for the banking sector risk choice have five interesting implications that we
first summarize in a proposition, before intuitively discussing them in turn.
Proposition 1: Be [r˜l,t, qt, kt] an equilibrium in the banking sector with interior bank
choices under perfect competition. Denote the expected return on investment in capital
units by f(qt) ≡
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
qt. Then:
(1) Risk decreases in the real interest rate: ∂qt
∂R˜t
> 0 .
(2) The equity ratio increases in the real interest rate: ∂kt
∂R˜t
> 0 .
(3) Risk taking is excessive: qt < argmax f(qt) .
(4) The expected return on investment increases in the real interest rate: ∂f(qt)
∂R˜t
> 0
.
(5) The expected return on investment is a concave function of the real interest
rate ∂2f(qt)
∂R˜2t
< 0 .
The proof can be found in Appendix C.
The first two results can be easily seen from equations (17) and (18). As the real risk-
free rate Rrt decreases, the equity ratio kt falls as banks substitute equity with deposits and
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the riskiness of the bank increases (qt falls).23 The intuition behind this result is as follows:
On the one hand, a lower risk-free rate decreases the rate of return on capital projects,
reducing the benefits of safer investments, conditional on repayment. This induces the
bank to adopt a riskier investment technology. On the other hand, the lower risk-free
rate reduces the cost of funding, leaving more resources available to the bank’s owners in
case of repayment: this force contrasts with the first one, making safer investments more
attractive. There is a third force: a lower risk-free interest rate means that the equity
premium becomes relatively more important. As a result the bank shifts from equity to
deposits, internalizing less the consequences of the risk decision and choosing a higher level
of risk. The first and third effects dominate, and overall a decline in the real interest rate
induces banks to choose more risk. Note that these two results depend on the assumption
that the (discounted) equity premium is independent of the (discounted) real interest rate.
If we allowed the equity premium to be a function ξ˜t
(
R˜t
)
of the real interest rate, the
result would continue to hold under the condition that ξ˜t
(
R˜t
)
> ξ˜t
′ (
R˜t
)
R˜t, which rules
out proportionality. This mechanism provides a rationalization of the empirical finding
in section 2: that a decline in the nominal interest rate24 causes an increase in bank
risk-taking behaviour.
The third result implies that the bank’s investment could have a higher expected return
(in units of capital) if the bank chose a higher level of safety. In other words, risk taking
is excessive, i.e. suboptimally high. This is due to the agency problem, which arises from
limited liability and the lack of commitment/contractability of the banker regarding his
risk choice. The importance of this friction can be assessed by comparing the solution of
the imperfect markets bank model with the solution of the model without any frictions.
The frictionless risk choice can be derived under any of the following alternative scenarios:
either both the equity premium and deposit insurance are zero (which eliminates the
cost disadvantage of equity and leads to 100% equity finance), or contracts are complete
and deposit insurance is zero (which eliminates the agency problem and leads to 100%
deposit finance), or liability is not limited and deposit insurance is zero (as before), or
households invests directly into a diversified portfolio of capital projects (which eliminates
the financial sector altogether). Since in a frictionless model qt is chosen to maximize the
consumption value of the expected return:
maxqt r˜l,t(ω1 −
ω2
2 qt)qt ,
the optimal level of qt trivially is qot = ω1ω2 . Comparing the frictionless risk choice q
o
t and
the choice given the friction qft
23At least under certainty equivalence or up to a first-order approximation, when the Λt+1 terms
contained in the tilde variables cancel each other out.
24In a monetary model, a cut in the nominal interest rate, the standard monetary policy tool, is followed
by a decline in the real interest rate due to price stickiness.
12
qft = qot
ξ˜t + R˜t
2ξ˜t + R˜t
≈ qot
ξt +Rrt
2ξt +Rrt
,
we observe that the agency friction drives a wedge between the frictionless risk level and
the level that is actually chosen. This wedge has two important features. First, it is
smaller than one,25 implying that under the agency problem the probability of repayment
is too low, and hence banks choose excessive risk. Second, note that the wedge depends
on Rrt and that the derivative of the first-order approximation of the wedge w.r.t. Rrt is
positive. This implies that the wedge increases, i.e. risk taking gets more excessive, as
the real interest rate falls. As we move further away from the optimal level of risk the
expected return on investments necessarily falls, which is the fourth result above.
But it is not only the bank risk choice that is suboptimal. The capital structure is
chosen suboptimally too. If banks could commit to choose the optimal level of risk, they
would not need any skin in the game. Hence they would avoid costly equity and would
finance themselves entirely through deposits: kot = 0. Instead they choose k
f
t = R˜tR˜t+2ξ˜t .
The equity ratio resembles the two features of the risk taking. First, there is excessive
use of equity funding. Second, the equity ratio is increasing in Rrt up to a first-order
approximation.
Both the risk and the capital structure choice have welfare implications. A marginal
increase in qt means a more efficient risk choice, i.e. a higher expected return, and hence
should be welfare improving, ceteris paribus. At the same time a marginal increase in
kt implies, due to the equity premium, a higher markup in the intermediation process,
which distorts the consumption savings choice and hence lowers welfare, ceteris paribus.
Since both qt and kt are increasing functions of the real interest rate, this begs the ques-
tion as to whether an increase in the real rate alleviates or intensifies the misallocation
due to the banking friction.26 The answer to this question depends on the full set of
general-equilibrium conditions. Given the estimated model, we will later numerically ver-
ify that the positive first effect dominates, i.e. an increase in Rrt has welfare improving
consequences for the banking market.27 The existence of these opposing welfare effects
motivates our optimal policy experiments in section 4.
Finally, the last statement of the proposition implies that a mean-preserving increase
in the variance of the real interest rate decreases the mean of the expected return on the
bank’s investment. This has implications for optimal monetary policy. As we discuss in
detail later, the monetary authority cannot affect the nonstochastic steady state of the
real rate, but it can influence its volatility. The policy maker therefore has an incentive
25This is true under certainty equivalence, i.e. up to first-order approximation.
26These two opposing forces are well known from the literature on bank capital regulation, where a
rise in capital requirements hampers efficient intermediation but leads to a more stable banking sector.
27The dominance of the risk-taking effect is intuitive for two reasons. First, while risk taking entails a
real cost, the equity premium just entails a wedge but no direct real costs. Second, as the real interest
rate increases the equity premium becomes less important, so a more efficient allocation is intuitive.
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to keep the real interest rate stable, at least as long as the opposing effect of the equity
premium is negligible.
2.4.5 Full model with deposit insurance and liquidation value
The simplified version of the bank’s problem presented so far is useful to explain the
basic mechanism. Yet deposit insurance and a non-zero liquidation value are important
to improve the quantitative fit of our model to the data.
The assumptions made about deposit insurance and the liquidation value imply that
depositors get the maximum of the amount covered by deposit insurance and the value
of the capital recovered from a failed project. That means that their return in case of
default is:
min
(
rd,t
pit+1
,max
(
rk,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt(1− kt)
θ
1− kt ,
ψ
1− kt
))
.
To make deposit insurance meaningful we assume that the liquidation value θ is small
enough such that rk,t+1+(1−δ)Qt+1
Qt(1−kt)
θ
1−kt <
ψ
1−kt , which eliminates the inner maximum.
28 As
the following lemma, proven in Appendix C, states, the outer maximum is unambiguous
in equilibrium.29
Lemma: There can be no equilibrium such that the insurance cap is not binding, i.e.
rd,t
pit+1
> ψ1−kt .
Deposits therefore pay ψ1−kt in case of default. Combining the nominal return on
the deposit funds (3) with the household’s no-arbitrage condition, and defining ψ˜t =
E [Λt+1]ψ, we can write the deposit supply schedule as:
qtr˜d,t + (1− qt) ψ˜t1− kt = R˜t . (19)
We assume that the deposit insurance scheme, which covers the gap between the
insurance cap and the liquidation value for the depositors of failing banks, is financed
through a variable tax on capital that is set ex post each period such that the insurance
scheme breaks even. The return on loans r˜l,t can then be rewritten as:
r˜l,t ≡ Et
[
Λt+1
rk,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1 − τt+1
Qt
]
where τt =
Qt−1
1−qt−1
qt−1
(
ψ − θ rk,t+(1−δ)Qt
Qt−1
)
ω1 − ω22 qt−1
28In principle the fact that the return on capital is determined only one period later implies that we
could have cases where this inequality is satisfied for some states of the world and violated for others. We
abstract from this complication, since we later approximate our model locally around the steady state,
which allows us to consider only small shocks.
29For this result we again abstract from the effect of uncertainty. See the previous footnote.
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This way, the tax also perfectly offsets the distortion in the quantity of investment caused
by the deposit insurance. Deposit insurance therefore influences only the funding decision
of the bank and, through that, the risk choice. Hence, if qt was chosen optimally (or was
simply a parameter) the deposit insurance would not have any effect.
The same procedure as outlined above can be applied to obtain closed-form solutions30
for the risk choice and the equity ratio. The solutions can be found in Appendix C. As
stated below in proposition 2, the equilibrium characterizations in subsection 2.4.4 remain
valid. In particular, note that the deviation of the chosen risk (equity ratio) from the
optimal level decreases (increases) in the real interest rate. Given our estimation, the
risk effect dominates in terms of welfare implications. The intuition for the risk-taking
channel is similar to before.
Deposit insurance makes deposits cheaper relative to equity. As a result, the bank
demands more deposits and chooses a riskier investment portfolio. Deposit insurance
furthermore strengthens the risk-taking channel, which is now affected not only by the
importance of the equity premium relative to the real interest rate, but also by the impor-
tance of the deposit insurance cap relative to the real interest rate. On the other hand,
the efficient risk level is not affected by deposit insurance.
The liquidation value, on the other hand, is irrelevant for the banks’ and investors’
choice, since it is assumed to be smaller than deposit insurance. Yet it eases the exces-
siveness of risk taking, since it increases the optimal level of risk: qot = ω1−θω2 .
An additional implication of our model, given the estimated parameters obtained in
section 3, is that both the expected loan profitability and the risk premium fall as the real
interest rate declines: a result which is in line with the respective findings of Ioannidou
et al. (2014) and Buch et al. (2014).
Finally, we would like to point out that none of the results in proposition 1 is due to
the functional form that we have assumed for the risk return trade-off. The statement
holds even for a generic function f(qt)31 under relatively weak assumptions, some of which
are sufficient but non necessary. For a proof and a discussion of these assumptions see
Appendix C.
Proposition 2: Consider proposition 1, but replace f (qt) with the expected return,
taking into account the liquidation value of failed projects: f (qt) + (1− qt)θ.
(1) Given this adjustment, all statements of proposition 1 hold for the full bank
model with deposit insurance and a small enough liquidation value as well.
(2) Given this adjustment, statements (1)-(4) of proposition 1 hold for a generic
conditional expected return function f(qt) with deposit insurance and a small
30In this case, one needs to apply the adjusted deposit supply schedule (19) and to make sensible as-
sumptions about the relative size of parameters and about the root when solving the zero-profit equation.
31Given that the recovery value f(qt) now describes the expected return conditional on success.
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enough liquidation value under the additional assumptions that f(qt) satisfies
f(qt) ≥ 0, f ′′(qt) < 0, f ′′′(qt) ≤ 0, f ′′′′(qt) ≤ 0. Statement (5) holds if
furthermore either the default probability is low relative to the parameters
qt
(1−qt) ξ˜t ≥ R˜t − ψ˜t or there is no deposit insurance ψ˜t = 0.
2.5 Labour and goods sectors
The labour and goods sectors feature monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities as
Calvo (1983), which allow for a role for monetary policy. Since the modeling of these
sectors follows the canonical New Keynesian model, we discuss them briefly in Appendix
B and refer to Smets and Wouters (2007) and Adjemian et al. (2008) for further details.
2.6 Monetary and fiscal policy
The central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule, targeting inflation and output
deviations from the steady state. In addition, the fiscal authority finances a stochastic
expenditure stream gyY¯ εGt through lump sum taxes.
3 Dynamic implications of the risk-taking channel in
the estimated model
We have embedded our risk-taking channel in a medium-scale model which closely re-
sembles the non-linear version32 of Smets and Wouters (2007), and we next estimate the
model parameters using Bayesian techniques. This serves two purposes. First, we want
to assess whether the risk-taking channel improves the quantitative fit of the model, once
other monetary and real frictions are taken into account. Second, Smets and Wouters
(2007) provide a quantitative model that is able to replicate key empirical moments of
the data, which are needed for the monetary policy evaluation we perform in Section 4.
3.1 Model estimation
We estimate a linearized version of the model with Bayesian techniques using eight US
macroeconomic time series covering the period of the great moderation from 1984Q1 to
2007Q3. These include the seven series used by Smets and Wouters (2007), i.e. the
federal funds rate, the log of hours worked, inflation and the growth rates in the real
hourly wage and in per-capita real GDP, real consumption, and real investment. To
identify the banking sector parameters we add a series of the banking sector equity ratio,
32Our model deviates from Smets andWouters (2007) only to the extent that we abstract (for simplicity)
from capital utilization, shown by the authors to be of secondary importance once wage stickiness is taken
into account, and growth. Furthermore, since we use one additional time series we have added a time
preference shock and reinterpreted it as an equity premium shock that affects only bank equity.
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which we construct from aggregate bank balance-sheet data provided by the FDIC. For
a full description of the data we refer to Appendix A and to the supplementary material
of Smets and Wouters (2007). The observation equations, linking the observed time
series to the variables in the model, as well as the prior specifications can be found in
Appendix B. While the priors of the non-bank parameters follow Smets and Wouters
(2007), the priors for the banking sector parameters are motivated by historical averages
and external estimates for the US. Note that instead of forming priors directly about ω2
(risk return trade-off) and ψ (deposit insurance), we rewrite these parameters as functions
of the steady-state equity ratio k¯ and default rate q¯. The prior mean of the steady-state
equity premium ξ is centred around an annualized value of 6%, in line with the empirical
estimates of Mehra and Prescott (1985), while the prior distribution for k¯ is diffuse and
centred around the historic mean of 12%. The prior for the liquidation value θ is set
such that it is contained between 0.3 and 0.7 with a 95% probability, in line with the
evidence provided by Altman et al. (2003). The success rate q¯ is not well identified and
is therefore fixed to 0.99, which implies an annual default rate of 4%, roughly in line with
the historical average of delinquency rates on US business loans. Sensitivity tests have
moreover shown that this parameter is only of small quantitative relevance.33 Lastly, we
normalize the units of capital versus final goods by setting ω1 (return on the risky asset)
such that one unit of final good is expected to produce one unit of capital good in steady
state.
Table 4 in Appendix B summarizes the posterior parameter values, which are broadly
in line with existing empirical estimates for the US. The key banking sector parameters
that determine the importance of the risk-taking channel are well identified by the data.
The steady-state equity ratio has a tight posterior around 12%, the posterior mean of the
equity premium is around an annualized value of 9%, and the liquidation value is about
74%.34 For the following quantitative analysis we set the parameters to their posterior
means.
3.2 Dynamic implications of excessive risk taking
To illustrate the dynamic effects of the risk-taking channel, we assess how the propagation
of monetary policy shocks is affected by the risk-taking channel. For this purpose, we
compare the impulse responses of two models: with banking frictions (henceforth bank
model), and without banking frictions. To enable the dynamic comparison, we equalize
33In particular, the implications for optimal monetary policy behaviour are very robust to the value
of the steady state default rate. What matters is the importance of the channel over the business cycle,
determined predominantly by the liquidation value and the scope of deposit insurance.
34The implied mean value for deposit insurance cap ψ of about 88% implies that 99% of deposits are
insured in steady state. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005) report that the explicit deposit insurance scheme
in the US is estimated to cover between 60% and 65% of deposits. The divergence can be interpreted
as implicit deposit guarantees resulting from the expectation of bailouts. The implied mean values of ω1
(1.13) and ω2 (0.2561) yield a corner solution for qopt at 1.
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Figure 1: Monetary policy shock in the bank and benchmark models: dynamic responses in the
bank model (solid red lines) and in the benchmark model (dashed blue lines) to an expansionary monetary
policy shock, at the mean of the posterior distribution. Shaded areas denote the highest posterior density
interval at 90% for the bank model impulse responses, and the black line the steady-state level. Inflation
and interest rates are quarter-on-quarter rates.
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the steady states of the two economies. In particular, we alter the model without financial
frictions by treating the risk choice qt and the equity ratio kt as fixed parameters, which
we set to the steady-state values of the bank model. This model, henceforth benchmark
model, has the same steady state as the bank model and corresponds to a standard New
Keynesian model with a small markup in capital markets.
In Figure 1 we compare the dynamic responses in the bank model (solid red lines) and
in the benchmark model (dashed blue lines) to an expansionary monetary policy shock.
A monetary policy expansion triggers a set of standard reactions, which are evident in the
benchmark model. An unexpected fall in the nominal risk-free rate causes a drop in the
real interest rate, since prices are sticky. Consequently, consumption is shifted forward,
firms that can adjust the price do so, causing an increase in inflation, while the remaining
firms increase production. The risk-taking channel adds two further elements, as both the
risk level and the capital structure chosen by the bank respond to the real interest rate
movement. On impact, the drop in the real interest rate cause banks to substitute equity
for deposits, since the relative cost advantage of deposits increases. Consequently, banks
have less skin in the game and hence take more risk (lower loan safety). The risk choice
therefore moves further away from the optimal level, and the expected return on aggregate
investment f(qt) = qt(ω1 − ω2/2qt) + (1 − qt)θ drops.35 To maintain the same path of
35Note that the decline in the equity ratio diminishes the distortion due to the equity premium, which
reduces the cost of capital. Yet this effect is tiny relative to the increase in the cost of capital due to
lower investment efficiency.
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capital as in the benchmark case, households would have to invest more and consume
less. Yet this would not be optimal because of consumption smoothing and because of
the lower expected return on investment. Therefore, investment rises by less than what
would be needed to compensate the loss in investment efficiency, which makes the capital
stock decline considerably. Overall, agents are worse off (in terms of welfare) in the bank
model than in the benchmark economy.
3.3 Evaluating the fit of the estimated model
Comparing our bank model to the benchmark Smets and Wouters (2007)-type model, we
find that the fit of the bank model is better.36 In particular, the posterior odds ratio of
exp(2.86) can be interpreted as providing ’positive’ evidence in favour of the bank model,
according to Jeffreys (1961) and Kass and Raftery (1995). To evaluate the plausibility
of the strength of the proposed channel, we furthermore estimate a meta-model that
nests both the benchmark and the bank model. This meta-model is characterized by the
auxialiary parameter Γ, which defines the weight on each of the two models.37 Using a
flat prior we find that the posterior mean lies around -0.5, implying that the benchmark
model is rejected and the estimated risk-taking channel is slightly too weak, if anything.
A close examination of the role of the investment efficiency shock in the two estimated
models provides some intuition for why the risk-taking channel improves the fit of the
model. In particular, we find that the introduction of the banking frictions reduces the
forecast error variance of output by a third, while the variance decomposition share of
the investment shock drops from around 49 percent (estimated benchmark model) to
34 percent (estimated bank model) for horizons between 3 and 8 quarters. This relates
to the argument of Justiniano et al. (2011), who find that the major role of this shock
in explaining GDP volatility in the canonical medium-scaled Smets and Wouters (2007)
model could be a spurious result that captures unmodelled financial frictions. In reducing
the importance of this shock, the risk-taking channel seems to be capable of capturing
at least some of this missing mechanism. This is intuitive because both the investment
shock εIt and the expected return on the banks’ investment qt
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
+(1−qt)θ enter
the capital accumulation equation multiplicatively:
Kt =
[
εIt (1− S(it/it−1)) it + (1− δ)Kt−1
] [
qt
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
+ (1− qt)θ
]
.
36Recall that the Smets and Wouters (2007)-type model is obtained by turning off the banking sector
frictions. Hence bank leverage is no longer defined. For the comparison we therefore estimate the two
versions of the model (with and without the banking frictions) using only the seven macro aggregates
used by Smets and Wouters (2007), and calibrate the banking parameters in the bank model to the
posterior estimates in Table 4.
37To set up this meta-model, we replace the equations for kt and qt in the bank model with: kt =
Γkbenchmarkt + (1 − Γ)kbankt and qt = Γqbenchmarkt (1 − Γ)qbankt , where kxt corresponds to the RHS of the
corresponding equation from the x model. Again, this estimation is run using the 7 non-financial time
series with fixed banking sector parameters.
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Figure 2: Risk taking in the model and in the data: The figure compares the value of loan safety
qt implied by the estimated model (in particular we plot the mean of the series posterior distribution)
with a survey-based index of loan safety computed from the US Terms of Business Lending Survey. For
a more detailed discussion see text and Appendix D.
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Yet the two are not perfectly isomorphic, since the shock affects only net investment,
while the expected return on investment affects gross investment. Moreover, the path of
εIt backed out from the estimated benchmark model is strongly correlated with the path
of the return on investment in the estimated bank model.38
To evaluate the fit with respect to financial variables we look at two statistics that
were not targeted by the estimation. First, we compare the model-implied series for the
risk variable qt with a survey-based proxy for bank risk taking. The latter is a weighted
average39 of the internal risk rating assigned by banks to newly issued loans, provided
by the US Terms of Business Lending Survey, and inverted so as to match the definition
of qt in the model. Figure 2 shows that the model implies a cyclical pattern of risk that
is roughly in line with the survey measure (the correlation is 60 percent). Second, the
responses in Figure 1 also show that, conditional on the monetary policy shock, leverage
(the inverse of the equity ratio kt) is pro-cyclical with respect to the size of the bank
balance sheet et + dt. Conditional on the full set of shocks, we find a correlation of
43 percent which is in line with the evidence for US data provided by Adrian and Shin
(2014), and distinguishes our model from canonical financial accelerator models that build
on Bernanke et al. (1999).40 Note in addition that the responses shown in figures 1 are in
accordance with the structural VAR results in appendix D, in particular with the finding
that the response of risk is proportional to that of the interest rate.
Overall, these findings suggest that the inclusion of the risk-taking channel improves
38For this exercise we use the same specification as for the likelihood comparision. Notice that the
specification of our model is not exactly the same as Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano et al.
(2011) since we have abstracted from capital utilization and use internal rather than external habits.
This means that the numbers are not directly comparable.
39For a detailed discussion about this variable we refer to Appendix D.
40See, for instance, the discussion in Adrian et al. (2015).
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the fit of nonfinancial data, while at the same time matching two key characteristics of
aggregate banking sector data.
4 Monetary policy with the risk-taking channel
Optimal monetary policy in the benchmark Smets and Wouters (2007)-type model is
well understood. Optimal monetary policy in this economy generally aims at mitigating
the effect of coexisting nominal frictions (price and wage stickiness) and real frictions
(monopolistic competition in goods and labour markets). The effect of price stickiness
can be avoided by keeping inflation stable. While wage stickiness and the real frictions
provide a motive to deviate from strict inflation stabilization, their effect is typically
quantitatively small and it is therefore, as Woodford (2004) puts it, “not a bad first
approximation to say that the goal of monetary policy should be price stability”. This
goal is easy to implement with a simple Taylor rule that attaches a major weight on
inflation.
The financial sector modelled in this paper adds another real friction: inefficient risk
taking. As we have seen, the intensity of this distortion depends on the real interest rate.
Upward movements in the real interest rate increase the efficiency of the capital production
technology since they lower the level of risk taking towards the efficient level. Downward
changes in the real interest rate lead instead to even more excessive risk taking. But this
does not mean that movements in the real rate are on average irrelevant. We have shown
in section 2 that the expected return on investments f(qt) is concave in the real interest
rate. A mean-preserving spread of the real rate therefore reduces the average expected
return on investments. Therefore the risk-taking channel provides a motive for keeping
the real interest rate constant. Yet this objective conflicts with the inflation stabilization
objective resulting from nominal rigidities, since the latter call for aggressive movements
in both the nominal and the real rate. The risk-taking channel therefore introduces a new
monetary policy trade-off. As a result, the central bank should accept higher inflation
volatility in order to reduce the distortion stemming from risk taking.
But is this new trade-off actually quantitatively significant for monetary policy? Given
that many previous studies have found the optimality of inflation stabilization to be
robust to the introduction of financial frictions (e.g. De Fiore and Tristani (2013) and
Bernanke and Gertler (2001)), the answer to this question is not trivial. To answer this
question we determine optimal simple implementable monetary policy rules in both the
bank and benchmark models, and compare their performance in the bank economy.41 This
comparison has an interesting interpretation. Suppose that the actual economy features
41Note that for this experiment we use the parameters estimated for the bank model both for the bank
and benchmark economy.
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the risk-taking channel (the bank model), but that the central bank is unaware of this
channel and believes that risk cannot be influenced by the interest rate. The central bank
would then implement optimal policy based on a wrong model (the benchmark model).
Our comparison then answers the question of how important it is to understand the
risk-taking channel, in terms of optimal policy and welfare.
Notice that in this paper we consider a central bank that has no policy tools besides
the interest rate.42 Exploring optimal macroprudential regulation is however beyond the
scope of the present paper.43
4.1 The central bank problem
We follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and characterize optimal monetary policy as
the policy rule that maximizes welfare among the class of simple, implementable interest-
rate feedback rules44 given by:
Rt − R¯ = φpipˆit+s + φyyˆt+s + φkkˆt+s + ρ
(
Rt−1 − R¯
)
, (20)
where the hat symbol denotes (expected) percentage deviations from the steady state,
and the index s allows for forward- or contemporaneous-looking rules (respectively by
setting s = 1 or s = 0). The policy rule specification (20) is chosen for its generality,
as it encompasses both standard Taylor-type rules (setting φk = 0), and the possibility
that the central bank reacts to banking sector leverage, the inverse of the equity ratio k
(φk 6= 0). A fall in the equity ratio implies that banks increase their debt financing, i.e.
they increase leverage. As a consequence, banks internalize less the downside risk of their
investments, and choose loans with a higher default probability. Hence, a fall in the equity
ratio signals an increase in risk taking, to which the central bank may want to respond
by increasing the interest rate. We choose not to let the interest rate depend on risk
taking directly, because the latter is not a readily observable variable. We furthermore
impose that the inertia parameter ρ has to be non-negative. Since we are interested in
the effect of systematic monetary policy, we switch off the monetary policy shock for this
experiment.
The welfare criterion that defines the optimal parameter combination for rule (20) is
42In the model, with a second instrument, such as capital regulation, the central bank could do better or
even eliminate the friction. In practice, however, regulation has not been able to eliminate the risk-taking
channel in the past. While improvements in regulatory practice are certainly feasible, we are sceptical
whether it will be possible to fully eliminate the channel through regulation. It is therefore likely that
the channel will continue to play a role for monetary policy.
43For a thorough analysis of macroprudential policy in an economy with bank risk-taking see Collard
et al. (2012).
44The implementability criterion requires uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium, while
simplicity requires the interest rate to be a function of readily observable variables. For a complete
discussion, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). Notice that we drop their second requirement for
implementability, which is that an implementable rule must avoid regular zero lower bound violations.
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Table 1: Optimal simple rules: The first (second) column describes the timing (restrictions) of the
policy rule. The last row corresponds to a rule where only φk can be chosen and the other parameters are
fixed to the optimized benchmark values. V is the welfare level associated with each policy in the bank
model. Ω is the welfare cost (in % of the consumption stream) associated with implementing in the bank
model the optimal policy rule of the benchmark model. For the benchmark model the restriction φk = 0
is irrelevant, since the equity ratio is constant. Italics indicate restricted parameters.
benchmark model bank model
s rule ρ φpit+s φyt+s ρ φpit+s φyt+s φkt V Ω
0 φk, ρ = 0 0 7.100 0.115 0 3.080 0.126 0 -185.321 0.476
0 φk = 0 0.000 7.100 0.115 1.059 0.510 0.005 0 -184.750 0.898
0 ρ = 0 0 7.100 0.115 0 2.637 0.097 0.027 -185.314 0.481
1 φk, ρ = 0 0 17.222 0.148 0 4.294 0.172 0 -185.209 0.687
1 φk = 0 0.236 12.084 0.124 1.114 0.072 0.074 0 -184.656 0.813
0 choose φk 0.000 7.100 0.115 0 7.100 0.115 -0.177 -185.438 0.389
the household’s conditional lifetime utility.45 In order to compare welfare levels we define
the measure Ω as the fraction of the consumption stream that a household would need
to receive as a transfer under the suboptimal rule to be equally well off as under the
optimal rule. If o denotes the optimal rule and s another suboptimal rule, this fraction Ω
is implicitly defined by the equation:
V o = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtεBt u((1 + Ω)cst , Lst) .
4.2 Findings
Using the welfare criterion just described, we numerically determine the coefficients of
the optimal simple implementable rules in the benchmark and in the bank model, using
second-order approximations around the non-stochastic steady state. The first five rows
of Table 1 report the optimal coefficients for five different specifications of the monetary
policy rule: contemporaneous and forward-looking, without inertia and with optimal
inertia, without and with a reaction to current leverage. The coefficients of the optimal
rules generally vary greatly between the two models. A set of results which are robust
across policy rule and estimation46 specifications, are worth noticing.
First, the optimal coefficients on inflation deviations are smaller in the bank model
compared to the benchmark model. Given that the optimal output coefficient is close
to zero, the optimal rule is hence closer to a stable real interest rate rule in the bank
model than in the benchmark model. Furthermore, if the central bank can optimize over
its smoothing parameter, then full interest rate smoothing is optimal in the bank model.
45 This measure, which is conditional on the economy being in steady state, is common in the literature.
46We have experimented with different estimation samples and calibrated parameter values. While the
optimized parameters and transfers slightly change, the qualitative results discussed in the text are very
robust.
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Table 2: Differences in moments associated with the optimal simple rules in the benchmark
and in the bank model: This Table shows the % differences in the mean and standard deviation
associated with applying the different optimal rules in the bank model. The first entry, for example,
indicates that under the optimal bank policy rule average risk would be 0.15% lower than if the rule
optimal for the benchmark model had been applied.
mean standard deviation
s rule q Rr pi y c f(q) q Rr pi y c
0 φk, ρ = 0 0.151 0.002 -0.051 0.311 0.499 0.045 -43.880 -47.975 52.470 -0.843 -4.108
0 φk = 0 0.214 0.007 -0.038 0.439 0.701 0.061 -67.949 -77.760 64.393 -9.545 –9.566
0 ρ = 0 0.152 0.003 -0.015 0.323 0.506 0.045 -41.666 -47.248 53.194 -0.773 -3.800
1 φk, ρ = 0 0.194 0.011 -0.037 0.413 0.652 0.062 -50.536 -55.417 57.719 -2.781 -6.906
1 φk = 0 0.195 0.004 -0.054 0.458 0.724 0.057 -65.839 -76.3112 71.906 -10.373 -11.737
0 choose φk 0.130 0.001 -0.070 0.244 0.417 0.042 -41.691 -41.948 31.838 3.323 -0.345
Table 2, which displays the changes in the mean and volatility of key variables in switching
from the benchmark optimal rule to the bank optimal rule in the bank model, helps to
understand the rationale behind these results. By responding less aggressively to inflation
and by smoothing the nominal interest rate, the central bank limits fluctuations in the
real interest rate. The lower volatility of Rrt translates into a higher average return on
investment f(qt) due to the concavity of this function in Rrt .47 This higher average return
on investment comes at the cost of a significantly higher inflation volatility. Hence, the
new trade-off between inflation and real rate stabilization implies a significant deviation
from inflation stabilization.
To understand how different the equilibria associated to the two optimal rules are,
and therefore how important it is for the central bank to take the risk-taking channel into
account, we compute the cost Ω of applying the rule that is optimal for the benchmark
model in the bank model. These costs, expressed in % of the lifetime consumption stream,
are reported in the last column of Table 1. Though the costs vary greatly across policy
specifications, they are always significant. For the best-performing policy (fifth row of
Table 1), the costs of applying the benchmark policy in the bank model are around 0.81%
of the lifetime consumption stream. Unlike the financial frictions analyzed by De Fiore
and Tristani (2013) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001), the risk-taking channel therefore
has implications for monetary policy that are important both in terms of the prescibed
policy and the cost of deviating from it.
Second, including an explicit response to banking sector leverage, in addition to infla-
tion and output, improves welfare only marginally (compare the last column of the first
and third row of Table 1). Recall that leverage depends on both the nominal interest rate
and expected inflation. By setting the nominal rate optimally as a function of current
inflation, the central bank can already steer risk taking, to the extent that current and ex-
pected future inflation are highly correlated. The fact that this correlation is not perfect,
47Note that the slight increase in Rrt accounts only for a marginal fraction of the increase in f(qt).
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and that our approximation allows for nonlinearities, accounts for the small improvement
in welfare obtained by allowing a response to leverage in the policy function. To further
illustrate this point, in the last row we fix the coefficients of current inflation and output
to the values which are optimal in the benchmark economy, and allow the central bank to
respond optimally only to leverage. In this case, it is optimal to strongly raise the interest
rate in response to higher leverage (lower equity ratio k). Thereby the central bank again
stabilizes the real interest rate and does not do much worse in terms of welfare than when
the responses to inflation and output are chosen optimally (compare the last column of
the third and sixth row of Tables 1 and 2).
5 Conclusion
Recent empirical evidence suggests that monetary policy can influence bank risk-taking
behaviour. However, the economic relevance of this connection and its implications for
monetary policy are still unclear. We address these questions by developing and estimating
a quantitative general-equilibrium model where interest rates affect bank risk taking.
In the model, all savings are intermediated by banks, which make risky investments.
Low levels of the risk-free interest rate induce banks to make riskier and therefore less
efficient investments. At the core of this mechanism is an agency problem between depos-
itors and equity providers: the latter choose the level of risk but are protected by limited
liability. The response of risk taking to interest rates alters the dynamics in the model.
To validate the risk-taking channel and gauge its importance, we estimate the model with
Bayesian methods for the US. We find that this new channel not only improves the fit of
the model but also predicts a path for risk taking that is in line with survey evidence.
We use the model to derive both analytical and quantitative implications for monetary
policy. We show analytically that the risk-taking channel implies a motive for real interest
rate stabilization. Since this motive conflicts with the inflation stabilization objective, it
generates a new trade-off for the central bank. We then use the estimated model to analyze
the quantitative importance of this new trade-off. Contrary to similar experiments with
financial frictions in the literature, we find that the risk-taking channel calls for significant
deviations from inflation stabilization. The policy maker optimally accepts 50% more
inflation volatility to reduce the volatility of the real rate by a similar share. Taking the
risk-taking channel into account generates welfare gains for consumers between 0.5% and
1%.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Data description
Table 3: All level variables are expressed in per-capita terms (divided by N). Hours are measured as
H1 ·H2/N where H1 is converted into an index. The nominal wage W is deflated by the GDP deflator.
We define equity capital as equity plus reserves plus subordinated debt, and total liabilities as equity plus
deposits. To do do, we net out two types of liabilities, since they are typically overcollateralized: federal
funds purchased & repurchase agreements and federal home loan bank advances. Furthermore, we omit a
few categories of debt that match neither of our concepts of insured deposits and equity, or that are simply
not enough characterized: other borrowed money, uncategorized liabilities, trading book liabilities, banks
liability on acceptances. All of these balance sheet positions are minor. Over the observation period,
the first group accounts for roughly 11% of the balance sheet, the second for about 9%. All indexes are
adjusted such that 2009 = 100. The estimation sample spans from 1984Q1 to 2007Q3. Our survey-based
proxy for bank risk-taking q, is constructed using data from the US Terms of Business Lending Survey.
The survey provides the internal risk rating assigned by banks to newly issued loans. In this survey,
available from 1997Q1 onwards, 400 banks report the volume of loans originated in the first week of the
mid month each quarter, grouped by internal risk rating. This rating varies between 1 and 5, with 5
being the maximum level of risk. Following Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014), we construct a weighted average
loan risk series, using as weights the value of loans in each risk category.
symbol series mnemonic unit source
Y real gross domestic product gdpc96 bn. usd fred / bea
P gdp deflator gdpdef index fred / bea
R effective federal funds rate fedfunds % fred / board of governors
C personal consumption expenditure pcec bn. usd fred / bea
I fixed private investment fpi bn. usd fred / bea
H1 civilian employment ce16ov thousands fred / bls
H2 nonfarm business (..) hours prs85006023 index department of labor
W nonfarm business (..) hourly compensation prs85006103 index department of labor
N civilian population lns1000000 0ce16ov bls
q average weighted loan risk own calculation % board of governors
E equity capital over liabilities own calculation % fdic
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Appendix B: The full model: equilibrium and estimation details
This Appendix outlines the set-up of the conventional parts of the model. Furthermore,
it defines the equilibrium, listing all model equations, grouped by sector.
The Households’ problem: Households maximize their lifetime utility function:
maxdt,et,st,ct,Lt E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtεBt
(ct − ιct−1)1−σC
1− σC exp
(
ϕL1+σLt
σC − 1
1 + σL
)]
,
subject to the per-period budget constraint in real terms:
ct + dt + et + st + Tt = Ltwt + dt−1
Rd,t
pit
+ et−1
Re,t
pit
+ st−1
Rt−1
pit
+ Πt ,
where pit is the inflation rate, while Tt and Πt are taxes and profits from firm ownership,
expressed in real terms. We allow for habits in consumption (ι) and a time preference
shock εBt . This shock is assumed to be persistent with log-normal innovations, like all
following shocks unless otherwise specified. The household’s optimality conditions are
given by the usual Euler equation, two no-arbitrage conditions and the labour supply
condition:
Λt = βEt
[
Λt+1
Rt
pit+1
]
,
Et
[
Λt+1
Rd,t+1
pit+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
pit+1
]
,
Et
[
Λt+1
Re,t+1
pit+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
pit+1
]
,
Λtwt =
(ct − ιct−1)1−σC
1− σC exp
(
ϕL1+σLt
σC − 1
1 + σL
)
(1− σC)LσLt
where Λt = εBt (ct − ιct−1)−σC − βιEt
[
εBt+1 (ct+1 − ιct)−σC
]
is the marginal utility of con-
sumption.
Labour and goods sectors: Final goods producers assemble different varieties of in-
termediate goods through a Kimball (1995) aggregator with elasticity of substitution p
and Kimball parameter kp, taking as given both the final good price and the prices of
intermediate goods. Their optimization problem yields demand functions for each inter-
mediate good variety as a function of its relative price.
A continuum of firms produces differentiated intermediate goods using capital Kt−1
and “packed” labour ldt as inputs. The production function is Cobb-Douglas and is affected
by a total factor productivity shock εAt . Firms use their monopolistic power to set prices,
taking as given their demand schedule. As in Calvo (1983), they can reset their prices in
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each period with probability λp, otherwise they index their prices to past inflation with
degree γp and to steady-state inflation with degree (1−γp). Furthermore, they are subject
to a time-varying revenue tax εpt that is equivalent to a markup shock, up to a first-order
approximation.
The labour market resembles the product market. Packed labor is produced by labor
packers, who aggregate differentiated labor services using a Kimball (1995) aggregator
with elasticity of substitution w and Kimball parameter kw.
Differentiated labour services are produced by a continuum of unions from the house-
holds labour supply. They use their monopolistic power to set wages. Wages are reset
with probability λw, otherwise they are indexed to past inflation (with degree γw) and
steady-state inflation. Like intermediate firms, unions are subject to a stochastic wage
tax εwt .48
See the Appendix of Smets and Wouters (2007) for a detailed discussion of the set-up
and Adjemian et al. (2008) for the recursive formulation of the equilibrium conditions,
which we list below.
Monetary and fiscal policy: The central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule,
targeting inflation and output deviations from the steady state:
Rt − R¯ = (1− ρ) (φpipˆit + φyyˆt) + ρ
(
Rt−1 − R¯
)
+ εRt , (21)
where ρ is a smoothing parameter, the hat symbol denotes percentage deviations from
the steady-state values, R¯ = piss
β
is the steady-state nominal interest rate, and εRt is a
monetary policy shock. In addition, the fiscal authority finances a stochastic expenditure
stream gyY¯ εGt :
ln
(
εGt
)
= ρgln
(
εGt−1
)
+ uGt + ρGAuAt ,
where we allow for a correlation between exogenous spending and innovations to total
factor productivity.49 For simplicity, we rule out government debt (st = 0), implying that
all expenditures are financed by lump sum taxes; i.e. gyY¯ εGt = Tt .
Competitive equilibrium: The competitive equilibrium is a path of 41 variables (Λ,
K, L, y, l, c, q, k, d, e, pi, rk, rd, re, R, W , mc, onew, o, pi?, Zp1, Zp2, Zp3, Zw1, Zw2, Zw3,
∆p1, ∆p2, ∆p3, ∆p4, ∆w1, ∆w2, ∆w3∆p4, W ?, i, R˜, ξ, ξ˜, ψ˜, τ) that satisfy the following 41
equations at each point in time, given initial conditions and the exogenous shock processes
εA, εB, εG, εI , εP , εR, εW , εξ.
48Both εpt and εwt follow the standard shock process augmented by an moving average component, as
in Smets and Wouters (2007).
49This is a shortcut to take exports into account. Productivity innovations might raise exports in the
data, and a way to capture it in a closed-economy model such as ours is to allow for ρGA 6= 0 as in Smets
and Wouters (2007).
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Household50
Λt = εBt (ct − ιct−1)−σC − βιEt
[
εBt+1 (ct+1 − ιct)−σC
]
(22)
Et
[
Λt+1
qtrd,t+1 + (1− qt) ψ1−ktpit+1
pit+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
pit+1
]
(23)
Et
[
Λt+1
qtre,t+1 − ξtpit+1
pit+1
]
= Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
pit+1
]
(24)
Λt = βEt
[
Λt+1
Rt
pit+1
]
(25)
yt = ct + it + gyY¯ εGt (26)
Goods sector
Ldt
Kt−1
α
1− α =
rk,t
wt
(27)
mct =
1
At
α−αrαktw
1−α
t (1− α)α−1 (28)
pi?t =
p (1 + kp)
p (1 + kp)− 1
Zp1,t
Zp2,t
+ kp
p − 1 (pi
?
t )
1+p(1+kp) Zp3,t
Zp2,t
(29)
Zp1,t = (1− τp,t)Λtmctyt∆p(1+kp)/(1−p(1+kp))p1,t + βλpEt
( pit+1
pi
γp
t p¯i1−γp
)p(1+kp)
Zp1,t+1
 (30)
Zp2,t = (1− τp,t)Λtyt∆p(1+kp)/(1−p(1+kp))p1,t + βλpEt
( pit+1
pi
γp
t p¯i1−γp
)p(1+kp)−1
Zp2,t+1
 (31)
Zp3,t = Λtyt + βλpEt
( pit+1
pi
γp
t p¯i1−γp
)−1
Zp3,t+1
 (32)
∆p1,t = (1− λp) (pi?t )1−p(1+kp) + λp∆p1,t−1
(
pit+1
pi
γp
t p¯i1−γp
)p(1+kp)−1
(33)
1 = 11 + kp
∆1/(1−p(1+kp))p1,t +
kp
1 + kp
∆p2,t (34)
50Note that Rd and Re have been substituted out. The FOC w.r.t. laboir is merged with the labour
sector equations.
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∆p2,t = (1− λp) pi?t + λp∆p2,t−1
(
pit+1
pi
γp
t p¯i1−γp
)−1
(35)
∆p3,t =
1
1 + kp
∆p(1+kp)/(1−p(1+kp))p1,t ∆p4,t +
kp
1 + kp
(36)
∆p4,t = (1− λp) (pi?t )−p(1+kp) + λp∆p4,t−1
(
pit+1
pi
γp
t p¯i1−γp
)p(1+kp)
(37)
AtK
α
t−1
(
Lt
∆p3,t
)1−α
= ∆p3,tyt (38)
Labor sector
w?t =
w (1 + kw)
w (1 + kw)− 1
Zw1,t
Zw2,t
+ kw
w − 1 (w
?
t )
1+p(1+kp) Zw3,t
Zw2,t
(39)
Zw1,t = εBt L¯L1+σLt w
w(1+kw)
t (Ct − ιCt−1)1−σc exp
(
L¯
σc − 1
1 + σl
L1+σLt
)
∆w(1+kw)/(1−w(1+kw))w1,t (40)
+βλwEt
( pit+1
piγwt p¯i1−γw
)w(1+kw)
Zw1,t

Zw2,t = (1−τw,t)ΛtLt
[
wt∆1/(1−w(1+kw))w1,t
]w(1+kw) +βλwEt
( pit+1
piγwt p¯i1−γw
)w(1+kw)−1
Zw2,t+1

(41)
Zw3,t = (1− τw,t)ΛtLt + βλwEt
( pit+1
pi
γp
t p¯i1−γp
)−1
Zw3,t+1
 (42)
∆w1,t = (1− λw)
(
w?t
wt
)1−w(1+kw)
+ λw∆w1,t−1
(
wt−1
wt
)1−w(1+kw) ( pit+1
piγwt p¯i1−γw
)w(1+kw)−1
(43)
1 = 11 + kw
∆1/(1−w(1+kw))w1,t +
kw
1 + kw
∆w2,t (44)
∆w2,t = (1− λw)
(
w?t
wt
)
+ λw∆w2,t−1
(
wt
wt−1
pit+1
piγwt p¯i1−γw
)−1
(45)
∆w3,t =
1
1 + kw
∆w(1+kw)/(1−w(1+kw))w1,t ∆w4,t +
kw
1 + kw
(46)
∆w4,t = (1− λw)
(
w?t
wt
)−w(1+kw)
+ λw∆w4,t−1
(
wt
wt−1
pit+1
piγwt p¯i1−γw
)w(1+kw)
(47)
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Government
Rt − R¯ = φpipit+s
p¯i
+ φy
yt+s
y¯
+ φk
kt+s
k¯
+ ρ
(
Rt−1 − R¯
)
(48)
Capital producer
Kt = qt
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
ot + (1− qt)θ (49)
ot = onewt + (1− δ)Kt−1
onewt = εIT it
1− κ2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2 (51)
Qtε
I
t
[
1− S
(
it
it−1
)
− S ′
(
it
it−1
)
it
it−1
]
− 1 = βEt
[
Λt+1
Λt
εIt+1Qt+1S
′
(
it+1
it
)(
it+1
it
)2]
.
(52)
Bank
qt = 1− R˜
ψ˜t
+
√
ω2
(
R˜t − ψ˜t
)
(R˜t + 2ξ˜t)
(
2ω1ψ˜t
(
R˜t + ξ˜t
)
+ ω2
(
R˜t − ψ˜t
)
(R˜t + 2ξ˜t)
)
ω2ψ˜t(R˜t + 2ξ˜t)
(53)
kt =
R˜t − ψ˜t
R˜t + 2ξ˜t
(54)
(
ω1 − ω22 qt−1
)
rk,t + (1− δ)Qt − τ:t
Qt−1
− rd,t
pit+1
(1− kt)− re,t+1
pit+1
kt = 0 (55)
τt =
Qt−1
1−qt−1
qt−1
(
ψ − θ rk,t+(1−δ)Qt
Qt−1
)
ω1 − ω22 qt−1
(56)
ξ˜t = ξtEt [Λt+1] (57)
ξt = ξεξt (58)
R˜t = Et
[
Λt+1
Rt
pit+1
]
(59)
ψ˜t = ψEt [Λt+1] (60)
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otQt = et + dt (61)
kt = et/ (et + dt) (62)
Shock processes
log
(
εBt
)
= ρP log
(
εBt−1
)
+ σBuBt (63)
log
(
εQt
)
= ρI log
(
εQt−1
)
+ σQuQt (64)
log
(
εξt
)
= ρξ log
(
εξt−1
)
+ σξuξt (65)
log
(
εPt
)
= (1− ρP ) log
(
ε¯Pt−1
)
+ ρP log
(
εPt−1
)
+ σP
(
uPt +mpuPt−1
)
(66)
log
(
εWt
)
= (1− ρW ) log
(
ε¯Wt−1
)
+ ρW log
(
εWt−1
)
+ σW
(
uWt +mWuWt−1
)
(67)
log
(
εAt
)
= ρA log
(
εAt−1
)
+ σAuAt (68)
log
(
εRt
)
= ρR log
(
εRt−1
)
+ σRuRt (69)
log
(
εGt
)
= ρG log
(
εGt−1
)
+ σGuGt + ρGAσAuAt (70)
Observational equations: The observation equations, linking the observed time series
(left hand-side) to the variables in the non-linear model (right hand-side) are the following:
100∆ log
(
Yt
Yt−1
)
= 100∆ log
(
yt
yt−1
)
+ 100µy
100∆ log
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
= 100∆ log
(
ct
ct−1
)
+ 100µy
100∆ log
(
It
It−1
)
= 100∆ log
(
it
it−1
)
+ 100µy
100∆ log
(
Wt
Wt−1
)
= 100∆ log
(
wt
wt−1
)
+ 100µy
100∆ log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
= 100pit
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100 log
(
Ht
H¯
)
= 100 log
(
Lt
L¯
)
+ 100µl
(
Rt
4
)
= 100R
E˜t = 100kt
where H¯ are hours worked in 2009 and µl is a shift parameter. Since there is no growth
in the model, we estimate the mean growth rate in the data µy. The equity ratio in the
data E˜t is transformed by taking deviations from its linear trend and adding back the
mean.
Prior specifications: We fix parameters that are not identified to values commonly
used in the literature. In particular, we choose a depreciation rate δ of 0.025, a steady-
state wage markup ε¯W of 1.05, a steady-state spending to GDP ratio gy of 18%, a weight of
labor in the utility function L¯ such that steady-state hours are equal to 1, and curvatures
of the Kimball aggregator for goods and labor varieties of 10.
For all structural shocks, we employ a non-informative uniform distribution. The
persistences of the shock processes are assumed to have a beta prior distribution centred
at 0.5, and with standard deviation of 0.2. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we
further assume that the two markup shows have a moving average component.
The priors of the Taylor rule parameters are centred around very common values: the
smoothing parameter has a Beta distribution with a mean of 0.75, while the responses to
inflation and output are assumed to follow a Normal distribution with a mean of 1.5 and
of 0.5/4 = 0.125.
Since we use level data of the inflation rate and of the nominal interest rate, we
choose the priors for the steady state of the inflation rate p¯i and the real interest rate
1/β−1 to match the mean in the data, i.e. we assumed they follow a gamma distribution
respectively centred around annualized values of 2.5% and 0.9.
The parameters affecting price and wage stickiness have a beta distribution centered
at 0.5 with standard deviation of 0.1. Our prior is that prices and wages are reoptimized
on average every 6 months, and that the degree of indexation to past inflation is only up
to 50%. The steady-state price markup is assumed to be centred around 1.25, slightly
above the steady-state wage markup.
We employ very common priors for all the parameters of the utility function. Habits
are centred around 0.7, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σc has a prior mean
of 1.5, while the elasticity of labor supply σl has a prior mean of 2. The capital share in
production has a prior mean of 0.3 while the investment adjustment costs parameter has
a loose prior around 4.
36
For the discussion on the priors for the banking sector parameters, we refer to the
main text.
Table 4: Model estimation: prior and posterior values
parameter prior shape prior mean prior std post. mean 90% HPD interval
structural parameters
µy trend growth norm 0.4 0.1 0.4264 0.3908 0.4618
µl labor normalization norm 0 2 -0.0938 -1.6569 1.4777
α output share norm 0.3 0.05 0.2001 0.1602 0.2395
100 1−β
β
real rate in % norm 0.25 0.1 0.427 0.2992 0.5485
ε¯P price markup norm 1.25 0.12 1.5068 1.3621 1.6523
p¯i inflation in % gamma 0.62 0.1 0.6263 0.4893 0.7616
φpi TR weight on inflation norm 1.5 0.25 1.8723 1.5489 2.2003
φy TR weight on output norm 0.12 0.05 0.0198 -0.0348 0.0753
ρ TR persistence beta 0.75 0.1 0.8411 0.8057 0.8768
κ investment adj. costs norm 4 1.5 7.4584 5.5992 9.3376
ι habits norm 0.7 0.1 0.7774 0.7042 0.8532
σc risk aversion gamma 1.5 0.375 1.7362 1.2809 2.1939
σl disutility from labor gamma 2 0.75 2.0183 0.9726 3.0566
λp price calvo parameter beta 0.5 0.1 0.6206 0.5429 0.701
λw wage calvo parameter beta 0.5 0.1 0.8476 0.8099 0.8864
γp price indexation beta 0.5 0.15 0.1533 0.0537 0.2479
γw wage indexation beta 0.5 0.15 0.448 0.2066 0.6829
ξ equity premium norm 0.015 0.01 0.0213 0.0054 0.0348
θ liquidation value norm 0.5 0.1 0.7416 0.6425 0.8385
k¯ equity ratio norm 0.12 0.05 0.1231 0.1208 0.1254
structural shock processes
σA stdev TFP unif 0 10 0.3665 0.3172 0.414
σB stdev preference unif 0 10 3.4696 2.2271 4.6946
σG stdev govt. spending unif 0 10 2.2678 1.984 2.5382
σI stdev investment unif 0 10 4.7269 3.0495 6.3757
σP stdev price markup unif 0 1 0.1332 0.109 0.1574
σR stdev monetary unif 0 1 0.1164 0.1009 0.1315
σW stdev wage markup unif 0 10 0.4742 0.4088 0.5389
σξ stdev equity premium unif 0 10 0.5805 0.199 1.0255
ρA persistence TFP beta 0.5 0.2 0.4623 0.3496 0.5765
ρB persistence preference beta 0.5 0.2 0.9004 0.8549 0.9486
ρG persistence gov.
spending
beta 0.5 0.2 0.9009 0.8471 0.9556
ρI persistence investment beta 0.5 0.2 0.1924 0.0357 0.3396
ρP persistence price markup beta 0.5 0.2 0.9772 0.9625 0.9925
ρR persistence monetary beta 0.5 0.2 0.9585 0.918 0.9967
ρW persistence wage markup beta 0.5 0.2 0.7721 0.6706 0.8734
ρξ persistence equity
premium
beta 0.5 0.2 0.8156 0.7623 0.8699
ρG,A correlation gov.
spending & TFP
beta 0.5 0.2 0.6513 0.3835 0.9394
mp MA component of price
markup
beta 0.5 0.2 0.7765 0.6826 0.875
mw MA component of wage
markup
beta 0.5 0.2 0.9741 0.9516 0.9972
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Appendix C: Proofs
The risk-taking channel for a generic expected return function
Consider the bank problem discussed in Section 2, but replace the expression for the
expected return conditional on success qt (ω1 − ω2/2qt) with the generic function f(qt).
Assume there exists an equilibrium [r˜l,t, qt, kt] under perfect competition that satisfies
the following conditions: (1) the bank’s choices are interior, i.e. [kt,qt] ∈ [0, 1]2, (2a) the
default probability is low relative to the parameters qt(1−qt) ξ˜t ≥ R˜t − ψ˜t or (2b) there is
no deposit insurance ψ˜t = 0, the conditional expected return function f(qt) satisfies (3)
f(qt) ≥ 0, f ′′(qt) < 0 and (4) f ′′′(qt) ≤ 0, f ′′′′(qt) ≤ 0.
Note that assumption 2a), which is sufficient but by no means necessary and only
needed for claim (e), is weak if we consider the empirically relevant section of the param-
eter space with a low equity premium (around 0.0x), a real rate just above 1 (1.0x) and
high level of deposit insurance (0.x) and high repayment probabilities (0.9x). Assumption
3 is straightforward as it guarantees a meaningful risk return trade-off with an interior
solution. Assumption 4 is another sufficient but non-necessary condition.
We prove that if such a solution exists, then:
(a) risk taking is excessive: qt < argmax f(qt) ,
(b) the safety of assets qt is a positive function of R˜t: ∂qt∂R˜t > 0,
(c) the equity ratio kt is a positive function of R˜t: ∂kt∂R˜t > 0,
(d) the expected return on investment is a positive function of R˜t:
∂f(qt(R˜t))+(1−qt(R˜t))θ
∂R˜t
> 0,
(e) the expected return on investment is a concave function of R˜t:
∂2f(qt(R˜t))+(1−qt(R˜t))θ
∂R˜2t
< 0.
For a generic return function f(qt) the bank’s objective function at the second stage is:
max
qt
f (qt) r˜l,t − qtr˜d,t(1− kt)
Deriving this problem with respect to qt yields the following first-order condition, which
by concavity is necessary and sufficient:
f ′(qt)r˜l,t = r˜d,t(1− kt) (71)
Notice that this condition implies f ′(qt) > 0 (kt ∈ (0, 1] by assumption, r˜d,t > 0 by the
deposit supply schedule, and r˜l,t > 0 by the zero-profit condition). Notice further that
in a frictionless world, e.g. without limited liability, the bank’s risk choice would satisfy
qoptt = argmax f(qt) + (1 − qt)θ, i.e. f ′(qoptt ) = θ. Since we have assumed above that
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the recovery value is smaller than the deposit insurance cap, which in turn is smaller
than the cost of deposits by lemma 1, we have: r˜l,tθ < ψ˜t < r˜d,t(1− kt). Combining this
with equation (71) and the frictionless optimality condition and rearranging, we obtain
f ′(qt) > f ′(qoptt ). Given f ′′(qt) < 0 this implies excessive risk taking, i.e. qt < qoptt
(claim(a)).
Since the deposit supply schedule must hold in equilibrium, we can rewrite this con-
dition as:
f ′(qt)r˜l,t − R˜t(1−kt)+(1−qt)ψ˜tqt = 0 (72)
Equation (72) implicitly defines qˆt(kt). Using the implicit function theorem we find that,
f ′(qoptt ) = θ < r˜d,t(1− kt) = f ′(qt)r˜l,t
∂qt
∂kt
= −qtR˜t(1−kt)R˜t−ψ˜t+q2t r˜l,tf ′′(qt)
At the first stage the maximization problem is:
max
kt
f (qt) r˜l,t − qtr˜d,t(1− kt)− qtktr˜e,t .
which, using the deposit and equity supply schedules r˜d,t =
R˜t− 1−qt1−kt ψ˜t
qt
r˜e,t = R˜t+ξ˜tqt , can be
written as:
maxkt f (qˆt) r˜l,t + (1− qt)ψ˜t − ktξ˜t − R˜t .
The corresponding FOC is:
(
f ′ (qˆt) r˜l,t − ψ˜t
)
∂qt
∂kt
− ξ˜t . (73)
Finally, the zero-profit condition can in expectations be written as:
f (qˆt) r˜l,t + (1− qt)ψ˜t − ktξ˜t − R˜t . (74)
Equations (72), (73), (74) implicitly define qt, kt and r˜l,t. Solving the latter two
equations for kt and r˜l,t we obtain:
kt = (
−ξ˜tR˜t+qtR˜tψ˜t+ξ˜tψ˜t)f(qt)−qt(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)(R˜tf ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt))
−ξ˜t(R˜tf(qt)−qt(R˜tf ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt))) (75)
r˜l,t = (
R˜t+ξ˜t)(R˜t−ψ˜t)
R˜tf(qt)−qt(R˜tf ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt)) (76)
Plugging these equations into (72) and rearranging, we obtain the following equation,
which implicitly defines qt:
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(
R˜t + ξ˜t
) R˜tψ˜tf(qt)−(R˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)−((1−qt)R˜t+ξ˜t)ψ˜t)f ′(qt)−qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)f ′′(qt)
−ξ˜t(R˜tf(qt)−qt(R˜tf ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt))) = 0
We can simplify this condition further by multiplying by the denominator and dividing
by
(
R˜t + ξ˜t
)
R˜t:
F (qt, Rt) ≡ R˜tψ˜tf(qt)−(R˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)−((1−qt)R˜t+ξ˜t)ψ˜t)f
′(qt)−qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)f ′′(qt)
R˜t
= 0 (77)
Using the implicit function theorem on equation (77), we find that :
∂qt
∂Rt
= −
∂F
∂Rt
∂F
∂qt
(78)
where
∂F
∂Rt
= (R˜
2
t+ξ˜tψ˜t)f ′(qt)+(1−qt)qtξ˜tψ˜tf ′′(qt)
−R˜2t
∂F
∂qt
= (R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)((R˜t+2ξ˜t)f
′′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′′(qt))
−R˜t
Using our assumptions on f , the parameters and assuming an interior solution, it is
obvious that ∂F
∂qt
> 0. How about the ∂F
∂Rt
?
To get the sign of ∂F
∂Rt
, we solve 77 for f(qt):
f(qt) = (
R˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)−((1−qt)R˜t+ξ˜t)ψ˜t)f ′(qt)+qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)f ′′(qt)
R˜tψ˜t
and plug this expression into the equations (75) and (76) for kt and r˜l,t:
kt = f
′(qt)(R˜t+ξ˜t)(R˜t−ψ˜t)+f ′′(qt)qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)
R˜t((R˜t+ξ˜t)f ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt))2 (79)
r˜l,t = (
R˜t+ξ˜t)ψ˜t
(R˜t+ξ˜t)f ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt) (80)
Since in equilibrium r˜l,t > 0 and since the numerator of r˜l,t is positive, it must hold that
its denominator is also positive:
(
R˜t + ξ˜t
)
f ′(qt) + qtξ˜tf ′′(qt) > 0 (81)
Similarly, since kt > 0 and since the denominator of kt is positive, the numerator must be
positive too:
f ′(qt)(R˜t + ξ˜t)(R˜t − ψ˜t) + f ′′(qt)qtξ˜t(R˜t − (1− qt)ψ˜t > 0 (82)
Since f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0 we can conclude from the previous inequality that for any
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[x1, x2] ∈ R2 it must hold that f ′(qt)x1 + f ′′(qt)x2 > 0 if
x1
x2
≥ (R˜t+ξ˜t)(R˜t−ψ˜t)
qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t) . (83)
We now test this condition for the numerator of ∂F
∂Rt
:
R˜2t+ξ˜tψ˜t
(1−qt)qtξ˜tψ˜t ≶
(R˜t+ξ˜t)(R˜t−ψ˜t)
qtξ˜t(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t) .
Rearranging, multiplying only by positive values, yields:
0 ≶ −R˜t(R˜t − (1− qt)ψ˜t)− qtψ˜tξ˜t −
(
R˜t(1− qt)ψ˜t + (1− qt)ψ˜tξ˜t
)
qtψ˜t
(R˜t−(1−qt)ψ˜t)
The RHS is obviously negative since from the proposition that every deposit insurance
cap will be exceeded, it follows that R˜t > ψ˜t. Hence the condition R˜
2
t+ξ˜tψ˜t
(1−qt)qtξ˜tψ˜t ≥
R˜t+ξ˜t
qtξ˜t
is
satisfied and we can conclude that the numerator of ∂F
∂Rt
is positive. Hence ∂F
∂Rt
< 0 and
therefore ∂qt
∂Rt
> 0 (claim (b)).
Equation (79) defines kt = K(qt, R˜t). Its derivative is given by
∂kt
∂R˜t
= ∂K
∂R˜t
+ ∂K
∂qt
∂qt
∂R˜t
where
∂K
∂R˜t
= ((f
′(qt))2R˜2t+2f ′(qt)(f ′(qt)+f ′′(qt)(1−qt)qt)R˜tξ˜t+(f ′(qt)+f ′′(qt)qt)(f ′(qt)−f ′′(qt)(1−qt)qt)ξ˜2t )ψ˜t
R˜2t(f ′′qξ˜t+f ′(R˜t+ξ˜t))2
∂K
∂qt
= qtξ˜tf
′′(qt)ψ˜t(2(R˜t+ξ˜t)f ′(qt)+qtξ˜tf ′′(qt))
R˜t(f ′′qξ˜t+f ′(R˜t+ξ˜t))2
From (83) it is immediately obvious that the numerator of ∂K
∂qt
is negative, hence ∂K
∂qt
< 0.
After division by ψ˜t, the numerator of ∂K∂R˜t can be rewritten as:
((
R˜t + ξ˜t
)
f ′(qt) + qtξ˜tf ′′(qt)
)2 − (f ′′(qt))2 q3t ξ˜2t − f ′′(qt)f ′(qt)q2t ξ˜t(2R˜t + ξ˜t)
Since the first term is positive and larger than the absolute value of the second term we
can see that ∂K
∂R˜t
> 0. Hence we have shown that ∂kt
∂R˜t
> 0 (claim (c)).
Applying the implicit function theorem a second time on equation (77), we can find
the following expression for the second derivative of qt:
∂2qt
∂R˜2t
=
(
∂2F
∂Rt∂qt
+ ∂2F
∂q2t
∂qt
∂Rt
)
∂F
∂Rt
−
(
∂2F
∂Rt∂qt
∂qt
∂Rt
+ ∂2F
∂R2t
)
∂F
∂qt(
∂F
∂qt
)2 (84)
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where:
∂2F
∂R˜t∂qt
=
(
R˜2t + 2(1− qt)ξ˜tψ˜t
)
f ′′(qt) + qt(1− qt)ξ˜tψ˜tf ′′′(qt)
−R˜t
∂2F
∂q2t
=
ψ˜t
(
qtξ˜tf
′′′(qt) +
(
R˜t + 2ξ˜t
)
f ′′(qt)
)
+
(
f ′′′′(qt)qtξ˜t + f ′′′(qt)
(
R˜t + 3ξ˜t
)) (
R˜t − (1− qt)ψ˜t
)
−R˜t
∂2F
∂R2t
= 2 (f
′(qt) + f ′′(qt)(1− q)q) ξ˜tψ˜t
R˜3t
since f ′′ < 0 and f ′′′ ≤ 0 f ′′′′ ≤ 0 and all parameters are positive, it is obvious that
∂2F
∂Rt∂qt
> 0 and ∂2F
∂q2t
> 0. The term∂2F
∂R2t
is less straightforward. A sufficient condition for
∂2F
∂R2t
> 0 can be found using condition (83):
1
(1− qt)qt ≥
(
R˜t + ξ˜t
) (
R˜t − ψ˜t
)
qtξ˜t
(
R˜t − (1− qt)ψ˜t
)
which simplifies to:
qt
(1− qt) ξ˜t ≥ R˜t − ψ˜t
Given the signs of the terms in (84) we have finally verified that:
∂2qt
∂R˜2t
= ((+) + (+) (+)) (−)− ((+) (+) + (+)) (+)(+) < 0
Under alternative assumption (2b) the expression for ∂2qt
∂R˜2t
simplifies to:
∂2qt
∂R˜2t
= −f
′(qt)(−2f ′′(qt)f ′′′(qt)qtξ˜t−2(f ′′(qt))2(R˜t+2ξ˜t)+f ′(qt)(f ′′′′(qt)qtξ˜t+f ′′′(qt)(R˜t+3ξ˜t)))
(f ′′′(qt)ξ˜t+f ′′(qt)(R˜t+2ξ˜t))3
which is negative without further conditions.
Using the signs of the derivatives of qt and the fact that f ′(qt) > f ′(qoptt ) = θ, we can
finally determine the slope and curvature of the expected return on the bank’s investment.
∂[f(qt)+(1−(qt))θ]
∂R˜t
= (f ′(qt)− θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂qt
∂R˜t︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0
∂2[f(qt)+(1−(qt))θ]
∂R˜2t
= (f ′(qt)− θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂2qt
∂R˜2t︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+ f ′′(qt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
∂qt
∂R˜t︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0
This completes the proof of claims (d) and (e).
Notice that the quadratic functional form we assumed for f(qt) in the model section
satisfies assumptions (3) and (4) and we focused on interior solutions (assumption (1)).
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Therefore claims (1), (2), (3) and (4) in propositions 1 and 2 hold. Furthermore, claim
(5) in proposition 1 holds since assumption (2a) is satisfied. Finally, to see that claim (5)
in proposition 2.1 holds independent of assumption (2a) and (2b), consider the solution
for qt
qt = 1− R˜ψ˜t +
√
ω2(R˜t−ψ˜t)(R˜t+2ξ˜t)(2ω1ψ˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)+ω2(R˜t−ψ˜t)(R˜t+2ξ˜t))
ω2ψ˜t(R˜t+2ξ˜t)
The second derivative of this expression is:
∂2q
∂R˜2t
= −
ω1ω2
{
2ω2
(
R˜t − ψ˜t
)3
ξ˜t
(
R˜t + 2ξ˜t
)
+ ω1ψ˜t...
...
[
R˜4t + 2R˜t
(
4R˜2t − 3R˜tψ˜t + 2ψ˜t
2
ξ˜t
)
+
(
12R˜t − 4R˜tψ˜t + 5ψ˜t2
)
ξ˜2t + 8R˜t + ˜4ψtξ˜3t + 16ξ˜4t
]}
(R˜t+2ξ˜t){ω2(R˜t−ψ˜t)(R˜t+2ξ˜t)[2ω1ψ˜t(R˜t+ξ˜t)+b(R˜t−ψ˜t)(R˜t+2ξ˜t)]}2/3
Both the numerator and denominator are positive, so ∂2q
∂R˜2t
< 0. Hence ∂2[f(qt)+(1−(qt))θ]
∂R˜2t
< 0.

Deposits in excess of insurance
The proof is by contradiction: Assume that there exists an equilibrium with no excess
profits where the bank would issue so little deposits that the promised repayment rd,t
would be lower than the cap on deposit insurance ψ/(1 − kt)pit+1.51 In this case the
deposit rate rd,t would be equal to the risk-free rate Rt.
The second-stage maximization problem of the bank would then be:
max
qt∈[0,1]
f(qt)r˜l,t − qtR˜t(1− kt)
and its solution qˆt is implied by f ′(qt)r˜l,t = R˜t(1 − kt). The first-stage maximization
problem is:
max
kt∈[0,1]
V (kt) = f(qˆt)r˜l,t − qˆR˜t(1− kt)− (ξ˜t + R˜t)kt
qˆt can either be a corner or an interior solution. If qˆt is a corner solution, the first-stage
objective function of the bank is obviously decreasing in kt, hence kt = 0 is optimal. If qˆt
is an interior solution, the first derivative of the first-stage objective function is:
−ξ˜t − R˜t(1− qˆt)
Since qˆt ∈ [0, 1], this derivative is negative for all kt ∈ [0, 1], i.e. the objective function
is again decreasing in k. Hence the solution to the first-stage problem is kt = 0. Optimality
51For simplicity, we abstract from the possibility that the cap is binding for some states of the future
but not for others, which would be possible due to the inconsistency between the timing of inflation and
the nominal deposit rate. Note that this distinction disappears under certainty equivalence or first-order
approximation.
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with full insurance therefore requires the bank to use only deposits. This contradicts our
initial assumption. This result implies that any insurance cap smaller than 100% would
be exceeded by the deposit liabilities in case of default. Depositors are therefore never
fully insured.
Notice that for a cap to be effective in the sense of ruling out full insurance equilibria,
the cap has to be low enough. Formally speaking, it needs to hold that rd,t(1− kt) > ψ˜t
even under full insurance, i.e. R˜t > ψ˜t.
Appendix D: Empirical motivation - the asset risk-taking channel
in the US
To motivate our theoretical analysis we provide here additional empirical evidence on
the existence of the asset risk-taking channel in the US. Our starting point is a classical
small-scale VAR that includes inflation, output, a measure of bank risk taking and the
effective federal funds rate, taken as the monetary policy instrument. Output is measured
by real GDP growth, while inflation is defined as the log change in the GDP deflator.
The transformation of the variables matches that used for the DSGE estimation, and is
described in appendix A. Identification of the monetary policy shock is achieved through
sign restrictions that do not involve the measure of bank risk, and are in this sense
agnostic. We find that an unexpected decrease in the risk-free interest rate causes a
persistent increase in bank risk taking, a result robust to using a recursive identification
scheme.
Measuring bank risk-taking behavior There are many notions of asset risk. One
can distinguish between ex-ante, ex-post and realized asset risk. The former is the risk
perceived by the bank when making a loan or buying an asset. Banks can influence this
class of risk directly, when making their investment decisions (the ex-ante risk choice). On
the other hand, the ex-post risk of a bank’s balance sheet is also affected by unforeseen
changes in asset riskiness, that take place after origination and are largely outside the
banks’ influence. Lastly, the payoff ultimately paid by an asset is a materialization of
the former two types of uncertainty (realized asset risk). In this paper we focus on active
risk taking, that is the level of ex-ante risk that intermediaries choose. Ex-ante bank
risk taking is however largely unobservable. Inferring it from realized risk (e.g. loan
losses) is hardly possible with aggregate data. Inference from the spread between some
measure of bank funding costs and loan rates neglects the fact that this spread not only
reflects default risk but also incorporates a liquidity premium and the markup, which
are likely to be affected by the same variables that influence the risk choice. Instead,
we use a survey-based proxy for bank risk-taking, which is provided by the US Terms
of Business Lending Survey and consists in the internal risk rating assigned by banks to
newly issued loans. In this survey, available from 1997-Q1 onwards, 400 banks report the
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volume of loans originated in first week of the mid month each quarter, grouped by the
internal risk rating. This rating varies between 1 and 5, with 5 being the maximum level
of risk. Following Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014), we construct a weighted average loan risk
series, using as weights the value of loans in each risk category.52 We plot this measure
of risk, together with the nominal risk-free interest rate, in figure 3. We can see that low
levels of the monetary policy instrument tend to be associated with higher level of bank
risk (lower or decreasing levels in the blue line). This is particularly evident in the period
between 2000 and 2006, when the monetary policy stance in the US was deemed to be
particularly lax.53
Figure 3: Bank risk taking and nominal interest rate: The risk measure (solid blue line, left axis)
is redefined such that a decrease is associated with higher risk-taking of the banking sector, matching the
definition in the theoretical model discussed later. The nominal interest rate (dashed line, right axis) is
the effective federal funds rate.
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Identification strategy and results We estimate a VAR on US data from 1997:Q2,
the start of the survey-based proxy for risk taking, to 2007:Q3, as described in appendix
A54. The lag length is chosen to be 1, as indicated by the BIC information criterion.
We identify an unexpected monetary policy shock by using a set of sign restrictions
that are robust across a variety of general-equilibrium models. In particular, we assume
that an expansionary monetary policy shock decreases the nominal risk-free interest rate,
and increases inflation and output, both at the time of the shock and in the quarter
immediately after. Note that the response of inflation ensures that this shock is identified
separately from a productivity shock, as summarized in table 5.
52The average loan risk is a perfect measure for bank risk taking if we assume that the volume of loans
is constant. Else, banks could also minimize their risk exposure by reducing the quantity of loans as
their average quality goes down. While the correlation between risk and loan volume growth is slightly
negative, it is not significant at a 10% significance level. For a more in-depth discussion of the data we
refer to Buch et al. (2014).
53See, for instance, the discussion in Taylor (2007).
54We have decided to cut the zero-lower bound period, but our results still hold when the latest available
data are used.
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Table 5: Sign restriction identification scheme: restrictions are assumed to hold on impact and
on the following period.
variables
shock y pi R
monetary policy shock + + −
total factor productivity shock + − −
Figure 4: Monetary policy shock on bank risk-taking: Impulse responses over a 3-year horizon,
identified through the sign restriction scheme in Table 1. Error bands correspond to 90% confidence
intervals reflecting rotation uncertainty. Loan safety is defined as the inverse of the average loan risk
rating, standarized to take values between 0 and 100. The remaining variables are annualized. See text
for further details.
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The response of bank asset risk to an expansionary monetary policy shock is shown
in figure 4. An unexpected decrease in the monetary policy interest rate is followed by a
moderate macroeconomic expansion: output growth increases for less than a year, while
inflation displays a longer reaction of about two years. The results are compatible with
the existence of a risk-taking channel in the US: a fall in the nominal interest rate leads
in fact to a decrease in the ex-ante proxy for the safety of banks’ assets, i.e. banks issue
riskier loans. Interestingly, the implied responses of the nominal interest rate and the risk
measure are approximately proportional.
We assess the robustness of our results by employing a recursive identification scheme
as in Angeloni et al. (2015). Output and inflation are always ordered before the nominal
interest rate, implicitly assuming that they do not react to interest rate shocks, nor to
shocks coming from the banking sector. More controversial is the ordering of the nominal
interest rate and of the loan risk rating. We experiment with both orderings and show
in figure 5 that results do not depend on the ordering chosen and confirm the results
obtained using sign restrictions.55
55Our measure of risk taking does not take into account loan quantities. For example, riskier lending
may go hand in hand with lower loan volumes which may leave the expected loss volume unchanged.
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Figure 5: An expansionary monetary policy shock - Recursive identification scheme. Error
bands correspond to 90% confidence intervals obtained by bootstrap. Loan safety is defined as the inverse
of the average loan risk rating, standarized to take values between 0 and 100. The remaining variables
are annualized. See text for further details.
Federal funds rate ordered last
5 10 15 20
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
%
p
o
in
t
s
Outpu t growth
5 10 15 20
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
%
p
o
in
t
s
Infl ati on
5 10 15 20
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
%
p
o
in
t
s
Loan safe ty
5 10 15 20
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
%
p
o
in
t
s
Nominal i nte re st rate
Risk ordered last
5 10 15 20
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
%
p
o
in
t
s
Outpu t growth
5 10 15 20
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
%
p
o
in
t
s
Infl ati on
5 10 15 20
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
%
p
o
in
t
s
Nominal i nte re st rate
5 10 15 20
−4
−2
0
2
%
p
o
in
t
s
Loan safe ty
When adding loan volumes to the VAR we find that the response of volumes is not significantly different
from zero with the mean showing no clear pattern in either direction, while the other IRFs remain
unchanged.
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Chapter II
Austerity to save the banks? A
quantitative model of sovereign
default with endogenous default
costs and a financial sector
1 Introduction
In the recent European debt crisis many governments faced a dilemma: Enforce austerity
in times of crisis to generate the surplus needed to repay their debt or default on their
debt obligations and face the financial disruptions entailed. In many cases it seemed hard
to believe that austerity policies were the less painful choice and some countries eventually
defaulted, most notably Greece. Yet the Greek experience, just like the recent defaults
by Russia or Argentina, confirmed that default does indeed entail a significant cost: In all
three cases the financial sector suffered major losses, which lead to severe repercussions
in the real economy.
These dramatic events brought an old question to the forefront of the policy and
academic debate: Why should sovereign governments repay their debt, even though there
is no institution that can force them to? This paper proposes a quantitative model
of opportunistic sovereign default with endogenous default costs reflecting the recent
experiences in Greece and elsewhere to answer this question.
In the model debt is issued by the government of a small open economy. This economy
is populated by households, banks and firms, which produce output from labor and capital.
The banks issue deposits to the household and invest into loans to firms and sovereign
bonds. Their capacity to intermediate private savings within the economy is constrained
by a financial friction, which limits their leverage. Besides the domestic banks, foreign
investors are also active in the sovereign debt market. This debt is commitment free, that
is the government, which maximizes the domestic households’ utility, can default on its
debt in a nondiscriminatory fashion whenever it finds it opportune to do so. Since this
model does not rely on any exogenous costs of default, not repaying the foreign held debt
per-se is a free lunch. Yet since defaulting on domestic banks generates a financial crisis
in the domestic economy, default becomes costly to the benevolent government. Besides
I would like to thank Arpad Abraham, Luigi Boccola, Nils Gornemann, Enrique Mendoza, Evi Pappa,
Cesar Sosa-Padilla and Leopold von Thadden as well as my colleagues at European University Institute
and the ECB and the organizers and participants of the 2014 ZICE workshop for useful comments. I
thank the ECB for funding my research stay in Frankfurt.
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the output losses due to the financial crisis, default furthermore is followed by a period
during which the government prefers not to issue new debt given the current prices. In
other words, the government self excludes itself from international capital markets. The
model is hence capable of simultaneously explaining both the output costs of default as
well as the breakdown of international lending after default. These costs constitute a
commitment device, which explains why governments mostly repay and hence why they
can borrow. Furthermore, the existence of capital in combination with the frictions in
domestic intermediation drive a wedge between the actual return on capital and the return
perceived by the household. This gives rise to an arbitrage motive, which explains why
governments want to borrow.
The model is calibrated to Greek data. Besides inheriting the quantitative features of
the RBC production structure, the model is successful at replicating both the empirical
magnitude of the output losses of default as well as estimates of the distribution of the
duration of the international capital market shutdown. Furthermore, I use the model to
argue that a recently debated policy proposal to reduce the exposure of European banks to
domestic sovereign debt may have severe unintended consequences: As the banks exposure
is reduced banks do not only become more resilient to sovereign debt crisis. Such a policy
furthermore reduces the degree to which the government can commit repayment of its
debt. Given a 20% reduction in the banks’ exposure, the model predicts a reduction in
the total amount of foreign debt sustainable by about one half. If implemented abruptly,
this reform would trigger default with a high probability.
This theory is motivated by a large body of empirical evidence. De Paoli et al. (2006),
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007), Acharya et al. (2011), Bolton and Jeanne (2011),
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b), Sosa-Padilla (2012) and Gennaioli et al. (2014) all document
the link between sovereign default and financial crisis. Gennaioli et al. (2014) for example
compile an international panel comprising data on the macro economy, public debt and
financial institutions’ balance sheets, covering 110 default episodes. They document that
domestic banks hold significant amounts of domestic sovereign debt and that defaults
often precede financial crises. Furthermore, they provide evidence that credit extended
by banks to the private sector drops significantly in case of default and that this drop is
stronger, the more exposed banks are to sovereign debt. Consequentially, they find that
higher shares of domestic debt reduce the probability of default.
This paper is related to a recent field of theoretical literature that analyzes sovereign
default in quantitative models, based on the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) framework.
Motivated by empirical observations this literature initially simply assumed that default
on external sovereign debt is costly, due to capital market exclusion and output costs (see
Arellano (2008) or Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)). Subsequently, researchers attempted to
endogenously explain the costs of default. For example, D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2012)
show that the distributional effects of default can explain default and repayment, while
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Guembel and Sussman (2009) outline a theory of political support in favor of or against
default. In Mendoza and Yue (2012) default leads to market exclusion not only for the
government but also for firms, which need the international markets to finance inter-period
working capital. This paper adds to this literature by proposing a quantitative model
where the costs of default arise from the exposure of the financial system to government
debt.
In doing so it provides 3 novel conceptual insights, all of which are found to be quan-
titatively relevant: First, the introduction of physical capital not only bridges the gap
between the sovereign default literature and the RBC model56, it furthermore yields a
new theory for why governments borrow. Virtually all the external sovereign default lit-
erature to date relies on the assumption that the borrowing country is impatient relative
to the world interest rate to explain why the country borrows. I show that capital as
a domestic savings technology together with the financial friction implies a permanent
difference between the return on domestic capital and the world interest rate, creating an
opportunity for arbitrage. Second, this is the first model on sovereign default to gener-
ate market exclusion as an equilibrium outcome. The existing literature typically simply
introduces exclusion by assumption, often referring to it as a coordinated punishment
strategy by lenders57. In many cases where the output costs of default are modeled en-
dogenously, they actually result from this assumption (e.g. Mendoza and Yue (2012)).
On the contrary, in the model I propose market exclusion arises as an optimal choice:
During the financial crisis the marginal return on domestic investment is depressed and
falls below the world interest rate. Hence, the gains from trade vanish temporarily, bor-
rowing becomes relatively expensive and abstention from external borrowing is optimal.
Third, this paper provides a new quantitative theory of the costs of sovereign default,
where sovereign default leads to a breakdown of intermediation resulting in a period of
underinvestment.
Four recent working papers also endogenize output costs by introducing a financial
sector, many of which have been concurrent work. Like in this paper, in these models
the bank is exposed to sovereign debt. Sosa-Padilla (2012) develops a very stylized model
in which banks’ wealth directly serves as an input to production, without providing in-
termediation services. In Engler and Grosse Steffen (2016), Mallucci (2014) and Perez
(2015) and local banks trade on inter-banking markets, and sovereign default brings these
markets to collapse: in the first and second case because sovereign bonds are necessary as
collateral to facilitate interbank lending and this collateral disappears in case of default,
in the last because the interbank-leverage is constrained. The collapse of the interbank
markets then leads to efficiency losses. While similar in spirit, a number of features in my
model are unique. First, all these models have in common that the bank needs to finance
56Joo (2014) and Gornemann (2015) also introduce capital into a default model.
57Kletzer (1994) has criticized this argument, since it would be profitable for each individual lender to
deviate from the punishment strategy.
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the labor bill in advance through intra-period loans. In my model on the contrary, the
bank finances capital. This gives rise to a more realistic bank balance sheet and, as ex-
plained above, generates a novel motive for borrowing. Second, the model I propose gives
rise to exclusion endogenously as a consequence of the financial crisis. On the contrary, all
of these papers simply assume exclusion and, apart from Sosa-Padilla (2012), rely on this
assumption to generate the financial crisis and the corresponding output costs of default.
The idea that sovereign default inflicts costly damage to the financial sector is also
developed in a more stylized manner in 3 periods models like Acharya et al. (2011), Basu
(2010), Bolton and Jeanne (2011), Brutti (2011), Gennaioli et al. (2014), Erce (2012) and
Mayer (2011). Due to their 1 shot nature, none of these models can speak about market
exclusion or be tested quantitatively.
At the same time this paper is also related to the macro literature on the role of
frictions in the financial sector, for which the handbook chapter of Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) is representative. Yet, while the shocks to the banks’ balance sheets in these
model result from the banks’ lending to the real economy, I focus on the shocks resulting
from their lending to the government. Boccola (2016) analyzes sovereign default and its
consequences in the context of the former model, yet he considers the default decision as
exogenous.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section lays out a quantitative
model of sovereign default with a 3 sector production economy and discusses the key
assumptions. Section 3 explains the mechanisms of the model, before the computational
strategy and the calibration are discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents the main
quantitative results and section 6 uses the model to evaluate the effects of a policy that
reduces the exposure of banks to domestic sovereign debt. The last section concludes.
2 The model
This chapter proposes a dynamic small open economy model of sovereign default, where
the only costs of default stem from the exposure of the domestic banking sector to
sovereign risk. The domestic private economy is made up of 3 sectors, namely households,
banks and firms and is governed by a benevolent government. The domestic economy is
open and can borrow from international lenders (the rest of the world).
2.1 The household
There is a continuum of mass 1 of identical households, which each make a consumption-
labor-savings choice. The household is risk averse and can invest into bank deposits dh and
loans to firms kh. Bank deposits are promises to pay 1 unit of the final good tomorrow,
which can be bought at price r. Loans are promises to repay R′ units of the final good
tomorrow, which can be bought at price 1 + ξ, where ξ is an exogenous variable, which
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reflects transaction costs and which follows a stochastic process discussed later.58 Both
assets are safe and loans can’t be shorted.59 The household’s disposable income is the
sum of the value of his assets carried over from the last period dh +Rkh, his labor income
Wlh and the lump sum dividend and profit payments from the banks Div and the firms
pi, minus a lump sum tax T . The household has rational expectations and chooses labor,
consumption and investment to maximize his lifetime utility, taking prices and aggregate
states as given.
The household’s problem hence is:
Vh(d,Ω) = maxc,d′
h
,k′
h
,lhu(c, l) + βE|Ω Vh(d′,Ω′)
st.
c+ rd′h + (1 + ξ)k′h + T = dh +Rkh +Wlh +Div + pi (1)
k′h ≥ 0
where Ω denotes the aggregate state vector. For instantaneous utility I choose a con-
ventional CARA function with additively separable disutility from labor, as for example
in Boccola (2016):
u(c, l) = c
1−γ
1− γ + χ
l1+ν
1 + ν
The corresponding first order conditions are necessary and sufficient:
uc(c, l) r = βE|Ω [uc(c′, l′)] (2)
uc(c, l)(1 + ξ) = βR′E|Ω [uc(c′, l′)] + λh (3)
0 = min {λh , k′h} (4)
uc(c, l)W = ul(c, l) (5)
2.2 The banks
The bank is the key agent in this economy. Banks intermediate the savings from the
households to the firm more efficiently than if the household invests directly, yet they
are constraint by a financial friction that gives rise to a leverage constraint. It is this
constraint that ultimately makes default costly for the government.
There is continuum of mass 1 of identical banks, each of which is run by a banker. (In
this subsection, I drop the index b to simplify notation). The banker is a small member
of the household, hence he uses the household’s stochastic discount factor to value the
58As will become clear later, the fact that banks do not face these transaction costs makes intermediated
lending desirable.
59Explicitly state contingent contracts or default are ruled out by assumption.
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payoff of his activities.
The banker enters each period with a portfolio of 1 period assets and liabilities (his
balance sheet) chosen last period. In particular, he holds (1) k units of firm loans which
pay the ex-ante fixed gross return R; (2) b units of government bonds which return 1 unit
if repaid (Rep = 1), otherwise they return nothing (Rep = 0); and (3) he owes depositors
d. The net cash flow of these 3 assets defines the bank’s pre-dividend equity e.
e = Rk + bRep− d
From this net cash-flow, the banker chooses how much to take home to his household,
or, more formally speaking, how much dividend div to pay to his shareholders. The rest
he carries into the period on the balance sheet as post dividend equity e− div. Given the
post-dividend equity, the banker next chooses his optimal portfolio of assets and liabilities:
he can invest in loans to firms k′ at price 1, buy government bonds b′ at price q, and sell
deposits d′ at price r. This yields the following end-of-period balance sheet:
Assets Liabilities
Loans k′ Deposits r · d′
Government bonds q · b′ Post dividend equity e− div
which can equivalently be expressed by the balance sheet equation:
qb′ + k′ = e− div + rd′
Note that, from the lenders point of view, loans by banks are different than loans by
the household - think of the latter as corporate bonds or entrepreneurial self-financing.
While the bank pays 1 unit to provide 1 unit of financing to the firm, the household pays
1 + ξ to provide 1 unit of financing to the firm. This cost difference stems from the su-
perior screening and monitoring technology that the bank possesses. Bank intermediated
financing is hence more efficient, which provides an explanation for why banks exist. As
mentioned before ξ is allowed to vary over the cycle. In particular I assume that ξ is
related to total factor productivity (TFP) ω according to ξ = ξ¯ω−ξˆ.
Besides the balance sheet equation, the banker’s choice is constrained by several other
constraints. The first constraint is crucial. Following Iacoviello (2005) I assume that
bankers face a commitment problem: Between periods, i.e. after having invested into
loans and bonds, but before the revelation of next period TFP, bankers can abandon the
bank. In that case the depositors would take over the bank, but they would only be
able to recover a fraction θ of the cash-flow, since they lack the special skills to run the
bank. This option gives the banker the opportunity to renegotiate the deposit contract.
Assuming that the banker has all bargaining power, the banker makes depositors a take-
it-or-leave-it offer: Either depositors agree to reducing the deposit repayment to a level
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that leaves them indifferent between accepting or rejecting the offer, or the banker will
abandon the bank. Of course depositors anticipate this, which is why, ex ante, they will
not accept any contract that is not renegotiation-proof. This translates into a leverage
constraint, requiring the bank to hold a certain minimum of expected pre-dividend equity
tomorrow (weighted by the depositors’ expected marginal utility):
E|Ω [uc(c′)] d′ ≤ E|Ω [uc(c′)θ(Rep′ b′ +R′ k′)]
Second, the banker’s dividend choice is constrained below, it can not be smaller than
a certain (1− η) fraction of equity.
div ≥ (1− η)e
This assumption, which is common in the macro literature on financial frictions60, makes
sure that the leverage constraint introduced above bites: One on hand, the banker can’t
simply raise new equity should he require more. On the other hand, the fact that he
constantly has to payout a positive dividend ensures that he also can’t overcome the
equity constraint over time by accumulating retained earnings. At the same time it is not
completely at odds with reality: Banks seem to have difficulties raising capital especially
in times of crisis and they generally try to smooth their dividends.61
Third, the bank has to hold a fixed fraction of government bonds on the balance sheet:
b′q
b′q + k′ = ψ
Fourth, next period equity must not be negative.
Rk ≥ d
Finally, there is no short selling of assets.
b′ ≥ 0, k′ ≥ 0
The bank has rational expectations and maximizes the discounted value of dividends,
taking the discount factor, the prices and the law of motion of the aggregate state as
given. Her objective function reads
Vb(d, b, k,Ω) = maxb′,k′d′,div div + E|Ω
(
β
uc(c′)
uc(c)
)
Vb (d′, b′, k′,Ω′)
After substituting out div, rearranging and abstracting from the short selling con-
60E.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), who motivate the same assumption by retiring bankers.
61The constraint implies that the dividend per (book) equity ratio (also known as dividends per share)
is bounded below by a fraction of the gross return on (book) equity. Since the gross return is fairly stable
across the cycle, even if the net return varies strongly, dividends per share are fairly stable.
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straints, which cannot be binding in any equilibrium with banking, and the non-negativity
constraint62, the banks problem is:
Vb(d, b, k,Ω) = maxb′,k′d′ (e+ rd′ − qb′ + k′)uc(c) + βE|Ω [Vb (d′, b′, k′,Ω′)]
st.
E|Ω [uc(c′)d′] ≤ E|Ω [uc(c′)θ(Rep′ b′ +R′ k′)]
(1− η)e ≤ e+ rd′ − qb′ − k′
b′q = ψ (b′q + k′)
where e = Rk + bRep− d
The solution of the bank’s dynamic problem can conveniently be characterized as I show
next.
Proposition 1: The vector of choice variables [b′, d′, k′] ∈
(
R+0
)3
is a solution to the
banks problem if and only if together with the vector of multipliers [λ1, λ2, λ3] ∈
(
R+0
)3
it solves the system of first order conditions
∂L/∂d′ : 0 = ruc(c)− βE|Ω [Vbe(e′,Ω′)]− λ1E|Ω [uc(c′)] + λ2r (6)
∂L/∂b′ : 0 = −quc(c)+βE|Ω[Rep′Vbe(e′,Ω′)]+λ1E|Ω[Rep′uc(c′)] θ−λ2q+qλ3(1−ψ)(7)
∂L/∂k′ : 0 = −uc(c) + βRE|Ω [Vbe(e′,Ω′)] + λ1R′E|Ω [uc(c′)] θ − λ2 − λ3ψ (8)
∂L/∂λ1 : 0 = min
{
E|Ω [uc(c)θ(Rep′ b′ +R′k′)]− E|Ω [uc(c′)d′] , λ1
}
(9)
∂L/∂λ2 : 0 = min {ηe− qb′ − k′ + rd′ , λ2} (10)
∂L/∂λ3 : 0 = b′q − (b′q + k)ψ (11)
where Vbe(e′,Ω′) , the derivative of the value function wrt. equity, is given by Vbe(e′,Ω′) =
uc(c′) + ηλ′2.
Proof: Five steps are necessary to arrive to this result. First, note that the value
function of the bank Vb (d, b, k,Ω) can be summarized as a function Vb (e,Ω) of only one
endogenous state variable e = Rk + bRep − d since (b, d, k) only enter the problem as
this linear combination. Second, the solution of the problem of the bank [b′, d′, k′] and its
value function Vb (e,Ω) is linear in e. To proof this second claim, assume that Vb (e′,Ω′) is
linear in e′. Be x a solution to the bank’s problem given e and Ω. Denote the associated
value function by V˜b(e,Ω) . Then we can conclude that αx is optimal given αe for any
α ∈ R+ since both the objective and the constraints are linear in both e and x . (If there
existed αx′ that is feasible given αe such that V˜b(αx′,Ω) > V˜b(αx,Ω) then by linearity x′
62The model will be parametrized such that this abstraction remains irrelevant.
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would also be feasible given e and by homogeneity it would dominate x.) Therefore the
solution of the banks problem - given a linear Vb (e′,Ω′) - is linear in e. Furthermore, by
linearity the value of this solution V˜b(e,Ω) also needs to be linear in e. Since the same
reasoning applies to the value function of all the following periods, the initial assumption
that Vb (e′,Ω′) is linear in e′ must hold. Third, the first and second result together imply
Vb (e′,Ω′) is linear in [b′, d′, k′]. Fourth, given the third result it is obvious that both the
constraints and the objective of the optimization problem are affine functions. Hence, the
first order conditions are necessary and sufficient. Fifth, to determine the derivative of the
value function w.r.t equity Vbe(e′,Ω′) we can apply the envelope theorem for maximization
problems with inequality constraints: Vbe(e′,Ω′) = uc(c′) + ηλ′2. 
The second part of the proof furthermore implies that the distribution of equity among
banks does not matter, which allows us to represent the banking sector by a representative
bank. The last step furthermore implies that the marginal value of equity Vbe(e′,Ω′)(e′,Ω′)
does not depend on e′. This allows us to eliminate all references to the value function
from the FOCs and to characterize the bank’s optimal choice in terms of policy functions
alone, which is convenient for the computations.
2.3 The firms
There is a continuum of mass 1 of firms. The dynamic problem of the firm can be broken
down to a 2 period problem. In the first period the firm borrows kf units from the banks
and households at a fixed interest rate R′, which she transforms into capital for the next
period. In the second period the firm hires lf units of labor from the households and
produces. The firm uses a standard Cobb-Douglas production function with capital share
α and stochastic TFP ω and capital depreciates at rate δ. TFP ω follows a log-normal
AR(1) process with persistence ρ and variance σ2
log(ω) = ρlog(ω−1) + σε
Like the bank the firm manager is part of the household, to whom any profits or losses pi
are rebated lump sum and whose stochastic discount factor the firm manager uses. His
sequential optimization problem is
maxk′
f
E|Ω
[(
β
uc(c′)
uc(c)
)(
ω′
(
k′f
)α (
lˆ(ω′)
)1−α
+ (1− δ)k′f −R′k′f −W (ω′)lˆ(ω′)′
)]
s.t
lˆ(ω′) = argmaxl′
f
ω′
(
k′f
)α (
l′f
)1−α
+ (1− δ)k′f −Rk′f −W (ω′)l′f
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The first order conditions determining the loan rate and the wage are necessary and
sufficient:
R′ = E|Ω
[
uc(c′)
(
ω′αkα−1f l
1−α
f + (1− δ)
)]
/E|Ω [uc(c′)] (12)
W = ω(1− α)kαf l−αf (13)
2.4 The foreign investors
The model describes a small open economy. The rest of the world is represented by
perfectly competitive risk neutral deep pocket foreign investors, who demand any asset
inelastically that pays their expected rate of return 1/q¯ (i.e. the world interest rate). I
assume that lending to domestic private agents requires local know-how and is not possible
for the foreign investors, but they can invest in the 1 period government bond. Foreign
demand for government bonds, denoted by Bx, is hence given by
Bx ∈
0 if E|ΩRep
′/q < 1/q¯
[0,∞) if E|ΩRep′/q = 1/q¯
(14)
2.5 Market clearing
This completes the discussion of the private agents’ problems. We are ready to close the
private economy by the corresponding market clearing conditions. From now I will denote
aggregate choice variables by capital letters, i.e.
´ 1
o
xidi = XI where i is the respective
agent’s index and I its type. Labor market clearing requires
LF = LH (15)
Loan and deposit market clearing implies
K ′F = K ′H +K ′B (16)
D′B = D′H (17)
Finally, bond markets clear when the total government debt issuance B¯′ equals the total
demand by foreigners and local banks
B′B +B′X = B¯′ (18)
and then by Walras’ law the goods markets clear as well.
This concludes the set up of the private economy. Before we move to the problem of the
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government, which will choose its tax, borrowing and repayment policy, it is convenient
to define the notion of a private equilibrium, given a certain set of government policies
T (Ω), B¯(Ω), Rep(Ω).
Definition 1: Private equilibrium Given certain state dependent government policy
functions T (Ω), B¯′(Ω), Rep(Ω) a stationary private equilibrium consists of a set of state
dependent policy functions C(Ω), LH(Ω), D′H(Ω),K ′H(Ω), D′B(Ω), B′B(Ω),K ′B(Ω),K ′F (Ω),
LF (Ω), B′X(Ω) price functions r(Ω), q(Ω), R′(Ω),W (Ω) and shadow price functions λ1(Ω),
λ2(Ω), λ3(Ω), λH(Ω) such that the maximization problems of the household, the bank
and the firm are solved, the foreign lenders’ demand is satisfied, markets clear and such
that the policy functions imply the state transition function thats underlies the agents’
expectations.
Call the vector of policy, price and shadow price functions X(Ω). Denote the func-
tional equation system over the domain Ω, which is defined by equations (2) to (18)
after replacing all individual variables with the corresponding aggregate variables63, by
F(X,Ω) = 0. Then, since all first order conditions are necessary and sufficient, an equiv-
alent way of defining a stationary private equilibrium is: X(Ω) such that F(X,Ω) = 0
given any T (Ω), B¯(Ω), Rep(Ω).
What are the state variables in this problem? First, we need to keep track of the
exogenous state variable ω. Second, we need to account for the endogenous choices of the
representative household and the bank, which have an inter-temporal dimension. This
encompasses the loans extended by the householdKH ; the deposits issued by the bank and
bought by the household, D; the loans extended by the bank KB; the bonds bought by
the bank BB and the loan rate set ex ante R. Furthermore Ω encompasses the endogenous
variable BX , the amount of outstanding sovereign debt held abroad, because this variable
influences the government policy choices, that are discussed next. The state vector is
hence Ω = [ω,KH , D,BB, KB, R,BX ].
2.6 The government
The model economy is governed by a benevolent government, which chooses its actions
such as to maximize the households’ utility. It needs to finance some fixed government
expenditures G and it can do so by taxing the household through the lump sum tax T 64
and issuing 1 period government bonds B¯′, which are a promise to repay 1 unit tomorrow
and are traded at price q.65 These bonds are sold on anonymous markets, where both
63This change reflects the equilibrium requirement that individual and aggregate decisions coincide. In
particular the bank’s, firm’s and the household’s choice variables need to be replaced by their aggregate
counterparts, i.e. capital letters.
64Following the literature, I assume lump sum taxation. This simplifies the model by avoiding a motive
for distortion smoothing.
65Explicitly state contingent contracts are ruled out.
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local banks and international investors can buy them. While it is known who buys the
bonds (banks buy B′B, foreign lenders invest B′F ), the government cannot discriminate
buyers, neither at the time of issuance nor at the time of repayment. Sovereign debt is
non-enforceable and the government can not commit; the government is free to choose to
repay its debt (Rep = 1) or to fully default on its obligations (Rep = 0) at the beginning
of each period after observing the realization of the TFP shock. In case of default there
is no direct punishment: in particular foreign lenders do not refrain from lending, and no
direct output costs arise. Yet I assume that following default the government effectively
can not save abroad, because its foreign assets would else be seized by the creditors.66
This gives rise to the following government budget constraint:
q · B¯′ + T ≥ B ·Rep+G (19)
BF ≥ 0
It is important to note that the government is the only agent who is ’big’ and hence
fully understands the impact of each agents decision, including its own, on the equilib-
rium. This means it understands how its own decisions influence the choices of house-
holds, banks, firms and foreign lenders. While no direct default costs are assumed, the
government understands that defaulting erodes the banks’ equity, reduces their capacity
to intermediate and hence leads to lower capital and therefore less production and income
for the household. This is how default becomes costly to the government - despite the ab-
sence of any direct punishment - and hence why it may choose to repay for certain regions
in the state space ex post. Furthermore, the government understands that its decision
how much new debt to issue influences the expectations of everyone on the probability of
default tomorrow. That means the government takes into account the effect of its actions
on all private variables, including the bond price.
We can summarize the government’s problem as follows in the notation common in
the default literature:
VG(Ω) = maxRep∈{0,1}{RepVGR + (1−Rep)VGD}
66In the optimization problem of the government below, I enforce this constraint also before default.
This simplifies matters and is innocuous since in equilibrium the constraint only binds after default for
the part of the parameter space that we are interested in.
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where the value of repayment is
VGR(Ω) = maxT,B¯′,XVH(Ω|Rep = 1)
st.
q · B¯′ + T ≥ B¯ +G
BF ≥ 0
0 = F(X,Ω)
and the value of default is
VGD(Ω) = maxT,B¯′,XVH(Ω|Rep = 0)
st.
q · B¯′ + T ≥ G
BF ≥ 0
0 = F(X,Ω)
Note that the condition 0 = F(X,Ω) constrains the governments choices to be consistent
with a private equilibrium.
Since there is no direct punishment for default, the value functions VGR(Ω) and VGD(Ω)
are equivalent, and we can write the problem more concisely:
VG(Ω) = maxRep,T,B¯′,XVH(Ω) (20)
st.
q · B¯′ + T ≥ B¯ ·Rep+G (21)
BF ≥ 0 (22)
0 = F(X,Ω) (23)
Definition 2: Full equilibrium: A stationary equilibrium in this economy is defined by
a set of value functions V H(Ω), V G(Ω), government policy functions T (Ω), B¯′(Ω), Rep(Ω),
private policy functions C(Ω), LH(Ω), D′H(Ω), K ′H(Ω), D′B(Ω), B′B(Ω), K ′B(Ω), K ′F (Ω),
LF (Ω), B′X(Ω), price functions r(Ω), q(Ω), R′(Ω), W (Ω) and shadow price functions
λ1(Ω), λ2(Ω), λ3(Ω) such that the governments problem (20) is solved subject to its
budget constraint (21), the non-negativity constraint (22) and the equilibrium conditions
of the private economy (23). Appendix A summarizes the government problem.
Intuitively, one can think about the equilibrium as an infinitely repeated game. Each
period the government moves first choosing the new debt and tax levels and whether
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to default, anticipating correctly the reactions of the private agents, which in turn have
correct expectations about the future. Yet another way to think about the full equilibrium
is a private equilibrium that is associated with a set of time-consistent (i.e. commitment
free) optimal government policy functions.
2.7 Discussion of key assumptions
No selective default and no bank bail outs The assumptions that the government
can not choose to default selectively and can not bail out domestic banks after default are
key to generate the endogenous costs of default that sustain an equilibrium with external
debt. If the government could choose to default only on foreign lenders, or equivalently
to inject capital selectively into domestic banks after defaulting, external default would
be costless an hence always ex-post optimal. Since foreigners would anticipate that, no
foreign lending could be sustained. Theoretically, both assumptions can be justified by
secondary markets, as Broner et al. (2010) show. In anonymous markets, if the government
planned to default selectively (or to bail some lenders out) the defaulted upon would
simply sell to the exempted (bailed out). The non-selectivity of default is plausible also
empirically. While there have been a few cases of selective default, they were never with
respect to the holder but to the currency (Moody’s (2008)) or the legislation (Reinhart
and Rogoff (2011a)) of the bond. It seems rather hard to target the holders of the bond
well. The empirical case for no bailouts seems a bit harder to make, given that we do
see that government defaults are often accompanied by bank bailouts. I nevertheless
follow the literature (e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Sosa-Padilla (2012), Engler and
Grosse Steffen (2016)) and rule them out. This must be understood as an approximation
for the fact that these rescue packages (1) typically do not fully compensate for the
full default losses, (2) are politically costly67, and (3) are subject to complicated legal
constraints.
Full default In line with most of the quantitative sovereign default literature in general
and the endogenous default cost literature more specifically, I assume that the government
can only choose between full repayment or full default, even though this assumption
is counter factual - most defaults are partial (see e.g. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2008)). Furthermore, in my model the optimal haircut ex post would generally not be
100%, because the costs of default depend on the amount that banks loose, relative to
their current equity. However, giving the country full discretion over the haircut seems
unrealistic as well. A realistic representation of the default process would be to assume
that a government can choose to either repay fully or enter debt renegotiations. At the
67Political costs can arise because the population perceives that banks were “accomplices” in bringing
upon the dire situation the country finds itself in or because they are provided by an external agent like
the IMF who enforces some conditionality.
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end of these, a proportional haircut is applied the country’s debt and the remainder
repaid. Yet this haircut is not simply a choice of the defaulting country, but is the
outcome of a lengthy and ex-ante highly uncertain renegotiation process.68 Given that
debt renegotiation is not the focus of this paper, it is therefore reasonable to approximate
this haircut as exogenous and potentially stochastic. In order to maintain comparability
with virtually all the existing sovereign default literature, I choose to set the haircut to
100%. However, the mechanism of the model would not be altered if one would assume a
smaller and/or stochastic haircut.
Bond holding requirement Another important assumption is that banks have to hold
a certain fraction of their assets in domestic bonds. This assumption is crucial for the
model, since banks would generally not find it optimal to invest into bonds that pay
the world interest rate, which is generally lower than the return on domestic capital.
At the same time their exposure is necessary to sustain any foreign lending. This simple
constraint is intended to capture in a reduced form are all sorts of forces that induce banks
to invest heavily into domestic sovereign bonds, such as financial regulation, financial
repression69 or liquidity considerations70. Whatever the exact nature of these forces, its is
a well documented empirical fact that banks exhibit a strong home bias and are heavily
exposed to domestic sovereign debt: Sosa-Padilla (2012) and Gennaioli et al. (2014) report
that on average 22% or 12% respectively of the financial sector’s assets in each country
in their samples are domestic sovereign debt.
International lending only to the government I assume that only the government
can trade financial contracts with the rest of the world. Neither households, nor banks, nor
firms can invest in or borrow from the rest of the world. This is a simplifying assumption,
which could generally be relaxed as long as foreign lenders have some disadvantage in
direct investment. Yet it is at the same time not an implausible approximation for many
less financially integrated economies, where private borrowing makes up for only a small
part of the total net foreign asset position, such as Greece for example.
Riskless loans The fact that I model loans as riskless and have the firm absorb the
aggregate risk may appear unusual. Many papers with banking sectors like Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) assume that instead bank equity buffers these shock. First note that in
the absence of a friction at the level of the bank, both assumptions are equivalent. Given
there are frictions they are not. In the real world most of banks assets are loans, that
have a flat repayment profile as long as they are not defaulted upon. I abstract from firm
68See Yue (2010a) for an extension of the Arellano model explicitly modeling the renegotiation process.
69Notice that in particular regulation and repression could be considered policy variables as well. I
abstract from these considerations. For a model with optimal financial repression see Chari et al. (2015).
70For a model with a liquidity motive for holding government bonds see Engler and Grosse Steffen
(2013).
63
default both for simplicity and because I want to isolate the effects of government default.
Assuming that banks carry some of the risk associated with firm investment would change
the quantitative properties of the model, since it would introduce a negative correlation
between the innovation in TFP and bank equity and would hence reduce the degree to
which default incentives increase in TFP.
Direct lending by the household In the model direct lending from the household
to the firm - think of corporate bonds but also entrepreneurial self finance - is generally
less efficient due to the costs ξ. Direct lending becomes an attractive alternative for the
household only when intermediated investment is constrained and the deposit-loan spread
is hence high. The idea behind this assumption is that banks have a superior screening
and monitoring technology. This technological advantage explains why banks exist and
is hence consistent with the fact that the financial sector intermediates a large part of
investment in many economies71. Furthermore, allowing for an alternative, less efficient
form of investment is in line with the finding that direct investment makes up for a
significant part of the loss of intermediated investment during banking crisis, documented
for example by Fiore and Uhlig (2015) for Europe and by Becker and Ivashina (2014) for
the US. The cost ξ is allowed to vary with TFP. For positive ξˆ this dependence is such
that the cost advantage of intermediated financing is particularly strong when the TFP
is low. This reflects the idea that the screening and monitoring technology of the bank is
most useful when profitable investment opportunities are scarce.
3 Financial frictions, sovereign debt, and the costs of
default
This section discusses the consequences of the financial structure of the economy and its
implications for the default decision.
3.1 Underinvestment due to the financial friction
In the model economy the household has two ways to investment into physical capital:
either directly by lending to the firm, or indirectly by lending to the bank, which lends to
the firm. (The bank also lends to the government, but abstract from that for the moment
for the sake of simplicity.) Bank lending is assumed to be more efficient, because it comes
free of any transaction costs, but the capacity of banks to intermediate is constrained by
a leverage constraint. Whenever this constraint does not bind, competition assures that
banks make no profits. But when it binds, it drives a wedge between the return on loans
and the cost of deposits, even though banks behave competitively. At the same time the
71With the notable exception of the US, where market based funding plays an important role.
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lower bound on dividends that banks have to respect implies a constant drain on the banks
equity. To finance this drain without its equity being eroded, the bank constantly has to
make profits. Assume the share η of pre-dividend equity that the banker can maximally
retain is lower than the inverse of the gross return on loans. In this case, the return on
the equity financed assets alone is not enough to finance this drain. Hence, for equity
not to erode over time banks have to make profits also on deposit financed assets. These
profits can only come from a spread between the deposit rate and the return on the banks
assets, which in turn arises whenever the constraint binds.
Therefore, if η is small enough, as I assume, banks are on average constraint by both
the deposit and the dividend constraint and the spread between the deposit rate and
the return on assets is on average bigger than zero. This means that the return on
intermediated investment that households perceive is lower than it actually is, whenever
the constrain binds and on average. Households hence under-invest in intermediated
loans. At the heart of this underinvestment in banks is an externality: Households only
take the deposit rate into account, but not the profits of the bank, which flow back to
the household lump sum. Even if they were not the recipient of these profits, they would
value them in a non-atomistic setting, because they would understand that these profits
allow banks to replenish their equity, which will reduce the tightness of the constraint and
make them behave more competitively.
Furthermore, if the wedge or spread between the loan rate is high enough, house-
holds will find it optimal to invest directly loans, despite the costs associated with this
transaction. This alternative channel of investment, which is absent from most papers
on banking, has a counter intuitive effect. One might expect that it might dampen the
effects of a shortage of bank equity, since it provides an alternative, albeit less efficient,
channel of investment. Indeed, it does so. But at the same time it also makes the effects
of the bank equity shortage worse, because it constrains the spread between deposit and
loan rate above. This implies that the leverage constraint binds tighter and it slows down
the re-accumulation of bank equity through retaining the profits derived from the lending
spread.
3.2 A new motive for international borrowing
The fact that the household under-invests in physical capital has an interesting effect in
the context of the full open economy model with a benevolent government. First note
underinvestment means that even in the non-stochastic steady state the return on capital
is higher than the inverse of the discount factor 1/β. Second note that whenever the
government borrows today to reduce taxes today, the household will want to save most
of it, anticipating higher taxes tomorrow. These additional savings will, in normal times
when the bank is not to tightly constraint, flow through the banking sector to the firms.
They will earn a return equal to the deposit rate, which in the non-stochastic steady state
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is equal to 1/β, plus the spread sp. At the same time the funds have a cost of 1/q¯. Hence
international lending is profitable from the benevolent government’s point if view, as long
as 1/β + sp ≥ 1/q¯, that is as long as the domestic household is not much more patient
than the rest of the world.
This means that the existence of capital, together with a friction that prevents the
return on capital to converge to the world interest rate over time, constitutes a motive
for government borrowing: The government is essentially arbitraging on the difference
between the domestic and the world interest rate. Or, more loosely speaking, funds from
international lenders are “cheaper” than taxes.
This return-differential motive complements the consumption-smoothing motive for
participating in international financial markets.72 Yet, there is one important difference:
The consumption-smoothing motive is roughly neutral across the cycle, in the sense that
in good times the government wishes to save and in bad times to borrow. Conversely,
the return-differential motive is not neutral across the cycle but on average calls for inter-
national borrowing, because for moderate deviations of TFP from its mean international
funds are always cheap relative to domestic ones. Hence, this motive explains why the
model economy is on average (and, for the calibrated version indeed most of the time)
highly indebted.73 While the return-differential motive for international borrowing is not
new in general, the fact that the financial friction sustains this motive endogenously across
the cycle is a novel feature of this model. It is interesting in particular in the context
of the sovereign default literature, since most models of external sovereign debt have so
far relied on the simplifying assumption that the borrowing country is strongly impatient
(relative to the international lenders) to generate a substantial amount of debt.74 As we
will see in the quantitative part, this model works also without that assumption.
3.3 The costs of default
As I stressed before, the model I propose assumes no direct costs of default, neither the
typical output costs nor exclusion. But this does not mean that default is costless. On
the contrary, the model predicts seizable and long lasting costs of default.
Figure 1, which shows how the model evolves after a default in the absence of shocks,
72Notice, that the country can smooth its consumption even in autarky by varying capital. Nevertheless,
foreign investment has additional consumption-smoothing value, since its return is exogenous, unlike the
return on capital.
73Notice furthermore, that the cycle has opposing effects on the two motives: Low TFP constitutes
a reason to borrow internationally from the point of view of the consumption smoothing motive. At
the same time the return differential between foreign and domestic funds decreases with TFP and hence
weakens the desirability of borrowing. The sum of the two effects, together with the varying costs of
default determine how the amount and riskiness of government debt varies across the cycle.
74With the time period being one quarter, Arellano (2008) uses a β of .953 and a net world interest
rate of 1.7%, which implies a q¯ of 0.983. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) use 0.8 and 1%. Mendoza and Yue
(2012) use 0.88 and 1%. Joo (2014) and Gornemann (2015), which to the best of my knowledge are the
only other papers which consider a sovereign default model with capital, rely on similar parameter values
too.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a default: Prior to the default all variables are at
their risk adjusted non-stochastic steady state. At period 0 the county defaults (note
that this default is not optimal). No other shocks occur. Equity, capital, labor, output
and consumption are normalized by their respective steady state values. Direct and bank
loans are fractions of total capital. This picture is drawn for ξˆ = 0 to make default at
average TFP look more like TFP at low TFP.
illustrates the consequences of default. Since banks are exposed to sovereign debt, they
loose a significant share of their equity. This implies that the leverage constraint, which
has already been binding loosely before, now binds very tightly (see panel 2 of figure 1
for the multiplier of the leverage constraint). As a consequence, banks have to reduce the
size of their balance sheets, and hence the amount of loans they extend and the amount
of deposits they raise. The lower demand for deposits by banks makes the deposit rate
drop, while the spread between the lending and the deposit rate increases. Given the
high spread, direct investment becomes profitable for the household, despite the costs
associated with this form of financing. Due to these costs however, the shift to direct
financing can only partially make up for the reduction in bank financing and total loans,
i.e. total capital drops. At the same time the household decreases his labor supply and
his consumption75. Since both labor and capital drop, this causes a fall in output. In the
periods following default, banks slowly recapitalize by accumulating the profits generated
75After a small initial jump in consumption due to the one-time gains from default. This jump is due
to the fact that the figure plots the responses to default in the absence of shocks. In equilibrium default
only occurs concurrent with bad shocks and the jump becomes negative.
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by the higher spread on their lending activity. As they do so, they expand their balance
sheet once again, and more and more of the direct investment is replaced by intermediated
investment. The economy slowly converges back.
It is interesting to see what happens to external debt. After default has wiped out
all foreign debt, the government does not borrow any new funds abroad. In fact they
continue not to do so for several periods until they eventually enter the international
capital markets again and borrow once more. What is happening? After default the
government is choosing not to borrow any more from abroad. It does so because the main
motive to borrow, which consisted in the difference between the world interest rate and the
return on domestic capital, vanishes when financial intermediaries are so constrained, that
the marginal return on capital is determined by the less efficient investment technology
(direct investment). The government essentially self-excludes itself from the market for a
period of several years.76 The duration of the period is endogenous and depends on the
duration of the financial crisis.
The model is hence able to endogenously explain not only the output costs of default
but also exclusion from international capital markets. While other authors have provided
models that endogenize the output costs of default, they still rely on the assumption of
exclusion. In the case of Mendoza and Yue (2012) exclusion is even necessary to generate
the output costs. This is the first model that can also account for exclusion endogenously.
Furthermore, the mechanism provides a novel explanation for why we observe exclusion.
The argument behind the assumption of exclusion typically refers to some coordinated
punishment of the borrower by the lenders. Yet this argument has one weakness: as
Kletzer (1994) argues, it would be optimal for individual (small) lenders to deviate from
this collective punishment strategy. The explanation for exclusion this paper proposes
is immune to such criticism because it is optimal for both sides not to trade. There is
simply no price at which the borrowing country and the lender would want to trade. At
the same time both this and the conventional theory are observationally equivalent.
In equilibrium all agents correctly anticipate the consequences of default: They un-
derstand that defaulting on foreigners per se is a free lunch. But they also understand
that defaulting on local banks causes a financial crisis. If the benefits from default are
low enough, i.e. if the external debt outstanding is low, the costs of a financial crisis
outweigh the benefits of default. Hence all debt is repaid ex post, which makes external
debt sustainable ex ante. The financial vulnerability of the economy essentially serves as
a commitment device for a government that can’t commit otherwise. Notice that this en-
tails another externality: Banks do not get remunerated for the value of the commitment
that their investment in bonds entails.
76Notice that it might actually want to save abroad, but this is ruled out by assumption.
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3.4 Default incentives
To understand what the default decision depends on it is useful to define the default set
as those states where the government defaults in equilibrium:77
D = {Ω ∈ Ω : VH(Rep = 0|Ω) > VH(Rep = 1|Ω)}
This default set has a number of features that resonate similar findings in Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008). In particular proposition 2 and the first part of
the conjecture are extensions of propositions in these papers, while the other parts of the
conjecture are more specific to the context of this model.
Proposition 2 Assume that Ω1 = [ω1, KH1, D1, BB1, KB1, R1, BX1] ∈ D. Then the
following holds:
Ω2 = [ω1, KH1, D1, BB1, KB1, R1, BX2] ∈ D if BX2 ≥ BX1.
Proof : First, note that the value of defaulting VGD(Ω) is independent of the level of
BX , hence VGD(Ω1) = VGD(Ω2). Second, if
[
T ∗2 , B¯
′∗
2 , X
∗
2
]
denotes the optimal level of all
choice variables under repayment given state Ω2, then
[
T ∗2 , B¯
′∗
2 , X
∗
2
]
is also feasible under
repayment given state Ω1 by the government budget constraint. Hence it must be that
VGR(Ω1) ≥ VGR(Ω2). Summarizing, we have VGD(Ω1) = VGD(Ω2) > VGR(Ω1) ≥ VGR(Ω2),
and hence that Ω2 ∈ D.
Conjecture Assume that Ω1 = [ω1, KH1, D1, BB1, KB1, R1, BX1] ∈ D. Then the fol-
lowing holds:
Part 1
Ω3 = [ω2, KH1, D1, BB1, KB1, R1, BX1] ∈ D if ω2 ≤ ω1
Part 2
Ω4 = [ω1, KH1, D2, BB1, KB1, R1, BX1] ∈ D if D2 ≤ D1
Ω5 = [ω1, KH2, D1, BB1, KB2, R1, BX1] ∈ D ifKB2 ≥ KB1 andKH1+KB1 = KB2+KH2
Ω6 = [ω1, KH1, D1, BB1, KB1, R1, BX1] ∈ D if R2 ≥ R1
Part 3
Ω7 = [ω1, KH1, D2, BB2, KB1, R1, BX1] ∈ D if BB2 ≤ BB1 and BB1 −D1 = BB2 −D2
Proposition 3: Part 3 of the conjecture holds, if we allow the government to transfer
funds from the bank’s equity to the household in a lump sum fashion, but not the other
way around.
77Note that this definition does not exactly coincide with the definition in Arellano (2008), but has the
same spirit.
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Proof: First, note that conditional on default or repayment, the vector [ω,E,KF , BX ]
sufficiently summarizes the 7 dimensional state Ω (Here E denotes the pre-dividend pre-
transfer bank equity E = RKB +RepBB−D). Second, note that the values of repayment
are equal VGR(Ω1) = VGR(Ω7) since the elements of the vector [ω,E,KF , BX ] conditional
on repayment are equal. Third, note that conditional on default, [ω,KF , BX ] are equal
but the banks pre-dividend pre-transfer equity is lower at Ω1. Denote the optimal level
of all choice variables under default given state Ω1 by
[
T ∗1 , B¯
′∗
1 , X
∗
1 , Z
∗
1
]
where Z denotes
the transfer from the bank to the household. Then, by choosing an appropriate transfer
Z7 > Z1 the allocation
[
T ∗1 , B¯
′∗
1 , X
∗
1
]
must be feasible given state Ω7. By optimality it must
hence be that VGD(Ω7) ≥ VGD(Ω1). Hence VGD(Ω7) ≥ VGD(Ω1) ≥ VGR(Ω1) = VGR(Ω7)
and therefore Ω7 ∈ D.
Proposition 2 and conjecture state that the default set is bounded below wrt. external
debt BX , domestic debt BB, the fraction of bank-held loans to total loans KB/(KB+KH)
and the loan rate R and bounded above wrt. TFP ω, deposits D and the ratio bonds
over equity financed bonds BB/(BB − D) . The intuition behind proposition 2 is that
if default is optimal for a given level of foreign debt it must be optimal for higher levels
too, because the benefit of defaulting increases but the costs remain unchanged. The
conjecture is intuitive too: Part 1 states that if default is optimal for a certain level of
TFP, it must be optimal for lower levels of TFP too. This is so because TFP does not
affect the bank equity, but it does affect the total resources of the economy. In worse
states optimal savings are lower than in good states. Hence, bank equity, which is needed
to intermediate savings, is less scarce at lower levels of TFP. Hence the loss of equity
due to sovereign default can be expected to be less costly at lower TFP levels. At the
same time aggregate resources are more scarce at lower TFP levels, hence the benefit of
not repaying the rest of the world increases. Part 2 says that default is more attractive
when the bank is better capitalized, keeping the total resources of the economy and the
exposure of the bank fixed. Here the idea is that on one hand the cost of default, that is
the loss of bank equity, diminishes as banks are better capitalized. At the same time the
benefits of default increase as banks are better capitalized, since well capitalized banks
allow a less distorted allocation of the fixed amount of total resources available. Part 3
finally states that lower levels of deposit financed sovereign debt exposure of the bank
make default more attractive. This is straightforward given that the post default equity
of the bank decreases in the bank’s deposit financed exposure.
While the conjecture cannot be proven analytically, numerical experiments have con-
sistently confirmed it.78
78Regarding part 1 of the conjecture: As the appendix shows, the numerical solution algorithm is based
on the guess that part 1 holds. This guess is verified ex post at each grid point. Regarding part 3: The
additional assumption necessary to proof part 3 of the conjecture does not change the equilibrium of the
economy, if the value function of the government is decreasing in the share of total resources held by the
bank, because then Z∗ = 0. I find that in equilibrium the value function is decreasing across the whole
state space for the calibrated model.
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Figure 2: Default Set: The dark area is the default region, the bright area is the
repayment region. The white area is off the equilibrium path. The remaining states are
set to their non-stochastic risk-adjusted steady state values. The levels of foreign and
domestic debt are normalized by the output at the non-stochastic risk adjusted steady
state. The equity ratio in panel 2 is conditional on repayment.
Figure 2 shows the default set for the calibrated model, exemplifying the above char-
acterizations. Panel 1 illustrates proposition 2 and part 1 of the conjecture: lower levels
of TFP and higher levels of foreign debt make default more likely. Panel 2 illustrates the
second part of the conjecture: the higher the ratio of bank equity to total resources of
the economy (which may result from higher values of R, D or KB/(KB +KH)) the more
attractive default. Finally the last panel illustrates part 3 of the conjecture: The higher
the domestic exposure to sovereign debt the less likely default.79 This panel furthermore
illustrates the disciplining role of domestic debt: the more exposed the domestic sector
is, the more foreign debt will be repaid.
While the costs of default discussed above guarantee that some amount of external
debt can be sustained, they do not suffice for default to happen along the equilibrium
path. For default to happen, there needs to be furthermore a strong enough desire to
borrow, such that the government has an ex-ante incentive to borrow even beyond the
maximal amount, for which default is ex-post undesirable. Furthermore, the default costs
need to depend on the exogenous state, such that it its possible to borrow an amount
that ex post leads to default only for some of the possible realizations of the exogenous
shock. While the motive for borrowing has been discussed before, the state dependence
of the costs of default evident in panels 1 and 2 merits further explanation.
Figure 3 illustrates the dynamic difference in the net cost of default across the exoge-
nous state. It plots the difference in the path of key variables for 2 scenarios, starting from
the same initial conditions: In scenario (1) a TFP shock hits the economy in period 0 and
the government repays. In scenario (2) the same TFP shock hits the economy but the
79Note that here D is kept fix. That means the additional domestic debt is equity financed, so the
graph actually exemplifies an even stronger conjecture that Ω8 = [ω1,KH1, D1, BB2,KB1, R1, BX1] ∈ D
if BB2 ≥ BB1 . For some pathological cases this stronger statement has been found to be wrong though.
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Figure 3: Net costs of default: This figure plots the difference between the paths
associated with a two scenarios, both starting at the non-stochastic risk adjusted steady
state. In scenario (1) in period 0 a TFP shock occurs and the government pays back.
In scenario (2) the same TFP shock occurs at period 0 but the government defaults.
No further shocks occur in either scenario. If the graph for e.g. output is negative, it
hence means that (given the same TFP shock), output is lower under default than under
repayment. The two lines correspond to a positive shock of one standard deviation (red
line) and a negative shock big enough to trigger default (blue line). In case of the bad
shock default is optimal; in case of the good shock repayment is optimal. All paths are
normalized by their steady state values.
government defaults. The difference between these paths illustrates the net cost/benefit
of default, which consists of the sum of the downside of default (banks’ equity is eroded)
and the upside (the foreign debt is not being repaid). This difference is plotted for two
different realizations of the TFP shock: high and low. It is evident that the net costs of
default in terms of consumption and labor (and hence utility) are much higher in case
of the positive TFP shock. The intuition behind this is simple. In states of high TFP
the households would like to invest more (both because expected returns are high and to
smooth consumption), relative to the case of a negative shock. At the same time the loss
banks face due to default does not depend on the exogenous state. Hence, the fall in bank
equity has stronger distortionary effects when TFP is high. This can be seen in panel 4:
The total amount of loans drops much more (relative to the repayment case) under the
good shock than under the bad shock. These distortions constitute the cost of default.
Given that the resource gain from defaulting on the rest of the world is also independent
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of the state, but their utility value is higher in bad times, the net costs of default are
bigger in states of high TFP.
Another subtle feature can be seen in this graph: Notice that the output costs of
default in case of the bad shock, which is when default actually is optimal, increase over
time. This is a result of the continued underinvestment, which results from the shortage of
bank equity. As the economy under-invests in capital, the capital stock declines gradually
(relative to the repayment case), which leads to a gradual decrease in output (relative to
the repayment case). Hence the drop in output the results from a bad TFP shock and a
simultaneous default is more persistent than the drop in output that would result from
a bad TFP shock without default. This feature can help to explain the sluggishness of
recoveries from default crisis.80
4 Computation and calibration
4.1 Computation
Given the high complexity of the model, only an approximate solution of the government’s
problem (20) is obtainable. Solving a continuous DSGE model numerically typically re-
quires the uses of 3 tools: function approximation, numerical integration and numerical
maximization. I briefly summarize each of these three steps here. In doing so I high-
light two computational innovations that were integrated in the solution algorithm. The
appendix provides more details.
I approximate the policy and value functions Z(Ω) by twice continuously differentiable
functions Z˜(Ω) over the whole state space (including exogenous states). In particular I
use using cubic splines defined over a multidimensional Cartesian grid as recommended
by Hatchondo et al. (2007). I extrapolate points outside the grid using these splines, but
choose the grid such as to ensure that the maximum distance from the grid remains small
and the probability of leaving the grid marginal.
Given this approximation for the policy and value functions, I exactly evaluate the in-
tegrals contained in the expectations of future values of these functions, such as E|Ω(Z ′) =´∞
0 pdf(ω
′|Ω)Z˜(ω′|Ω)dω. This approach is novel and different from the quadrature ap-
proaches, that are usually used to evaluate expectations, including the application in
Hatchondo et al. (2007). It extends or ’inverts’ the insight of Gaussian quadrature meth-
ods, that integrals over polynomials can be evaluated exactly given a sufficient number
of function values, to the piecewise-polynomial cubic-spline function. This approach has
80Already the Arellano (2008) model has a similar feature: As the economy gradually recovers from
a bad endowment shock, the default costs increase and keep endowment net of default costs depressed
for longer than in case of repayment. Yet this is purely due to the recovery of the endowment. If the
endowment were to stay constant for as many period as the economy remains in autarky, the default
costs would remain constant too. In my model however the output costs of default increase after default,
even if TFP were to remain constant.
73
two advantages: First, it avoids an additional layer of approximation. Second, and more
importantly for the current application, it generates expectations that are twice contin-
uously differentiable not only in the endogenous states, but also in the exogenous states.
This facilitates the application of continuous solution methods to optimization problems
where the exogenous state appears as a variable, as it for example does when there exists
a threshold value of the exogenous state, such as in the case of default models the default
threshold.81,82
Finally, to find the stationary solution to the optimization problem of the government,
given these choices for how to approximate policy and value functions and their expec-
tations, I solve problem (20) recursively using a time iteration algorithm, that jointly
iterates on the policy and value functions.83 To find the solution at each individual time
iteration, I use a numerical solver to solve the government’s problem (20) continuously in
all variables.
Solving the model poses some significant computational difficulties due to (1) the high
dimensionality of the state space and (2) the complexity of the government maximization
problem (20), which is subject to a system of nonlinear equations including complementar-
ity conditions. To address the first problem, I use a trick that reduces the computationally
necessary state space from 7 to 4 dimensions. The general idea is to replace the portfolio
variables by cash-at-hand, which is only possible though after anticipating certain future
decisions that depend on the whole state space.84 This trick, which is the second method-
ological innovation, is explained in detail in the appendix and in its general applicability
in Thaler (2016). Furthermore, the use of smooth interpolation and integration discussed
above, allows me to operate with a low number of grid points without too much loss of
precision. Second, to solve the complex maximization system, I rely on a modern, deriva-
tive based maximization algorithm for complementarity problems (KNITRO). Given I
provide algebraically computed first derivatives of target and constraint functions and
the smoothness of the optimization problem, this solver is able to reliably and quickly
find solutions.
81Take for example the continuous version of the Arellano model, and be ω¯ the default output thresh-
old and B the debt level. Then the expectations of the value function are given by E|Ω(V (ω′|B′)) =´ ω¯
0 pdf(ω
′|ω)V def (ω′|B′)dω+´∞
ω¯
pdf(ω′|ω)V rep(ω′|B′)dω. Therefore E|Ω(V (ω′|B′)) is a function not only
of the endogenous state, B′ but also of the exogenous state ω¯. Continuous interpolation of V implies
continuity of the expectation in the endogenous state. If combined with exact integration it also implies
continuity of the expectation wrt. the exogenous state.
82This approach can be applied given any approximating function. Given a non twice-continuous ap-
proximation function, like a piecewise linear approximation, it is equivalent to straightforward quadrature,
but then it does not deliver the second advantage. For chebychev polynomials, the other common twice
continuous approximation function, it is equivalent to Gaussian quadrature with enough points.
83First make a guess for the policy and value functions c′(Ω), λ′2(Ω) and V ′H(Ω). Second, I solve the
optimization problem for many points on a grid over the state space Ω. Third, I update my guess given
the solutions from step two and then go back to step two.
84Without anticipating future decisions, one can reduce the state space to 5 dimensions. Besides, by
applying the same trick to the labor decision I could reduce the state by 1 further dimensions, which is
left for future work.
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4.2 Calibration
I calibrate the model to Greek data, which is the case that motivated this research. As
we have seen, the model I laid out describes a small open economy whose government
has access to international capital markets, with an important domestic financial sector,
no foreign investment into the private sector and without the option to inflate away its
debt. Greece satisfies this description to a large extent. First, Greece is a small open
economy with respect to both the EU and the world. Second, the Greek government has
borrowed extensively: the mean debt to GDP ratio for the post-Euro pre-default period
2000-2010 is 121% according to OECD data. This debt was held both domestically (48%)
as well as abroad according to Bank of Greece data. Third, credit to the local economy is
largely supplied by the domestic banking sector and non-intermediated investment plays
a minor role (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999)). Similarly, domestic financial
institutions account for most of the domestically held sovereign debt (80% according to
Bank of Greece data). Fourth, private investment of foreigners in Greece play a minor role.
As figure 4 shows, the net foreign asset position of Greece is dominated by government
debt and what little net private investment there is largely flows out of Greece rather
than in. Fifth, since the accession to the Euro zone, Greece can not inflate its debt away,
even though they issued most of their debt under domestic currency (and law). The main
difference between the model and the Greek scenario probably is the policy response:
Both Greek banks as well as the government were to some extent bailed out by the EU.
While the model abstracts from bailouts altogether, the bailouts that were implemented
certainly did not go anywhere as far as to compensate entirely for the consequences of
default.
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Figure 4: International investment position: Nominal values reported by Bank of
Greece. The figure distinguishes between public and private liabilities, and between debt
liabilities and total liabilities, including equity. For the government the latter two are
almost identical.
While Greece seems an ideal match for the model, other southern European countries
like Italy and Portugal also fit the above description. However in these cases default (resp.
debt restructuring) did not materialize - even though it was a major concern at the height
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of the European debt crisis - which makes them less useful examples for the following
quantitative analysis. Spain and Cyprus could be considered similar examples as well,
the latter even defaulted in the aftermath of the Greek debt restructuring. Yet for these
two countries it was a financial crisis that triggered a sovereign crisis and not the other
way around. While the modeling was guided by the European debt crisis, the predictions
of the model furthermore are consistent with patters documented by Gennaioli et al.
(2014) across a large panel of mainly developing and emerging economies. Among these
is the well studied case of the Argentinian default in 2001, where concerns regarding the
damage to the financial sector indeed played a dominant role in the policy debate before
and the policy response after default.85 However, the mechanism the model describes can
be expected to be stronger for countries with more developed financial systems.
The data on Greece used for the calibration and the model evaluation comes from
several sources. Real GDP per capita is taken from the IMF IFS database. Its compo-
nents are obtained from OECD data. TFP is taken from the AMECO database. Data on
the balance sheet composition of Greek banks, the spread between short term household
deposits and loans to the non-financial sector and the composition of Greek foreign liabil-
ities is taken from the Bank of Greece. The sovereign spread is defined as the difference
between the returns on one year government bonds from Greece and Germany. The data
stems from the IFS for Greece and from the Bundesbank for Germany. Private credit is
also taken from the IFS, while the sovereign debt to GDP ratio is taken from the OECD.
For GDP and its components and TFP I use annual data covering the pre-default period
1980 to 2010, while for the financial variables the observation period is restricted to the
post-Euro pre-default period 2000 to 2010. I do this both due to data availability and
to account for the structural change of accessing the Euro, which should have a stronger
impact on these variables. I decompose the series for GDP, TFP and credit into a linear
trend and a cyclical component and use the deviation of each variable from its trend.
Note that in doing so I follow Arellano (2008), who also uses a linear long-run trend,
whereas many other papers using emerging economy data focus on the business cycle fre-
quency fluctuations alone (E.g. Mendoza and Yue (2012), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).
While these differences are relatively unimportant for the much studied 2001 default of
Argentina, they are significant for Greece, which experienced a much more prolonged and
deep downturn, which a medium-frequency filter would attribute to the trend. Further-
more, using data only till 2010 to construct the trend, (which I then extrapolate for the
post default years), prevents the estimate of the trend to be affected by the 2010 crisis.
This choice is in line with my model, in which sovereign defaults are rare events that
lead to large and prolonged temporary downward deviations from the trend. The trade
balance is expressed in percentage of GDP.
The calibration is summarized in table 1. As in the data the time period is one year.
85 See Sosa-Padilla (2012), Perry and Serven (2003) and Kumhof (2004).
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Parameter Value Target/Explanation
α capital share 0.36 standard value
δ depreciation 0.14 21% investment/GDP
β discount factor 0.96 same as β
γ risk aversion 2 standard value
χ labor weight in utility 1.33 mean of labor = 1
ν inverse Frisch elasticity 0.5 standard value
G government expenditures 0.28 21% govt. consumption/GDP
θ financial constraint 0.7 28% equity ratio
η share of retained equity 0.803 6% deposit-loan spread
ψ share of bonds on balance sheet 0.14 14% exposure
ξ¯ average cost of direct investment 0.071 1.5 ppt increase of deposit-loan
spread in case of default, costs
vary 2 ppt across the cycle
ξˆ dependence of cost of direct
investment on GDP
0.45
q¯ inverse world interest rate 0.96 real rate Germany
ρ persistence of TFP shock 0.76 estimate
σ standard deviation of TFP shock 0.057 7.5% standard deviation of GDP
Table 1: Parameter values
The utility function features standard parameter values: The discount factor β is set
to 0.96 while the risk aversion coefficient γ is chosen to be 2, a common value in the
default literature. The labor weight χ is set to normalize the mean of labor to 1 while
ν is chosen to imply a Frisch elasticity of labor of 0.5 as in Boccola (2016), which is a
common value and within the range of empirical estimates reported by Greenwood et al.
(1988). The production function is parametrized in with a conventional capital share α
of 36%. Depreciation δ is set such as to match the 21% average investment to GDP ratio
for Greece. G is chosen to match the average government consumption to GDP ratio of
21%.
The inverse world interest rate q¯ is set to 0.96, that is to exactly the same value as
the domestic discount factor. This value is in line with the average real interest rate in
(West) Germany for the period 1980 to 2010. While this choice might not seem very
surprising, it is highly unusual in the context of quantitative models of sovereign default,
which usually rely on a huge difference between β and q¯ in order to generate a motive
for the government to borrow. As I explained before, my model features an endogenous
motive for borrowing and can therefore do without this assumption.
The choice of the financial sector parameters is the least straightforward. I choose these
values in order to match moments of financial variables for Greece. Given th previous
parameters, the payout parameter η is chosen to match an average spread between the
loan and the deposit rate of 6%. This is in line with the average spread between 1
year deposits and firm loans for Greece. The parameters that govern the relative cost
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advantage of intermediated over direct investment ξ¯ and ξˆ are simultaneously chosen
such that direct investment becomes profitable only after an extreme shock (like default)
and so as to match the 1.5ppt increase in the deposit-loan spread after default observed in
the Greek data. This implies that ξ varies only mildly.86 The share of domestic bonds on
banks balance sheets ψ is set to 14%, which is the mean of the Greek credit institutions’
exposure to sovereign bonds in the Bank of Greece data. Lastly, θ, which determines
the tightness of the banks’ (implicit) leverage constraint, is set to 0.7, which implies a
mean equity ratio of 26% percent. This value, while far higher than the average for Greek
banks87, is approximately in line with the well known papers by Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), which feature a leverage constraint that is very
similar in spirit. Furthermore, this value guarantees that sovereign default does not drive
the banks into default in the ergodic distribution. Hence the higher-than-realistic equity
ratio compensates for the simplifying assumptions that default is complete and there is
no partial recapitalization of banks after default.
Finally, the the persistence parameter of the TFP process ρ is estimated using de-
trended TFP data. The corresponding standard deviation σ is set such as to such as to
match the standard deviation of detrended GDP in the data.88 To compute the volatility
of GDP for the model, following the literature, I simulate the model for 100.000 periods,
extract the 31 periods prior to each default, express the data in deviation from its mean
and report the mean of the volatilities of the pre-default periods.
5 Quantitative results
This section assesses the model’s quantitative performance in terms of business cycle
moments and the patterns observed around default episodes.
5.1 Cyclical moments
Table 2 reports the most important business cycle moments of the model and compares
them to their empirical counterparts in Greek data.
The data used to generate the empirical moments has been discussed before, with
the exception of the default frequency. This frequency is an empirically difficult concept:
Since default is an extremely rare event, it is very hard to estimate this value well given
a relatively short observation period. If one considers the longest possible observation
86ξ moves from 0.06 to 0.08 as log TFP moves from 3.5 standard deviations above to 3.5 standard
deviations below the mean.
87In the period 2000-2009 the average equity ratio for Greek credit institutions was 8.3%. In the
aftermath of the crisis Greek banks have massively expanded their equity buffers, and have now reached
an equity ratio of 21.3%.
88As commonly found in the RBC literature (e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995)), the estimated volatility
of TFP is too small for the model to explain observed volatilities. Hence, to capture the observed volatility
of output in a simple model with just one shock I scale up the estimate of σ.
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Moment Data Model
Means
E(B¯/Y ) Total debt to GDP ratio 121% 44%
E(BX/Y ) Foreign debt to GDP ratio 51% 18%
E(BX/B¯) Share of domestic debt 47% 59%
E(spread) Sovereign spread 0.48% 0.50%
E(Rep) Default frequency < 2.7% 0.44%
Volatilities
σ(Y ) GDP 7.5% 7.4%
σ(B¯/Y ) Total debt to GDP ratio 7.3% 4.2%
σ(TB) Trade balance 3.7% 2.9%
σ(spread) Sovereign spread 0.55% 0.26%
σ(C)/σ(Y ) Relative consumption volatility 79% 83%
σ(I)/σ(Y ) Relative investment volatility 226% 306%
Correlations of GDP with
corr(Y,C) Consumption 95% 93%
corr(Y, I) Investment 91% 81%
corr(Y, spread) Sovereign spread -28% -70%
corr(Y, TB) Trade balance 11% -1%
Table 2: Cyclical moments
period, that is since Greece’s independence in 1829, there have been 5 default events: The
4 reported by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) in 1843, 1860, 1893, 1932 plus the recent crisis.
This yields an annual default frequency of 2.7%, which is in line with similar estimates in
the literature for groups of emerging economies over the last centuries. Yet, this estimate
is based on the assumption that the underlying economy has not changed over time. This
is hardly the case for Greece. Financial development for example arguably has made
default more costly. Given that my model describes a financially developed economy,
in which the costs of defaults are presumably larger than they were in past centuries or
are in economies with less developed financial markets, I consider this estimate an upper
bound for the default frequency at best. The low spreads on Greek bonds in the post-Euro
pre-default period seem to confirm this notion.
To generate the moments for the stochastic stationary state of the model, I simulate
the model for 100,000 periods, discarding the initial observations. From this series I
calculate the default frequency. Then I take the values for the 31 periods preceding each
default event (excluding cases where another default happened in this period), normalize
them by their mean and calculate the respective moments for each pre-default episode.
Table 2 reports the means of these moments. Notice that, with the exception of the
output volatility, none of these moments were targeted.
The model predicts a total debt to GDP ratio of 44% and a foreign debt to GDP
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ratio of 18%, which is less than half of their empirical counterparts. This is a well known
property of models with short term debt. For example, Arellano (2008) and Mendoza
and Yue (2012) report even lower numbers: They obtain 6% and 23% quarterly debt to
quarterly GDP, or 1.5% and 5.75% debt to annual GDP. As Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2012) and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) show, more realistic ratios can be obtained
with long term debt, yet this extension is beyond the scope of this paper. The magnitude
of the volatility of the debt to GDP ratio lies in the ballpark of what is measured in the
data89. Furthermore the model predicts that 59% of debt are domestically held, which is
not very far away from the 47% observed in the data.
Like in all models with risk neutral lenders, the default frequency and the mean of the
sovereign spread coincide by assumption (almost90). Hence, the model can only match
one of the two numbers. In fact the model matches the spread very well, which has the
consequence that the predicted default frequency is much lower than the “historical upper
bound estimate” discussed above. Furthermore the model yields a negative correlation
between GDP and the spread, and in doing so reproduces a stylized fact that holds not only
for the Greek default episode studied here, but is generally found in studies of sovereign
debt (see e.g. Mendoza and Yue (2012)). At the same time the model underestimates the
volatility of the spreads.
Besides, the model preserves the typical features of the real business cycle model:
As in the data, consumption is slightly less volatile and investment significantly more
volatile than output. Moreover, the model matches the data well in predicting a very
high correlation between consumption and GDP, and, albeit less perfectly, a slight lower
but still high correlation between investment and output. Furthermore the model predicts
a trade balance that is about as volatile and as uncorrelated to GDP as in the data.
5.2 Default episodes
Next I study the model’s dynamics around default events. This is done using event
study techniques. Similarly as before, I extract the period starting 5 years before default
and ending 25 years after from the simulated data and normalize these values by their
respective means. I plot the mean of the evolution of each variable in figure 5. To highlight
the stochastic properties of these paths, their 10th to 90th percentiles are also plotted.
The figure furthermore shows the evolution of the respective variables in the data. The
default period 0 corresponds to 2011 for the data.91 GDP values beyond 2015 are IMF
89Note that this number is very poorly estimated. Excluding the last observation (2010) slashes this
number by 2/3
90The following relationship holds spread = P (Rep=0)1−P (Rep=0)
1
q¯ , which for q¯ and 1 − P (Rep = 0) close to 1
can be approximated as spread ' P (Rep = 0). Furthermore, the default frequency refers to the whole
sample and the spread to pre-default periods.
91The default of Greece was a somewhat gradual process. While Greece effectively had lost access to
capital markets by the end of 2010, Greek banks registered their first losses on sovereign bonds in August
2011 when they participated in the securities exchange program. The process of debt restructuring was
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forecasts.
Several features are worth noticing. First, in line with the other two stylized facts
documented by Mendoza and Yue (2012) the model predicts that default happens in bad
times. Prior to default output is below trend 2/3 of the time and default itself is associated
with a strong drop in GDP. Furthermore the external debt ratio is above average prior
to default and peaks in the default period. Second, the magnitude of the output drop
associated with default predicted by the model coincides with the what we observed in
Greece, where GDP dropped by a quarter after default. Third, the model predicts a credit
crunch: Funds supplied to the real economy drop, while the spread between the deposit
and loan rate spikes. Again, the magnitudes predicted by the model are similar to what
we observe in the data. Fourth, while the model understates the magnitude of the drop
in consumption, it does a fairly good job with respect to investment. Fifth, the responses
predicted by the model are less protracted than what we observe in Greece, despite the
fact, that the output costs increase over time (recall figure 3). This divergence is explained
by the relatively quick reversal of TFP in the model and the linear detrending applied to
the data.
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Figure 5: Default episodes: This figure plots the mean of the simulated path of key
variables around default events (black solid line). Furthermore the 10th to 90th percentiles
are plotted in blue. The black dotted line corresponds to the evolution of the variable in
Greek data, where loans are equated to private credit. All variables are normalized by
their means. Default occurs at period 0. For the data this period corresponds to 2011.
Most importantly, the model predicts that default is followed by a period of several
years, during which the government does not issue any new debt. Unlike in existing
finished in April 2012. When mapping this process to the more stylized default decision in the model, it
seems reasonable to choose 2011 as the default period.
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models of sovereign default, this is an equilibrium outcome. The average duration of this
period is 4 years, which is close to the values usually assumed in the default literature.
With Greece still excluded from the capital markets as of summer 2016, we still have to
see how long it will take till Greece re-accesses the markets. Yet the prediction of the
model is well within the range of 1 to 8 years estimated in Gelos et al. (2011), Richmond
and Dias (2009) and Cruces and Trebesch (2013). Furthermore, note that the endogenous
duration of exclusion is stochastic. As figure 6 shows, its distribution is strongly skewed
to the right, with a mean of 5.8 and a median of 4 years.92 This property of the model
is in accordance with empirical observations: Using a sample of 147 defaults since 1975
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016) report a mean duration of default of 8 and a median
of 5 years. However, their sample contains a lot of developing countries. Constraining
the sample to the 50% more financially developed countries according to the financial
institutions development index proposed by Svirydzenka (2016)93 reduces these values to
3 and 6.94
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Figure 6: Length of default episodes: The bar histogram refers to the model, the
distribution function (blue line, right axis) is copied from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016),
Figure 13.1.
92I consider a country to have re-accessed capital markets if it borrows for two consecutive periods.
This way, the exclusion periods include a few episodes where the government interrupts its no-borrowing
period for one period due to a strong temporary shock.
93Thereby I exclude defaults of most African and less developed Latin countries.
94Two caveats are in order: (1) Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016) report the duration of default, not
of non-zero trade, which need not necessarily coincide. (2) There are several plausible ways to define
the start and end dates of default and market access which lead to deviations across different studies.
However, the skewness seems to be a robust feature.
Gelos et al. (2011) measure the time from default to reaccess and report a mean of 4.7 and a median of
3.5 period across 45 default episodes. Combining the data from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016) to date
entry into default and Cruces and Trebesch (2013) to date reaccess to the markets and restricting the set
to the more developed countries leaves us with only 38 episodes and yields a median of 7.5 and a mean
of 9. Among the episodes I referred to before as cases where the financial sector played an important
role, the exclusion period is significantly shorter: Greece (2012) 4+, Cyprus (2013) 2, Argentina (2001)
5, Russia (1999) 2.
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5.3 Robustness
The results are qualitatively robust against a number of qualitative changes. The exact
shape of the financial friction for example does not influence the results much. In partic-
ular, using a state dependent leverage constraint as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) or a
simple leverage constraint , does not affect the results much
95. Furthermore, the main results are robust to using GHH preferences or abstracting
from labor all together. Using government spending / endowment shocks produces similar
results as well.
Furthermore, most of the conventional parameters have relatively little quantitative
effect on the default statistics of the model as well. This is in particular true for the level
of government spending and the parameters of the utility function and the production
function. Yet, allowing the domestic economy to be impatient relative to the world interest
rate, as the literature routinely does, the model yields significantly higher default rates.
The financial sector parameters play a more important role, since they determine the
costs of default. The parameter ψ, which determines the exposure of banks to sovereign
debt and hence the strength of the financial crisis triggered by default, increases the
costs of default and hence the amount of debt which is sustainable. The intensity of the
financial friction θ determines the leverage of banks. The higher the leverage, the higher
the costs of default and hence the amount of sustainable debt. The dividend payout
parameter η pins down the spread between the bank lending and the deposit rate. The
higher the spread, the higher the difference between the steady state return on domestic
capital and the world rate, hence the stronger the incentive for the government to borrow
- more and at higher risk. Finally the cost advantage of intermediated investment ξ has
an ambiguous effect on the default incentives. Consider first the case that ξ is constant,
i.e. ξˆ = 0. While within one period, a lower cost advantage of intermediation means that
the reduced intermediation capacity of banks due to the shortage of bank equity is less
harmful for the capital stock, it also means that the maximum spread which banks can
charge is lower. This slows down the process of bank equity reaccumulation, and extends
the period, during which bank equity is so scarce that direct intermediation is used. For
the calibration I use I found that the second effect dominates the first (locally), and hence
95A simple leverage constraint would require the bank to finance no more than a certain fraction
of their assets by deposits: d′r ≤ θ(k′ + qb′). As in Iacoviello (2005) I assume that the bank is re-
quired to promise no more than a certain fraction of their net return to depositors E|Ω [uc(c′)] d′ ≤
θE|Ω [uc(c′)(Rep′ b′ +R′ k′)]Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) assume that the continuation value of banking
has to be bigger than a certain (divertable) fraction of the assets E|Ω [V ′B ] ≥ θ(k′ + q′b). These three
different constraints have slightly different implications: For a simple leverage constraint interest rates do
not matter, and book equity is constant as long as the constraint binds. For the constraint I use today’s
interest rates matter. The higher the spread between the loan and the deposit rate, the higher today’s
leverage is allowed to be. This is so because higher bank profits tomorrow increase the value of the bank
in case it is taken over by depositors. The constrained proposed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) extends
this reasoning to the infinite future: the discounted value of the profits in all future periods disciplines
the banker. Another way to look at the three constraints is to say that the first constrains the book-value
leverage, the third constrains the market value leverage and the second lies in between.
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lowering ξ marginally increases both the period of zero external debt and the sustainable
amount of debt. That lower ξ increases the debt capacity only locally becomes clear
when one takes the value for ξ towards its lower extreme of zero. Trivially, at ξ = 0 banks
become obsolete and no debt is sustainable. The other extreme, setting ξ to infinity,
means shutting down direct investment and turns out to have similar effects: in that
case upon default the economy experiences a very strong and very short financial crisis,
during which investment drops dramatically and the deposit-loan spread shoots up to
empirically very implausible levels, which though allow the bank to recapitalize almost
fully within one period. The cost of this strong but short crisis is far smaller than the
cumulative cost of the protracted crisis resulting from intermediate values of ξ and hence
the amount of debt sustainable is lower. This highlights the crucial role of allowing for
an imperfect substitute for bank intermediation to generate bigger and more protracted
financial crisis. Allowing ξ to vary slightly with TFP makes the post-default bank lending
spread and recovery path depend on TFP is such a way that, sovereign default becomes
more attractive in bad times (in relative terms), and hence slightly increases the default
probability (by about 0.1 ppt) and the debt to GDP ratio (by 1pt) and the exclusion time
(1 period).
6 Policy application: The EU plan to reduce the ex-
posure of banks to domestic sovereign debt
In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis, policy makers in the EU have begun dis-
cussing new rules to weaken the sovereign-bank nexus. One proposal being discussed is
to limit the exposure of banks to domestic sovereign debt through various measures like
ceilings or higher capital requirements on domestic sovereign exposure.96 The intention of
this proposal is to reduce the risk of a vicious cycle, in which problems of sovereign debt
sustainability lead to losses for banks, which in turn affects output and hence government
revenues negatively, and hence makes the sovereign debt burden even more unsustainable.
Yet, looking at this proposal through the lens of this model, such a reform may have un-
intended consequences: Making banks less exposed to domestic sovereign, ceteris paribus,
debt reduces the cost of default for the domestic economy. This has two implications.
First, default will be more attractive ex post, given the same amount of external debt.
Changing the rules from one day to the other may hence trigger sovereign defaults that
would otherwise not have occurred. Second, the anticipation of lower default by interna-
tional lenders ex ante costs means that governments will not be able to borrow as much
as before. Hence, the benefits derived from international lending will shrink.97
96See for example “Sovereign debt rule changes threaten EU bank finances”, Financial Times, 8.6.2016
97In the policy discussion it is sometimes argued that the reduced demand for government bonds by
domestic banks may increase the interest rates of sovereign bonds as an unintended side effect. Yet
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Moment Baseline ψ-20%
E(B¯/Y ) Total debt to GDP ratio 43% 29%
E(BX/Y ) Foreign debt to GDP ratio 18% 9%
E(BX/B¯) Share of domestic debt 60% 69%
E(spread) Sovereign spread 0.47% 0.65%
E(Rep) Default frequency 0.44% 0.62%
Table 3: Effect of reduction of exposure
To illustrate these consequences, I analyze the effects of a reduction of the banks
exposure to sovereign debt ψ by 20%.98 Table 399 shows the long run effects of this
regulatory change: As as the banks exposure is reduced by 20%, the total debt to GDP
ratio drops by one third and the foreign debt ratio by half. This loss of foreign debt
capacity comes at a utility cost of about 0.9% in consumption equivalent.
The short run effect is equally stark: Assume the country finds itself at the non-
stochastic risk adjusted steady state of the baseline economy at the end of period t.
Assume furthermore that between periods t and t+ 1 ψ is changed unexpectedly, but the
balance sheet of the bank is not yet affected. Then there is a 10% probability that TFP
turns out so bad that the government will default at the beginning of t+ 1 because it can
only partially roll over its outstanding foreign debt and prefers default to the high taxes
otherwise needed. If we assume instead that the change in the regulation is affecting also
the current balance sheet between the periods100, the effect is even more striking: As the
government wakes up the next morning, not only does it realize that it can’t roll over its
debt, but also that its banks are less exposed. It will default wit 86% probability. While
these sudden change scenarios are arguably too stylized, it exemplifies the point that if
the default probability along the transition to the lower ψ is to be contained, a gradual
implementation of the reform is to be recommended.101
7 Conclusion
Motivated by the recent European sovereign debt crisis, this paper proposes a quantitative
model of opportunistic sovereign default with endogenous costs of default. In particular, it
this argument is simply based on lower demand, while the argument I make here is based on the lower
commitment value. In fact the model abstracts from the demand argument altogether: In the model
domestic borrowing by the government does not add any resources to the economy and taxation is lump
sum, so lower domestic demand per se is irrelevant. Domestic borrowing is useful only because it provides
the commitment to borrow externally.
98This number is arbitrary, as there is no concrete final proposal yet.
99Unlike in the previous table, these moments are unconditional.
100Assume that 0.2% of the government debt on the domestic bank’s balance sheet is exchanged with
the household for a claim of equal amount.
101It seems likely that a model with long term debt would predict even starker consequences.
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aims at endogenizing two types of default costs: the lack of access to international capital
markets and output costs. With this objective, I develop a model of sovereign debt
with international lenders and an explicitly modeled domestic economy, which consists
of households, banks and firms. Savings are intermediated from households to firms by
banks. Since there is a friction in the intermediation process, which makes bank equity
both necessary and scarce, the economy never reaches its optimal level of investment. This
fact generates a strong incentive for the government to borrow on international markets.
While the government might default on this debt ex post, the fact that domestic banks
are also exposed to sovereign debt generates commitment: If the government chooses to
default, banks suffer losses, which leads to a period of credit shortage. This translates into
a reduced capital stock and output losses. Furthermore, while the financial crisis lasts,
the domestic return on investment drops which discourages the government to borrow
at the constant world interest rate. Hence default is followed not only by a period of
depressed output, but also by a period during which the government issues no new bonds.
These two consequences of default arise endogenously and make some amount of debt
sustainable.
Conceptually, this paper therefore contributes to the existing literature in three ways.
First, it introduces the capital shortage motive for borrowing into the sovereign debt
literature. Second, it proposes a new mechanism to explain the output costs of default,
which is in line with recent experiences with the sovereign bank nexus. Third, it proposes
a novel explanation for why we observe temporary breakdowns of international borrowing
in the aftermath of default and for how long this period lasts, which is a question that
has not been addressed by this literature before.
Quantitatively I show that the model calibrated to other moments predicts empirically
plausible magnitudes of the consequences of default: Both the drop in output, investment
and credit as well as the duration of market shutdown are roughly in line with the data.
This model furthermore offers insights that are relevant for a current policy debate on
reducing banks exposure to domestic sovereign debt. I show that any such policy not only
makes banks more resilient against sovereign debt crisis, which would be desirable per se.
It also reduces the sustainability of sovereign debt, which is clearly undesirable, at least in
the context of the model. Furthermore this model also contributes an explanation to why
some countries like the US, Japan, or Italy seem to be able to sustain debt to GDP ratios
that are higher than what other countries can sustain. It suggests that countries which
have a higher share of domestically held debt and which have more leveraged financial
sectors would suffer more in case of default and are hence less likely to renege on their
obligations. The same argument may apply over time: The development of leveraged
financial sectors across the developed world may explain the increase of debt to GDP
ratios in the post war period.
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Appendices
Appendix A: The optimization problem of the government
BeX the vector of private sector variablesX = [C,L,D′, K ′H , K ′B, B′B, B′X , K ′F , r, q, R′,W, λ1, λ2, λ3, λH ].
Then the government’s problem, after substituting out some variables (HH value func-
tion, tomorrow’s labor supply and dividend), expressing the foreign bond demand as a
complementarity constraint and dropping a few redundant indices, is:
VG(Ω) = maxRep,T,B¯′,X
C1−γ
1− γ + χ
L1+ν
1 + ν + βE [V
′
G]
s.t.
Government budget constraint
qB¯′ + T = B¯Rep+G
BF ≥ 0
Bank FOCs
0 = rC−γ − βE [V ′B e]− λ1E
[
C ′−γ
]
+ λ2r
0 = −qC−γ + βE [Rep′V ′B e] + λ1E
[
Rep′C ′−γ
]
θ − λ2q + λ3q(1− ψ)
0 = −C−γ + βR′E [V ′B e] + λ1R′E
[
C ′−γ
]
θ − λ2 − λ3ψ
0 = min
{
E [uc(C)θ(Rep′B′B +R′K ′B)]− E
[
C ′−γD′
]
, λ1
}
0 = min {η (RKB +RepBB −D)− qB′B −K ′B + rD′ , λ2}
qB′B = (qB′B +K ′B)ψ
Household FOCs
C−γ = β/rE
[
C ′−γ
]
C−γ = βR/(1 + ξ)E
[
C ′−γ
]
+ λh
0 = min {λh , K ′H}
C−γW = χLν
Firm FOC
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R′ = E
[(
C ′−γω′
) 1−α
ν+α+1 αK ′α−1F [(1− α)K ′αF /χ]
1−α
ν+α
]
/E [C ′γ] + (1− δ)
W =
[
ω(1− α)KαFL−α
]
Foreign lenders’ bond demand
0 = min {q − E [Rep] q¯ , BX}
Market clearing
B¯ = BB +BX
KF = KB +KH
Resource constraint
C +K ′B +K ′H(1 + ξ) +B′Bq = B¯′q + ωKF αL1−α + (1− δ)KF − B¯ +BB −G
Notice that in this problem, the government not only needs to form expectations
over tomorrows value function V ′G, but also over the marginal utility of consumption
uc(C ′, L′) = C ′−γ, the marginal value of bank equity V ′B e = C ′−γ + ηλ′2 , the repayment
choice Rep′ and products thereof.
Appendix B: Computation
State space reduction:
The state space of the model described above is 7 dimensional Ω =
[
ω, B¯,KH , D,BB, KB, R
]
.
To reduce the computational burden it us helpful to reduce its dimensionality. This can
be done by anticipating the default decision. In the following I will explain this trick,
which is an application of the method explained in Thaler (2016), in two steps.
First assume that for a given state Ω we know the default optimal decision. In that
case, we can compute cash-at-hand (or pre-dividend equity) of the bank after debt repay-
ment directly from the information contained in Ω:
E ≡ RKB +RepBB −D
Cash-at-hand for the household, after debt repayment (but before receiving the proceed-
ings of new debt issuance) is given by the difference of the total resources of the economy
minus bank equity:
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W = ω (KB +KH)α L1−α + (1− δ) (KB +KH)−Rep(B¯ −BB)− E
This variable contains the non-predetermined choice L though.102 Therefore, we need to
keep track separately of
KF = KB +KH
and
BX = B¯ −BB
Once we know the three variables [E,BX , KF ], plus the exogenous state ω, we have suffi-
cient information to solve the governments problem for all variables other than Rep, that
is we can find (T, B¯′, X).103 Call this alternative “state vector”
[
ω, Ω˜
]
= [ω, [E,KF , BX ]].
Assume we solve the governments problem across this alternate state vector.
But what about the repayment decision, which after all depends on all the 7 state
variables in Ω? This bring us to step two. Whenever we solve for (T, B¯′, X) given
the state
[
ω, Ω˜
]
, we determine the values of all the endogenous elements in Ω. That
means, we can determine the value of tomorrow’s endogenous alternative state condi-
tional on repayment: Ω˜′|Rep′. Furthermore assume that for each (B¯,KH , D,BB, KB, R)
there exists a threshold level of the exogenous shock ω¯, below which default is optimal
and above which repayment is optimal. (This assumption is verified ex post.) Once
we know this threshold value ω¯, we can determine tomorrow’s endogenous state as a
function of the exogenous state: Ω˜′(ω′) = [E ′(ω′), B′X , K ′F ]. This is all we need to
know in order to compute the expectations over future variables, given we have approx-
imated them across the state
[
ω, Ω˜
]
. Finally, we need to ensure that we picked the
right ω¯. We know that at ω¯ the government must be indifferent between default and
repayment, i.e. V
(
ω¯, Ω˜|Rep′ = 1
)
=V
(
ω¯, Ω˜|Rep′ = 0
)
. To find this threshold level, we
therefore augment the above optimization problem by the variable ω¯ and the condition
V
(
ω¯, Ω˜|Rep′ = 1
)
=V
(
ω¯, Ω˜|Rep′ = 0
)
. I call this trick “anticipation of future choices”
because what we essentially do here is to explicitly anticipate one of the choices that the
government has to make tomorrow and incorporate it into todays problem - with the aim
of being able to reduce the state space.
This means, that by complicating the optimization problem only slightly (by adding
one equation and one variable), we are able to reduce the computationally necessary state
space from 7D to 4D104. This brings about a massive reduction in computation time.
102If L is constant it is enough to know E and W . Furthermore, given separable utility, one could apply
the trick that I apply to the repayment decision also to L. Then, even with variable labor, knowing E,
W and ω is sufficient.
103 To see this note that the state variables only appear in the above problem in these combinations.
104As mentioned in the main text, a reduction to 5D is feasible without this trick, and a further reduction
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Algorithm:
Apart from the way to deal with the state space and to evaluate integrals (expectations),
the time iteration algorithm I use is a standard one loop algorithm, commonly used in
the sovereign default literature.
1. Define a Cartesian grid over the 4D alternative state vector. Instead of using[ω,E,KF , BX ]
I rotate the grid so as to reduce the inclusion of regions of the state space into
the grid, which are never visited along the equilibrium path. In particular I use[
ω, W˜ , E/W˜ ,KF − (ς0 + ς1W )
]
where W˜ = (KB +KH)α + (1 − δ) (KB +KH) −
Rep(B¯−BB) and ς0 + ς1W˜ is the result of a regression of KF on W˜ . I use (8,10,8,5)
points.
2. Make an initial guesses for the functions uc(C), λ2 and VG across the points of this
grid.
3. From these guesses and this grid, construct a cubic spline interpolant for each of
the 3 functions. I use not-a-knot end conditions.
4. For each of the points on the grid, solve the optimization problem described in ap-
pendix A, augmented by the additional state ω¯ and the additional equation discussed
above.
5. Check the difference between the previous guess and the solutions at the grid points
obtained. If they are very similar stop. Else update the initial guess and return to
point 3.
The whole code is written in MATLAB. To solve the nonlinear optimization problem at
each of the grid points at step 4 of the algorithm, I use the solver KNITRO, which is able
to solve smooth complementarity problems fast and reliably. To improve the performance
of the solver, I supply analytical first derivatives, which are largely computed and coded
automatically using MATLAB’s symbolic toolbox. Furthermore the code is executed in
parallel.
Despite the fact that the policy functions exhibit minor kinks but are approximated
by smooth functions, the precision of the result is satisfactory: The algorithm converges
successfully up to an average (across the grid) absolute change of the forward looking
variables of 0.0001%. Across a very long simulation the mean absolute error of the forward
looking variables (also known as Euler Error, see Judd (1998)) is around 0.05%.
to 3D is feasible by applying the same trick o the labor decision.
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Chapter III
Reducing the computationally
necessary state space by anticipating
future choices
1 Introduction
Assume you want to find a recursive solution to a dynamic model with global solution
methods. This dynamic model is given by the following equation system105:
f1 (xt−1, xt, zt, et, Et [f2 (zt+1, et+1)]) = 0 (1)
where x is a vector of n endogenous state variables, z is a vector of o forward-looking
endogenous variables106 and e is a vector of p exogenous state variables. A stationary
equilibrium in this model is given by a set of policy functions x(xt−1, et) : Rn × Rp→Rn
and z(xt−1, et) : Rn × Rp→Ro that solve system (1).
To approximate this solution with global methods, for example with policy function
iteration, parametrized expectations or collocation, one typically specifies a grid over the
state variables and solves the equation system either sequentially or simultaneously at all
grid points. The computational cost involved increases exponentially in the number of
state variables, a problem known as the curse of dimensionality. Researchers therefore
typically try to use the smallest computationally necessary state space possible. Let me
briefly discuss two well known strategies to reduce the state space before I come to the
method I propose, which is a generalization of the two more common approaches.
Manipulation 1: The most obvious trick is to eliminate redundant endogenous state
variables. That is assume the system (1) can be rewritten as
f3 (wt−1, xt, zt, et, Et [f2 (zt+1, et+1)]) = 0 (2)
g1(xt) = wt
105Notice that the method is also applicable to constrained maximization problems and value function
iteration. I restrict the exposition to an equation system merely because it eases exposition.
106including purely contemporaneous variables
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where g1(x) : Rn→Rm with n > m. I.e. g1(xt−1) is a function that summarizes the
relevant state. f3 is an arbitrary function. The solution of this manipulated system
(x, z) (wt−1, et) : Rm × Rp→Rn × Ro depends on less endogenous state variables and
hence requires less computation time to solve for.
Manipulation 2: Another well known trick, by which the number of endogenous
states can sometimes be reduced is to combine exogenous states and endogenous states
in a new summary state variable. This is possible if we can rewrite (1) as
f4 (wt, xt, zt, et, Et [f5 (zt+1, et+1, wt+1)]) = 0 (3)
g2 (xt, et+1) = wt+1
where g2(x, e) : Rn × Rp→Rm with n > m. As before g2(xt, et+1) is a function that
summarizes the computationally necessary state. f4 and f5 are arbitrary functions. Again,
the solution of this manipulated system (x, z) (wt, et) : Rm × Rp→Rn × Ro depends on
less endogenous state variables and hence requires less computation time to solve for.
Manipulation 3: This trick can be generalized to allow for summary state variables
which also include forward looking variables. Partition zt into two parts, z1,t and z2,t of
length o1 and o2, i.e. zt = [z1,t, z2,t]. Assume we can rewrite system (1) as
f5 (wt, xt, z2,t, et, Et [f6 (z1,t+1, z2,t+1, et+1, wt+1)]) = 0
g3 (xt, z1,t+1, et+1) = wt+1 (4)
h1 (xt, Et [h2 (z1,t+1, et+1)]) = 0
where g3(x, z, e) : Rn × Ro1 × Rp→Rm with n > m. Again g3(xt, z1,t+1, et+1) is a
function that summarizes the computationally necessary state. Note that this function
now also depends on forward-looking endogenous variables. f5, f6, h1 and h1 are ar-
bitrary functions. The solution of this manipulated system is given by three functions
x(wt, et) : Rm × Rp→Rn , z2(wt, et) : Rm × Rp→Ro and z1(wt−1, et−1) : Rm × Rp→F
where F is the function space of all functions F : Rp → R. Again this solution depends
on less endogenous state variables and hence is likely to require less computation time
to solve for. Yet notice that while (x, z2) (wt, et) maps from a hypercube of reals (the
state space) to a hypercube of reals, z1(wt, et) maps from the same hypercube of reals to
a function space. This function essentially tells us tomorrows choice of z1 conditional on
tomorrows exogenous states.
Instead of explaining the idea any further at this abstract level, let us turn to an
simple concrete example and consider the three proposed manipulations in turn.
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2 Example: A neoclassical growth model
Consider a version of the neoclassical growth model with capital with full depreciation,
labor and a storage technology. The household maximizes:
V = maxct,st,kt,lt u(ct)− v(lt) + βE(V ′)
s.t.
ct + st + kt = ltWt +Rtkt−1 +Rsst−1
where c, s, k, l, W , R, Rs and denote consumption, safe assets, capital, labor, the
wage, the return on capital and the return on the safe asset respectively. t indicates the
period in which a variable is determined.
The firm has a Cobb-Douglas production technology with variable capital utilization
q and maximizes its profits:
maxlt,kd,t yt −Wtlt −Rtkd,t
s.t.
yt = Atf(kd,t, qt)kαd,tl1−αt
where TFP At follows a stochastic AR(1) process.107
The first order conditions of the two agents problems together with the market clearing
conditions (kt−1 = kd,t) gives rise to a system of equilibrium conditions, which can further
be simplified by substituting out Rt and Wt108
uc(ct) = βE
[
At
{
f(kt, qt+1)αkα−1t + fk(kt, qt+1)kαt
}
l1−αt+1 uc(ct+1)
]
uc(ct) = βRsE [uc(ct+1)] (5)
ct + st + kt = Atf(kt−1, qt)kαt−1l1−αt +Rsst−1
vl(lt) = uc(ct)Atf(kt−1, zt)(1− α)kαt−1l−αt
fz(kt−1, qt) = 0
This equation system implicitly defines the equilibrium of this baseline economy. Notice
how this system resembles the generic system (1): In this case the exogenous state is
given by e = A and the endogenous state by x = [k, s]. Furthermore the system features
107This model is constructed to be as simple as possible yet to allow to illustrate all types of state space
reduction. While this toy model serves as an example only, one can think of this model as a small open
economy where the safe asset represents international lending.
108One could reduce the system further by substituting c but i refrain from doing so here to keep the
equations shorter.
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3 forward looking variables z = [l, c, q]. A stationary equilibrium in this baseline economy
is given by 5 policy functions [c, s, l, k, q] (kt−1, st−1, At) that satisfy system (5).
I will now illustrate the 3 different ways to reduce the state space using simplified
versions of this example.
Case 1 To illustrate the easiest way to reduce the state space consider first a simplified
version of the baseline model where At = 1 , lt = 1 and f = 1, that is a deterministic
version of the model without labor and without utilization. In that case we can reduce
the number of states by summarizing s and k by cash-at-hand w.
wt = g1(st, kt) = αkαt +Rsst
The state vector is now given by wt−1 instead of by (st−1, kt−1). This is a manipulation of
the type described by equation system (2). This trick is well known and discussed in great
analytical depth in the Kubler and Schmedders (2003), where they define the concept of
a a wealth recursive equilibrium for portfolio choice models.
Case 2 Next consider that we only fix labor lt = 1 and utilization f = 1 but keep the
TFP shock At. In that case we can again reduce the number of states by summarizing A,
s and k by cash-at-hand w.
wt = g2(Atst−1, kt−1) = αAtkαt−1 +Rsst−1
The state vector is now given by by (At, wt) instead of by (At, st−1, kt−1). This is a
manipulation of the type described by equation system (3).
Case 2b To build intuition for the third type of manipulation, let us first consider
another more complicated case of the second type of manipulation. Consider the baseline
model but without labor lt = 1. In this case cash at-hand is given by
wt = g2′(Atst−1, kt−1, qt) = Atf(kt−1, qt)kαt−1 +Rsst−1
This expression contains one variable, qt, which is not predetermined, hence the trick
applied in case 2 does not apply directly. Yet, if the last equation of system (5) can be
solved analytically for qt, yielding qt = q(kt−1), we can use it to substitute qt in the whole
system.
uc(ct) = βE
[
At
{
f (kt, q(kt))αkα−1t + fk (kt, q(kt)) kαt
}
1− αuc(ct+1)
]
uc(ct) = βRsE [uc(ct+1)] (6)
ct + st + kt = Atf (kt−1, q(kt−1)) kαt−1 +Rsst−1
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Consider this reduced system to as the initial system (1). A solution to this system
consists of 3 functions [c, s, k] (At, st−1, kt−1). Thanks to the elimination of qt, cash-at-
hand now does not depend on forward looking variables any more:
wt = g2′′(At, st−1, kt−1) = Atf(kt−1, q(kt−1))kαt−1 +Rsst−1
We can use this definition to rewrite system (6) using a smaller state space (At, wt).
uc(ct) = βE
[
At
{
f (kt, q(kt))αkα−1t + fk (kt, q(kt)) kαt
}
1− αuc(ct+1)
]
uc(ct) = βRsE [uc(ct+1)] (7)
ct + st + kt = wt
At+1f(kt, q(kt))kαt +Rsst = wt+1
This manipulation results in a system of the generic form described by system (3). Yet
notice: while in case 2 we just collected predetermined state variables, this time we had
to first eliminate one forward looking variable by replacing qt+1 with the inverse of the
relevant FOC. Hence we have reduced the set of endogenous variables by “anticipating a
future choice” before we could reduce the state space. This more involved manipulation is
used for example in Khan et al. (2014). They set up a model of heterogeneous firms, which
employ labor and capital and finance the latter partially through borrowing and reduce
the firms state space by one dimension by merging capital and borrowing to cash-a-hand,
after substituting out the firms labor choice. To my k
Conceptually, the manipulation I propose and explain in case 3 is an extension of this
manipulation for the case when reducing the set of variables is not analytically feasible.109
To my knowledge this note is the first to explore this extension systematically, even though
it appears not unlikely to have been used by researchers before.
Case 3 Finally let us consider a manipulation of the type described by equation system
(4). For this purpose consider the model with labor and TFP but without utilization
(f = 1). In this case cash at hand is given by
wt = g3(Atst−1, kt−1, lt) = Atkαt−1l1−αt +Rsst−1 (8)
109In fact, adding qt back as a variable and q(kt) = qt+1 as an additional equation to system (7) we
arrive at an equation system that resembles system (4). This system can be directly derived from system
(5) without changing the set of variables, just as the generic system (1) can be derived from the generic
system (4).
Yet, using the more generally applicable but also more complicated computational approach I discuss
in case 3 instead of the one discussed in case 2b is likely to be computationally inefficient. Of course
the manipulation discussed in case 2b might be feasible, because fz(qt, kt−1) = 0 might not be solvable
analytically for qt. In that case applying the method from case 3 becomes the only alternative. Note that
this instead of adding I equations as in the example with labor, one would only need to add 1 equation,
because f is independent of A.
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This expression contains lt, which is not predetermined. Hence we can not apply the same
trick as in case 2 in a straightforward fashion. Furthermore we can not derive a closed
form solution for lt as a function of exogenous or predetermined variables from system
(5), as we were able to for qt in case 2b, because the labor supply equation contains the
unknown function c(k, s, A). Hence the trick form case 2b doesn’t apply. Yet it is still
possible to reduce the state space using cash-at-hand wt by anticipating the choice lt using
an implicit function for lt (instead of an explicit function as in case 2b for qt).
We start from the initial system, which resembles the generic system (1)
uc(ct) = βE
[
At
{
αkα−1t
}
l1−αt+1 uc(ct+1)
]
uc(ct) = βRsE [uc(ct+1)] (9)
ct + st + kt = Atkαt−1l1−αt +Rsst−1
vl(lt) = uc(ct)At(1− α)kαt−1l−αt
A solution to this system is a function [c, s, l, k] (kt−1, st−1, At) : R3→R4. We manipu-
late this system by shifting the labor equation one period forward and using the definition
of cash at hand (8):
uc(ct) = βE
[
At
{
αkα−1t
}
l1−αt+1 uc(ct+1)
]
uc(ct) = βRsE [uc(ct+1)] (10)
ct + st + kt = wt
vl(lt+1) = uc(ct+1)At+1(1− α)kαt l−αt+1
wt+1 = At+1kαt l1−αt+1 +Rsst
This system now resembles the generic system (4) and depends on no state variables
other than wt and At. A solution to this system consists of 2 elements: First, a policy
function [c, s, k] (wt, At) : R2→R1 that describes the contemporaneous choice of c, s and
k. Second, a function l(wt, At) : R2→F where F is the function space of all functions
F : R → R. This function l describes, for a given state of the world today, the labor
choice that pertains in the next period conditional on the realization of the exogenous
state next period.
An intuitive way to think about this representation of the original problem is to split
each period in 2 sub-periods: in sub-period 1 agents produce and in sub-period 2 they
spend their income. Instead of solving for sub-period 1 and 2 of period t simultaneously
we solve for sub-period 2 of period t and sub-period 1 of period t+1 simultaneously.110
110Unlike the solution to the original problem, the solution to the modified problem does not provide
us with a policy function of current labor as a function of the current state. This is natural since we
have defined the state to be “post labor choice”. Furthermore this does not reduce the usefulness of the
solution. Simulations including the path for labor for example are still possible: Starting at a given state
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The unusual part about this solution is the function l. Next I will explain how this
solution can be computed using policy function iteration.111 But first let me recapitulate
how to find the solution to standard representation of the problem with the bigger state
space (system (9)).
With policy function iteration we typically approximate the forward looking variables
by some approximating function (e.g. interpolation) over the state space. In our case
that means we might replace ct+1 by the approximating function c˜(kt−1, st−1, At) and
lt+1 by l˜(kt−1, st−1, At). Furthermore we usually approximate expectations with quadra-
ture methods. That means we replace the expectations of variable x, E [xt+1(At+1)], by∑I
i=1 piix(Ai) =
∑I
i=1 piixi where I is the number of grid points for the exogenous state A
and pii are the corresponding weights. Let us write the equation system (9) using these
approximations explicitly:
uc(ct) = β
I∑
i=1
[
pii
{
Aiαk
α−1
t l˜(kt−1, st−1, At)1−α
}
ktuc(c˜(kt, st, At+1))
]
uc(ct) = βRs
I∑
i=1
[piiuc(c˜(kt, st, At+1))]
ct + st + kt = Atkαt−1l1−αt +Rsst−1
vl(lt) = uc(ct)
{
At(1− α)kαt−1l−αt
}
Traditional policy function iteration would now start with some guesses for the func-
tions c˜ and l˜ and the solve this system for each grid point on a grid for [kt−1, st−1, At]. Then
the guesses would be updated. One would iterate over the last two steps till convergence.
To solve the alternative representation of the problem given by system (10) we plug
in cash-at-hand wt and use it as a state instead of [kt−1, st−1]. Furthermore, instead of
defining an approximating function l˜ we “anticipate” the labor choice lt+1 by adding the
labor optimality condition for tomorrow (and dropping the labor optimality condition for
today). Since we need to know the labor supply for each state tomorrow we have to add
I such equations. Notice that these I equations together approximate the function to
defined by w0 and A0 the labor policy functions gives us todays choices of k0, c0 and s0 and tomorrows
labor conditional on all possible values of A1. Then we iterate forward, draw a new A1, use this A1 to
pick the relevant l1 and combine A1, l1, s0 and k0 to get w1.
111See below for the applicability of this state space reduction method to other global solution methods.
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which l(wt, At) maps.
uc(ct) = β
I∑
i=1
[
pii
{
Aiαk
α−1
t l
1−α
i
}
ktuc(c˜(wi, Ai))
]
uc(ct) = βRs
I∑
i=1
[piiuc(c˜(wi, Ai))]
ct + st + kt = wt (11)
vl(l1) = uc(c˜(w1, A1))
{
A1(1− α)kαt l−α1
}
...
vl(lI) = uc(c˜(wI , AI))
{
AI(1− α)kαt l−αI
}
where wi = Aikαt l1−αi + Rsst. With this system we proceed as before: We start with a
guess for c˜, solve the system at each grid point, update c˜ and iterate to convergence.
This new equation system has 3 + I equations and 3 + I variables (kt, st, ct, l1, . . . , lI).
Due to the larger number of variables, solving this system at each grid point may be
somewhat more time consuming, say X times more time consuming than solving the
original equation system with 4 equations and 4 variables. Yet we have to solve the new
system for each point on a 2D grid, while the original system had to be solved for each
point on a 3D grid. That means that each time iteration will take roughly J times longer
with the original method, if J is the number of grid points for the endogenous variables.
With a efficient solver (e.g. using analytical derivatives) and with a fine enough grid for
the endogenous variables but a coarse enough grid for the exogenous variables, it is very
likely that X  J , hence that the modified problem is much faster to solve.
3 Applicability of the method
Let me conclude with a few remarks about the scope of applicability of this method.
Types of models
First, notice that this method can of course be use to reduce the number of states by
even more than one as in the above example. For example consider a two country version
of our model. In that case we could reduce the state space from 4 endogenous variables
to 2 endogenous variables. Or consider a version of the model with human capital. In
that case we could reduce the state space from 3 endogenous variables to 1 endogenous
variables.
While these models are useful as an example, the method is applicable to more com-
plicated and more interesting macroeconomic models as well. In a paper on sovereign
default with 2 agents and 5 assets Thaler (2016) I apply this method to anticipate the
default threshold, which allows me to reduce the state space from 7 to 4 dimensions.
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While not limited to this class of models, these examples show that a natural class of
models, for which this method is useful are models featuring portfolio selection.
Yet this method is not universally applicable. In particular the method requires that
one can summarize the states in a convenient form such that the resulting system features
the endogenous variables that enter the summary variable only with time indexes higher
that the time index with which they enter the summary variable. In the example above the
endogenous variables entering wt are lt, st−1 and kt−1. Note that none of these variables
appear (with that index or a lower index) in system (11). It is easy to find examples that
violate this assumption. For example assume a non-separable utility function. Then lt
would appear on the LHS of the two Euler equations in system (11) in uc(ct, lt). Knowing
cash-at-hand would then not be sufficient any more to describe the relevant state of the
economy. One could of course add l as a state variable, but this would only make sense
if the summary variable eliminated more than 1 state (as in the extension with human
capital). Another example that makes he method inapplicable are capital adjustment cost
φ (kt/kt−1) . They would show up on the LHS of the budget constraint. It would hence
not be possible anymore to eliminate all references to kt−1 by plugging in wt.
Types of solution methods and computational costs and benefits
Policy or Value function iteration We have seen how this method can be applied
in a policy function iteration context. It is straight forward to apply the same method to
value function iteration problems.
For these algorithms the additional computational cost of the reduction of the state
space increases in the number of exogenous variables and the number of grid points for
each exogenous variable. The benefits of the reduced state space increase with the in the
number of endogenous variables that can be summarized and the number of grid points
for each endogenous variable.
For the two country version of our example model the solution algorithm would speed
up due to the reduction of the number of endogenous states from 4 to 2. Yet this would
come at the cost of I (2I) extra equations assuming global (regional) TFP shocks. In the
default model Thaler (2016) the state space reduction from 7 to 4 dimensions comes at
the cost of only 1 additional equation.
Collocation or weighted residuals The same method can be applied in a straight-
forward way when using collocation or weighted residuals methods. The computational
costs and benefits should be similar as above.
Parametrized expectations Finally, the method can also be adapted for parametrized
expectations algorithms. Given certain parametrized expectations E1(wt, At) one first
solves:
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uc(ct) = βE1(wt, At)
uc(ct) = βRsE2(wt, At) (12)
ct + st + kt = wt
vl(lt) = uc(ct)At(1− α)kαt−1l−αt
This yields policy functions (c, l, k, s)(w,A). Next one simulates the economy. Finally
one updates the parametrized expectations E1(wt, At) and restarts with step 1. In the
simulation step one then has to solve after each period for the next period state by solving
the equation
Atk
α
t−1l(wt, At)1−α +Rsst−1 = wt
Whether the method still speeds up the process now depends on the cost of solving
this equation and the length of the simulation.
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